not to know what is demonftrable, and what is not, is a prominent mark of ignorance.°

UPON the whole, Mr. Locke, with many other philofophers, has been more at a lofs upon moral subjects, than in any other part of learning. Too anxious for the fimplicity and uniformity of his new analysis of the Human Understanding, he derives all its knowledge originally from one and the fame source, that of External Senfe, to the exclufion of Internal Senfe, the first inlet of all moral truth, which is of equal authority, and as extenfive and effential in its ufe :' And

Αξιἔσι δὲ καὶ τᾶτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι' απαιδευσίαν, ἔσι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία, τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπό deiživ, xai tívwv & d. Ariftot. Metaph. lib. iv. c. 4..

To make way for his new philofophy, he employed the first book of his Effay to prove that there are no Innate Principles, either Speculative or Practical: and, as by Principles he means General Propofitions, most of which are neither known nor affented to without the exercise of many previous judgments, nor often without a great maturity and progrefs of reasoning, he had no great difficulty in overturning an absurd doctrine, though it had obtained for many ages. In the fecond book he proceeds to trace all ideas, by which he means whatever is the object of thinking,

thus, having loft one of the eyes of Truth in the outfet of his journey, which should have been his guide through fome of the most abftrufe and difficult paffages, we cannot fo Jul much wonder that his moral philofophy fhould form a glaring defect of his incomparable Effay.

to their original in the EXTERNAL SENSES alone, as the inlet of all knowledge, both fpeculative and practical: fo that neither are they innate. Still this word is not to be excluded from the philofophy of mind. That the Eye diftinguishes black, white, red, yellow, is a faculty innate in that organ, else whence is it derived? But to apprehend love and hatred, good and evil, is not at all in the power of that external organ. No: we feel that it belongs to a faculty within the breast, which is likewife innate; and which we, therefore, call Confciousness. Thefe innate Faculties are, therefore, different, and independent of each other; from which we, accordingly, receive the different materials of all our knowledge, fpeculative from the one, and practical from the other: they are, therefore, First Principles of knowledge. And, as the one is properly called natural or external SENSE; the other, by its correfpondent analogy, is as properly called moral or internal Senfe.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of the PERFECTION of Morale.

How

OWEVER thofe inferior but more useful parts of ethical wisdom, which are neceffary to ensure the peace and existence of focieties, to direct the conduct of individuals to their neceffary well-being, and to enforce the ordinary duties of common life, may be impreffed on the minds of all men with a clear and obvious conviction; when we reflect, that the whole Moral Law is a tranfcript of the unfearchable Will of the great Governour of the univerfe, we may easily fufpect, that but a small and partial glympse of this celestial light illumines the human intellect. Though, from just observations on the conduct of his providence, and by a due exercise of their reafon, men may hope to develope fome of his lefs obvious difpenfations; yet we may fufpend our wonder, if philofophers ancient and modern, who have attempted (and the attempt conducted by humility

S2

humility and difcretion does honour to human nature) to look with a more philofophic eye into the deeper counfels of the Almighty, to fcan the ways of his moral providence, and to reduce them to the formalities of fyftem, have been disappointed in their object, and Inon, that, in fubjects of morality, error has frequently affumed the face of truth.

Though the Deity has never been wanting in the discovery of himself to the meanest of his rational creatures; the fublimeft parts of his divine œconomy are referved as mysteries too exalted for the natural faculties of the highest to investigate, and sometimes for their largest capacities to comprehend: however they may be enabled to embrace some parts, when discovered, and to acquiefce in others. Our great philofopher and reformer of all learning human and divine, has, therefore,

Nec illud dubitandum eft magnam partem legis moralis fublimorem effe, quam quo lumen naturæ afeendere poffit. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

Particeps eft anima lucis nonnullæ ad perfectionem intuendam et difcernendam Legis Moralis; quæ tamen lux non prorfus clara fit, fed ejufmodi ut potius vitia quodatenus redarguat, quam de officiis plane informet. Ibid.

referred

referred Reason in regard to the whole of the divine Law, moral as well as pofitive, to Revelation, as affording that clear and certain light, on which it can firmly and securely rely.

Befides the ftupendous Myfteries it unveils, which are positive and doctrinal, it delivers a new and more perfect system of moral duties, grounded on their true and proper principle, as the directory of our lives and actions: a divine philosophy, unconscious of all error, and free from imperfection, and which is carried to that height of purity and fublimity, of which Reason is loft in admiration. No code of Ethics, ancient or modern, is fo full or fo precife, none fo clear, none fo confiftent, none fo practical, and none fo practicable, and, above all, none fo authoritative, as the MORALITY of the eternal GOSPEL.

To this code of evangelical Ethics the philofopher must look up as to a polar star, both to direct his ftudies and to regulate his conduct. And here he will receive an in

• Quare Religio, five Myfteria five Mores fpectes pendet de Revelatione divina, Ibid.

ftruction