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philosophical distinction of the three provinces, according to the different nature and direction which Truth assumes in each. In the Theoretic province, he represents it as originating with its Subject," as Standing independent, and terminating in itsef v In the Practic, it originates in the Mind of the agent, joins itself to right Appetite with intention which it mixes and cooperates, and has in

Αμφοτέρων δη των νοητικών μορίων ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ το έργον. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2. .

• Εν ή η αρχή της κινήσεως και σάσεως εν αυτη, δηλον ότι ούτε πρακτική εσιν ούτε ποιητική. Αriftot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. Ι.

• Της δε θεωρητικής διανοίας, και μη πρακτικής, μηδε σοιήτικής, το εύ και κακώς, ταληθές έσι και ψευδG" τετο γάρ έσι παντός διανοητικά έργον. Αriftot. Eth. NiCom. lib. Vi, cap. Ι.

1 Τών δε πρακτικών, εν τω πράττοντι η προαίρεσις" το αυτό γαρ το πρακτών και τροπιρετόν. Αriftot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. Ι. . * Του δε πρακτικού και διανοητικά, η αλήθεια ομολόγως έχουσα τη ορέξει τη ορθή. τράξεως μεν εν αρχή, τροαίρεσις, όθεν η κίνησις, αλλ' έχ και ένεκα. προαιρέσεως δε, όρεξις και λόγος και ένεκά τινος· διό ούτ' άνευ να και διανοίας, έτ' άνευ ηθικής έσιν έξεως ή προαίρεσις. ευπραξία γαρ και το εναντίον εν σραξα άνευ διανοίας και ήθους εκ έςι. διάνοια δ' αυτή έθεν κινεί, αλλ' η ένεκά τε, και πρακτική. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 1. .


prospect a moral end beyond itself: In the Poetic, it originates in the more inventive Mind of the artist, and, through the instrumentality of different means, intends and accomplishes a still farther end,' which is properly termed Effect.

· This distinction of the Peripatetic, however philosophical, may be in some respects too metaphysical and refined : and, as all the parts of knowledge, which do not belong to the Practic and Poetic Provinces, must be included in the Theoretic, (for there are only three,) he has made the outline of that not sufficiently comprehensive. The object of Theoretical learning is not confined to mere speculative truth, which terminates in itself alone : it extends, as we have seen, to the nature and properties of external things,

* Των μεν γαρ ποιητικών εν τω ποιώνται η αρχή, ή νους ésiv, ñ réxun, ñ dúvapís tis. Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. I.

1 Αύτη γαρ και της ποιηλικής άρχει. ένεκα γάρ τε ποιεί πας ο ποιών και ου τέλος απλώς, αλλά πρός τι, και τινός sò sointòr, ara? ou to wparròv, si yae cumpatía, ting v pegs, TOÚTOU. Aristot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2.


and takes account of what is done and doing in the world, as truths adapted to all the uses and purposes of life e As the object of Practical Learning is the knowledge of good and evil, with a view to the right and responfible conduct of life. The end of the former is Utility : as the end of the latter is Happiness.

But, before we advance in the Practical department, as the subject of rational investigation, and productive of Truth issuing in moral Action, another distinction or subdivision must be drawn : for no part of learning has been more involved and complicated, in consequence of the vague and indefinite mode in which it has been treated, than Morality in general; whence much obscurity and confusion have been brought into that most interesting and extensive science.

Before men can act in a moral capacity, they must first know how to act. So that the Ethical province, taken in its full extent, consists of two parts,—the Knowledge


and the Action; which, however inseparable they may be in the production of moral virtue, are distinct considerations in the eye of science and philosophy. It is with this Knowledge, as a species of Truth deducible from principles and propositions by an act of Reafon, or what moralists have been pleased to call Practical Intellect, independently of the Action, that Logic is concerned :k and it is this part of ETHICS to which the present chapter will be confined. But this Truth, resulting from right reason, and forming the basis of morality, is, like all other speculative truth, a dead inactive thing ; till it be invigorated and enlivened into Action by the motions and affections of the Will, from which it is denominated Practical Truth, and arranged under that department of the mind. And here the

* Nulla potestas aut imperium in Voluntatem tribui debet Intellectui ; cujus quippe munus solum, eft bonum atque verum cernere, deque eo judicare.

"Velle autem, eligere, aut imperare folius Voluntatis elt. Laugb. Eth. p. 13.


other field of Ethical cultivation opens to our view, which consists in influencing that Will; in exciting and stimulating it to virtuous actions on the one hand, and in soothing and restraining it from vicious actions on the other. This part of Morality confifts more in perfuahon, than in conviction; and is properly the Rhetoric of Ethics. It must, however, be acknowledged to be the crown and glory of the science ; as a philosophy which confers the highest honour on human nature. It descends to the first {prings and movements of the heart. It penetrates the inmost recesses of the mind. It both subdues and animates the passions, and regulates all the motions and affections of the Will, by holding out to it the incentives of Hope and Fear. Its labour is various and extensive. It attends to every character and disposition. It consults the particular inclinations, and seconds the natural propenfities, of men. And, by the application of every expedient that reason and prudence can suggest, it nourishes the seeds of virtue into


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