all the business and affairs of life, that (as is common in the ufe of many words,) from the frequency of its application, it has appropriated to itself the name of Evidence, which is a general term, equally applicable to the principles of other kinds of truth befides Hiftorical. THIS General Principle is, however, very different in its nature and conftitution from Mathematical, Phyfical, and other Axioms, as it is of much larger operation and extent; and, accordingly, the Method of REASONING from it, in all particular inftances, is very different. Axioms, logically fpeaking, are the Causes of truth producing it in the minds of all who can apply them in reafoning; without respect to perfons, times, and places. They are, therefore, general Laws poffeffed of a certain ftandard, which is fixed and determined in itself, by which they impart the fame degree of certainty and conviction in all the cases to which they are applied, namely that which they poffefs themselves. Tefti mony mony, on the other hand, is not properly the Caufe of truth: it is only the Medium, however indifpenfable, through which truths already deduced from other Caufes are conveyed from one mind to another: it is only the Inftrument by which actual truths are converted into hiftorical; which Medium or Inftrument has an immediate connection with, and dependency upon, particular perfons, times and places, by which their power and operation are perpetually varied, become ftronger or weaker, more contracted or more enlarged. It is not, therefore, a general Law poffeffing one common rule or ftandard, by which it imparts, in all cafes, the same degree of certainty and conviction. Historical learning is, therefore, the reverse of philofophical. Philofophy confifts in tracing Generals, Hiftory in pursuing Individuals: And the Teftimony on which it is founded varies with the Circumftances, in every particular inftance to which it is applied. Hiftorical REASONING does not Hiftoria proprie individuorum eft, quæ bircumfcribuntur loco et tempore. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. I. conclude conclude by reducing particulars under general propofitions by Syllogifm or Superinduction. It has a more tedious and laborious process; defcending to the investigation of every particular historical fact through all the windings of Testimony, either by tracing it up to its proper time, place, and the perfons of its primitive witneffes, or by bringing it down from thence; and confifting in a minute examination of particular witnesses, in a candid estimate of collateral proofs, and in a conclufion formed upon a full induction and fair valuation of the whole." The knowledge, which we derive through the channel of Hiftory, is more various and extenfive, more interesting and important, than, perhaps, the whole ftock of our other Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence which infallibly determines the Understanding, and producés certain Knowledge, the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of Probability, and fee how they make more or lefs for or against any Propofition, before it affents to, or diffents from it, and, upon a due Balancing the Whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm Affent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one Side or the other. Locke Hum. Und. B. iv. c. xv. §. 5. : information and the investigation of historical facts, which must be conducted by a particular and separate procefs, constitutes a very large proportion of the most useful labours, and valuable collections, of learned men. History involves in its compofition many different and diftinct objects, and has many different ends in view. In the execution, it receives from the pen of the historian many graces and embellishments, and, from the interest which man always takes in the concerns of man, it becomes a fpecies of writing the most entertaining to the mind, and the most pleafing to the imagination. Divested, however, of these adventitious confiderations, and logically viewed, it is the investigation of Facts through the channel of Testimony. And the general Rule by which this investigation is conducted, in bringing them down from the time of their actual existence, is, firft, To enquire whether the Senfes of the primitive witnesses were duly informed of the facts related, and they themselves competent to judge of them: fecondly, To examine whether these wit neffes neffes were boneft and faithful relators of thefe facts to others: thirdly, as teftimony, from the nature and neceffity of things, is often committed to written record, To trace the purity and authenticity of that record through all the perfons, times, and places, through which it has defcended : laftly, To strengthen and corroborate the whole conclufion, by the examination and adduction of collateral teftimonies. In which work of various learning, extensive enquiry, and attentive investigation, Reason will, I fear, derive little help from Mood and Figure.* In the Testimony of others, is to be confidered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witneffes. 4. The Defign of the Author, where it is a Teftimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Confiftency of the Parts and Circumftances of the Relation. 6. Contrary Teftimonies. Locke Hum. Und. B. iv. c. xv. §. 4. • But, however it be in Knowledge, I think I may truly fay, it is of far less, or no Use at all in Probabilities. For the Affent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due Weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumftances on both Sides, nothing is fo unfit to affift the Mind in that, as Syllogifm; which running away with one affumed Probability, or one topical Argument, pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of Sight P 2 |