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not to know what is demonstrable, and what is not, is a prominent mark of ignorance." :
Upon the whole, Mr. Locke, with many other philosophers, has been more at a loss upon moral subjects, than in any other part of learning. Too anxious for the fimplicity and uniformity of his new analysis of the Human Understanding, he derives all its knowledge originally from one and the same source, that of External Sense, to the exclu-, fion of Internal Sense, the first inlet of all moral truth, which is of equal authority, and as extensive and essential in its use :: And
• 'Αξιεσι δε και τέτο αποδεικνύναι τινές δι' απαιδευσίαν, έξι γαρ απαιδευσία, το μη γινώσκειν τίνων δει ζητείν απόdziśw, xai tivwv å dei. Aristot. Metaph. lib. iv. C. 4.
To make way for his new philosophy, he employed the first book of his Essay to prove that there are no Inrate Principles, either Speculative or Practical: and, as by Principles he means General Propositions, most of which are neither known nor assented to without the exercise of many previous judgments, nor often without a great maturity and progress of reasoning, he had no great difficulty in overturning an absurd doctrine, though it had obtained for many ages. In the second book he proceeds to trace all ideas, by which he means whatever is the object of thinking,
thus, having lost one of the eyes of Truth in the outset of his journey, which should have been his guide through some of the most abstruse and difficult passages, we cannot so much wonder that his' moral philosophy should form aglaring defect of his incomparable Essay.
cludereither aresh edge; bork KNAL SENSE
to their original in the External Senses alone, as the inlet of all knowledge; both speculative and praftical: fo that neither are they innate. Still this word is not to be excluded from the philosophy of mind. That the Eye distinguilhes black, white, red, yellow, is a faculty innate in that organ, else whence is it derived ? But to apprehend love and batred, good and evil, is not at all in the power of that external organ. No: we feel that it belongs to a faculty within the breast, which is likewise innate; and which we, therefore, call Consciousness. These innate Faculties are, therefore, different, and independent of each other; from which we, accordingly, receive the different materials of all our knowledge, speculative from the one, and practical from the other : they are, therefore, First Principles of knowledge. And, as the one is properly called natural or external Sense; the other, by its correspondent analogy, is as properly called moral or internal Sense.
Of the Perfection of Moral taste.
ITOWEVER those inferior but more 11 useful parts of ethical wisdom, which are necessary to ensure the peace and existence of societies, to direct the conduct of individuals to their necessary well-being, and to enforce the ordinary duties of common life, may be impressed on the minds of all men with a clear and obvious conviction; when we reflect, that the whole Moral Law is a transcript of the unsearchable Will of the great Governour of the universe, we may easily suspect, that but a finall and partial glympse of this celestial light illumines the human intellect. Though, from just observations on the conduct of his providence, and by a due exercise of their 'reason, men may hope to develope some of his less obvious dispensations ; yet we may suspend our wonder, if philosophers ancient and modern, who have attempted (and the attempt conducted by
humility and discretion does honour to human nature) to look with a more philosophic eye into the deeper counsels of the Almighty, to scan the ways of his moral providence, and to reduce them to the formalities of system, have been disappointed in their object, and that, in subjects of morality, error has frequently assumed the face of truth.
Though the Deity has never been wanting in the discovery of himself to the meanest of his rational creatures ; the sublimest parts of his divine æconomy are reserved as mysteries too exalted for the natural faculties of the highest to investigate, and sometimes for their largest capacities to comprehend: however they may be enabled to embrace some parts, when discovered, and to acquiesce in others." Our great philosopher and reformer of all learning human and divine, has, therefore,
* Nec illud dubitandum eft magnam partem legis moralis sublimorem esse, quam quo lumen naturæ aseendere poffit. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.
• Particeps est anima lucis nonnullæ ad perfectionem intuendam et discernendam Legis Moralis ; quæ tamen lux non prorsus clara fit, fed ejusmodi ut potius vitia quodatenus redarguat, quam de officiis plane informet. Ibid.
referred Reason in regard to the whole of the divine LAW, moral as well as positive, to Revelation, as affording that clear and certain light, on which it can firmly and securely rely.
Besides the stupendous Mysteries it unveils, which are positive and doctrinal, it delivers a new and more perfect system of moral duties, grounded on their true and proper principle, as the directory of our lives and actions: a divine philosophy, unconscious of all error, ytren and free from imperfection, and which is 215 carried to that height of purity and sublimity, of which Reason is lost in admiration. No code of Ethics, ancient or modern, is fo full or so precise, none so clear, none so consistent, none fo practical, and none so practicable, and, above all, none so authoritative, as the MORALITY of the eternal GOSPEL.
To this code of evangelical Ethics the philosopher must look up as to a polar star, both to direct his studies and to regulate his conduct. And here he will receive an in
• Quare Religio, five Mysteria live Mores spectes pendet de Revelatione divina, Ibid.