philofophical diftinction of the three provinces, according to the different nature and direction which Truth affumes in each. In the Theoretic province, he represents it as originating with its Subject, as standing independent, and terminating in itsef☛ In the Practic, it originates in the Mind of the agent, joins itself to right Appetite with intention, which it mixes and cooperates, and has in

Αμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ τὸ ἔργον. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2.

4 Εν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ ςάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτική ἐσιν οὔτε ποιητική. Ariftot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. I.

ευ

• Τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας, καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς, μηδὲ ποιητικῆς, τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς, ταληθές ἐςι καὶ ψεύδο τέτο γάρ ἐσι παντὸς διανοητικᾶ ἔργον. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. I.

f

* Τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν, ἐν τῷ πράτοντι ἡ προαίρεσις· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ προπιρετόν. Ariftot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. I.

* Τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικέ, ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ, πράξεως μὲν ἦν ἀρχὴ, προαίρε σις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' ἐχ * ἕνεκα, προαιρέσεως δὲ, ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκα τινος· διὸ οὔτ ̓ ἄνευ να καὶ διανοίας, ἔτε ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐσιν ἕξεως ή προαίρεσις. εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους ἐκ ἔςι. διάνοια δ ̓ αὐτὴ ἐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ ̓ ἡ ἕνεκά τε, καὶ πρακτική. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. I.

profpect

prospect a moral end beyond itfelf: In the Poetic, it originates in the more inventive Mind" of the artist, and, through the inftrumentality of different means, intends and accomplishes a still farther end,' which is properly termed Effect.

This distinction of the Peripatetic, however philofophical, may be in some respects too metaphysical and refined: and, as all the parts of knowledge, which do not belong to the Practic and Poetic Provinces, muft be included in the Theoretic, (for there are only three,) he has made the outline of that not fufficiently comprehenfive. The object of Theoretical learning is not confined to mere speculative truth, which terminates in itself alone it extends, as we have seen, to the nature and properties of external things,

* Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιῆνται ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἢ νοῖς ἐσιν, ἢ τέχνη, ἢ δύναμίς τις. Ariftot. Metaph. lib. vi.

cap. I.

1 Αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει. ἕνεκα γάρ τε ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν· καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρός τι, καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητὸν, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ τὸ πρακτὸν, ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία, τέλο ǹ♪'ögεžis, TOútou. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2.

ท

and

and takes account of what is done and doing in the world, as truths adapted to all the ufes and purposes of life. As the object of Practical Learning is the knowledge of good and evil, with a view to the right and refponfible conduct of life. The end of the former is Utility as the end of the latter is Happiness.

But, before we advance in the Practical department, as the subject of rational inveftigation, and productive of Truth issuing in moral Action, another diftinction or fubdivision must be drawn: for no part of learning has been more involved and complicated, in confequence of the vague and indefinite mode in which it has been treated, than Morality in general; whence much obfcurity and confufion have been brought into that most interesting and extensive science.

Before men can act in a moral capacity, they must first know how to act. So that the Ethical province, taken in its full extent, confifts of two parts,-the Knowledge

and

:

and the Action; which, however infeparable they may be in the production of moral virtue, are distinct confiderations in the eye of fcience and philofophy. It is with this Knowledge, as a fpecies of Truth deducible from principles and propofitions by an act of Reafon, or what moralifts have been pleafed to call Practical Intellect, independently of the Action, that LOGIC is concerned and it is this part of ETHICS to which the present chapter will be confined. But this Truth, refulting from right reason, and forming the bafis of morality, is, like all other fpeculative truth, a dead inactive thing; till it be invigorated and enlivened into ACTION by the motions and affections of the WILL,' from which it is denominated Practical Truth, and arranged under that department of the mind. And here the

* Nulla poteftas aut imperium in Voluntatem tribui debet Intellectui; cujus quippe munus folum, eft bonum atque verum cernere, deque eo judicare.

1 Velle autem, eligere, aut imperare folius Voluntatis eft. Laugb. Eth. p. 13.

other

other field of Ethical cultivation opens to our view, which confifts in influencing that Will; in exciting and stimulating it to virtuous actions on the one hand, and in soothing and restraining it from vicious actions on the other. This part of Morality confifts more in perfuafion, than in conviction; and is properly the Rhetoric of Ethics. It must, however, be acknowledged to be the crown and glory of the science; as a philofophy which confers the highest honour on human nature. It defcends to the first fprings and movements of the heart. It penetrates the inmoft receffes of the mind. It both fubdues and animates the paffions, and regulates all the motions and affections of the Will, by holding out to it the incentives of Hope and Fear. Its labour is various and extensive. It attends to every character and difpofition. It confults the particular inclinations, and feconds the natural propenfities, of men. And, by the application of every expedient that reafon and prudence can fuggeft, it nourishes the feeds of virtue into habits,