the former are capable of being univocally and mechanically expreffed, of being precisely diftinguished from each other, and from those of other kinds, and of being exactly measured; and they are ready, at first, to be defined, and SYLLOGISTICALLY compared: whereas the latter can never be fo univocally and artfully expreffed; nor diftinguished with fuch precision, (defects which no expedients can remedy*) nor exactly measured; neither can they be logically defined at all or compared fyllogiftically, till their general ideas are formed by INDUCTION and general Propofitions made.

So that, in Mathematics the Method of Reasoning begins where it ends in Ethics, and is contrary throughout. In the one, it begins with Definitions and general Propofitions, and advances from Syllogifm to Syllogifm, in which the minor as well as the major Propofitions are always general truths ; which generality is indifpenfable to Demonftration. In the other, the chief labour of Reasoning, by which many personal observa

* See Mr. Locke's Attempt, B. IV. C. iii. §. 26.

tions are taken, accurate inveftigations purfued, and fine diftinctions drawn, and by which many particular comparisons are formed, neceffarily precedes the logical Definition. And, when the general Office or Duty with its correfpondent quality, has been Inductively established into a general propofition, Definition, by reducing particular actions under their general head, will itself terminate the logical process: Or, if Syllogifms must be used, the minor propofitions will be particular; fo that there can be no Demonftration and, to the mortification of difputants, one, or however a very few fyllogifms, will, be fufficient.

ETHICAL TRUTH is, therefore, totally different from Mathematical; and, logically confidered, and put in a comparative point of view, it bears a nearer refemblance to Phyfical, and Phyfical to Mathematical.'

PHYSICS and MATHEMATICS have the fame First Principle, the External Senfes; and, when Phyfical Forms are generalized, Mathematic can lend its Reafoning; and they both terminate in fpeculative, not practical, ufe. ETHICS differ from BOTH in its First Principle the Internal Senfe, and from MATHEMATICS in the Method of ReaJoning,

LOCKE was that bold and adventurous philofopher, who, led on by a candid impartiality and a reverence for truth, with a ftrong and liberal mind, left the beaten track of fcience, and took a new and untrodden path, in which he walked with great honour to himself, and great advantage to the learned. To fubvert doctrines of philofophy fanctioned by authority, to break through systems of education made venerable by time, and to remove habits and prejudices by which the mind has been long enslaved, is a task which has ever been referved for thofe few champions of philofophy, who are bleft with superior talents. His Effay produced an useful revolution in the republic of learning; and he may fairly be confidered as the second to Bacon in improving the purfuit, and in promoting the interefts, of general knowledge. When the navigator of an unknown sea, for

foning, but in this they agree with PHYSICS, the subject of both being individuals: and they differ from BOTH in their End which is practical, not speculative, use: So that ETHICS and MATHEMATICS differ in toto.

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the purpose of new discoveries, involves himfelf in difficulty, and perplexes himself in error, it is what we readily pardon, because it is what we naturally expect: and both he and the philofopher, who embark in the spirit of improvement, in order to correct what was before erroneously adopted or imperfectly known, will not only commend but honour the fame spirit in others, by which they themselves are corrected or improved.

The opinion, however, which he entertained in his Effay, of the demonftrability of Ethics, he himself doubted of afterwards, and in part retracted in his Familiar Letters. Philofophers as well as navigators derive great advantages from being well informed of the works and obfervations of those who have gone before them: and he would have neither entertained the opinion in the first inftance, nor have doubted about it in the fecond, had he not been unacquainted with

Though by the view of moral ideas, whilft I was considering that subject, I thought I saw that Morality might be demonftrably made out; yet whether I am able to make it out is another queftion. Locke's Fam. Let. p. 10.

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the philofophy of Demonstrative and Syllogistic reasoning, for want of having studied with attention the Analytics of Aristotle, in which that deep philofophy is fo particularly investigated; and had he not likewise been mistaken in regard both to the Principles and Reasoning of Morality, of which the book of Topics, however defective that part of the organon may be, would have fufficiently informed him, by distinguishing those subjects which are capable of Probability from those which admit of Demonftration." Above all, the Metaphyfics of Ariftotle, which should be most attentively ftudied by every future metaphysician, would have taught him, that

The attempt which Mr. Locke has fhewn, in different parts of his Effay, to make Morality demonftrable like Mathematics, is a fufficient proof that he was unacquainted with the old Logic derived originally from Ariftotle: And the method by which he hoped to make the attempt fucceed, viz. by proving the agreement or disagreement of ethical ideas by the application and menfuration of a third or medium, is an additional proof that the Logic he espoused was the new one, founded on the first Axiom of Euclid, which is more partial and imperfect than the old. And this is, indeed, ftrongly apparent in every part of his Effay.

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