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could not dignify the narrowness of its conceptions; and its dependence upon personal rather than ideal influences soon left it without any cohesion of thought. Its higher elements passed off, as all thinkers foresaw they would, into their natural channel of Roman Catholicism; its lower sank into what is known as Ritualism. The inevitable fate of every movement which hangs upon persons and traditions, rather than principles, is to drift rather than to lead, and finally to fall into the arms of some ancient authority instead of moulding anew the course of human history.

We have dwelt upon these features of Dr. Newman's intellectual character because his position as a writer, and especially his last volume now before us, can only be understood in connexion with his own mental career. Few writers have ever presented a more unique or persistent type of mind. He is now in mental habitude and grasp very much what he was in 1832, when he composed and dedicated to Keble his historical sketch of the 'Arians of the Fourth Century. He has changed his religious associations and sympathies, but his modes of reasoning and his appreciations of opinion and of life remain very much what they were. He never was an inquirer,* and never had

faith in human reason.

His mind has never been able to stand alone, and from the depths of intellectual solitude to look quietly towards the light or travel painfully in quest of it. Some form of authoritative dogma has always possessed him, apart from which truth has had to him no existence. Of the pure action of the intellect his only conception has been that of an all-corroding and devouring • scepticism.'+

We confess therefore that we heard with astonishment that Dr. Newman was busy with a • Grammar of Assent.' In the close of the History of his Religious Opinions he appeared so deliberately to have abandoned, not only reason—for as we have said he never stood on any ground of reason-but even argument in reference to his faith, and to have embraced so entirely the dogma of infallibility, that nothing could well remain for him to say on the subjects of his religious assents. Nothing could be more intelligible than the position of his mind.' Thousands have occupied the position before and


• In this very volume he tells us that inquiry is incompatible with religious faith. " He who inquires has not found; he is in doubt • where the truth lies. We cannot, without absurdity, call ourselves at once believers and inquirers also. (P. 184.) † llistory of Religious Opinions, p. 215.


occupy it at this moment. All must come to it who decisively distrust reason and put out its light. The present elaborate volume was in consequence a surprise to us; yet it is so remarkable in itself and so singularly in keeping with his remarkable intellect, that we feel, now that it has appeared, that Dr. Newman's authorship would have been incomplete without it. For his mind, while intensely dogmatic and authoritative in expression, is yet in spirit and essence really sceptical, seeing difficulties although refusing to own them, and from the depths of its very restlessness casting itself forcibly into the arms of authority. Its dialectic instinct will not let it repose, but incessantly strives to bottom itself on some logical or intellectual as well as ecclesiastical basis. And as the History of his Religious Opinions gives us the personal narrative of the process by which he passed from one stage to another of dogmatic assent, so the present volume expounds what seem to him the intellectual conditions on which even such a fully developed and comprehensive faith as his may find a foundation.

In its literary characteristics the volume is an admirable specimen of Dr. Newman's manner. It is written with great ease and charm of expression, and at the same time with a great appearance of logical force and comprehension. We cannot say that the argument is clear, especially in its points of connexion. On the contrary, it appears to us here and there to be singularly obscure, and to drop its links often in a subtle maze of words which carry the reader along, and yet open to him no rational sequence of thought which he can retrace with mental satisfaction. Everywhere, however, there is the old felicity of exposition and appositeness of illustration and of epithet which make Dr. Newman's literary handiwork so delightful. Some readers may be deterred by the technical structure of the book and the abstract nomenclature of its divisions; but, when these are got over, its difficulties are pretty well mastered; and the subject is found to run forth into many side excursions of an extremely interesting and lively character. The intellectual charm of the book, in fact, appears to us to lie-not at all in its formal argumentation—but in the surprises which it now and then gives us in expositions not only of rare beauty of expression, but marked by thought as just and enlightened as it is happily expressed. Dr. Newman's very dogmatism-the firmness with which he holds his intellectual as well as theological ground-refusing to look around, helps him to expound his ideas with a clear and unwavering force. The following exposition of the idea of Cause, for example, strikes us as very forcible :

' It is to me a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive truth that everything must have a cause.

If this were so the voice of nature would tell false ; for why in that case stop short at One, who is Himself without cause ? The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle that nothing happens without a cause is derived in the first instance from what we know of ourselves; and we argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to us. One of the first experiences of an infant is that of his willing and doing ; and as time goes on one of the first temptations of the boy is to bring home to himself the fact of his sovereign arbitrary power, though it be at the price of waywardness, mischievousness, and disobedience. And when his p:rents as antagonists of this wilfulness begin to restrain him, and to bring his mind and conduct into shape, then he has a second series of experiences of cause and effect, and that upon a principle or rule. Thus the notion of causation is one of the first lessons which he learns from experience, that experience limiting it to agents possessed of intelligence and will. It is the notion of power combined with a purpose and an end. Physical phenomena, as such, are without sense ; and experience teaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes. Accordingly wherever the world is young the movements and changes of physical nature have been and are spontaneously ascribed by its inhabitants to the presence and will of hidden agents, who haunt every part of it, the woods, the mountains, and the streams, the air and the stars. for good or for evil; nor is there anything illogical in such a belief. It rests on the argument from analogy.

* As time goes on, and society is formed, and the idea of science is mastered, a different aspect of the physical universe presents itself to the mind. Since causation implies a sequence of acts in our own case, and our doing is always posterior, never contemporaneous or prior, to our willing, therefore when we witness invariable antecedents and consequents, we call the former the cause of the latter, though intelligence is absent from the analogy of external appearances. At length we go on to confuse causation with order; and because we happen to have made a successful analysis of some complicated assemblage of phenomena, which experience has brought before us in the visible scene of things, and have reduced them to a tolerable dependence upon each other, we call the ultimate points of this analysis, and the hypothetical facts in which the whole mass of phenomena is gathered up, by the name of Causes, whereas they are really only the formulæ under which those phenomena are conveniently represented. Thus the constitutional formula, “The King can do no wrong," is not a fact, or a cause of the Constitution, but a happy mode of bringing out its genius, of determining the correlations of its elements, and of grouping or regulating political rules and proceedings in a particular direction and in a particular form. And in like manner, that all the particles of matter throughout the universe are attracted to each other with a force varying inversely with the square of their respective distances, is a profound idea, harmonising the physical works of the Creator; but even could it be proved to be a universal fact, and also to be the actual cause of the movements of all bodies in the universe, still it would not be an




experience any more than is the mythological doctrine of the presence of innumerable spirits in physical phenomena.

• Of these two senses of the word “ cause,” viz., that which brings a thing to be, and that on which a thing under given circumstances follows, the former is that of which our experience is the earlier and more intimate, being suggested to us by our consciousness of willing and doing. The latter of the two requires a discrimination and exactness of thought for its apprehension, which implies special mental training; else, how do we learn to call food the cause of refreshment, but day never the cause of night, though night follows day more surely than refreshment follows food ? Starting then from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will; and by the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle, that all things come of effective will; and the reception or presumption of this notion is a notional assent.' (Pp. 63-66.)

Having thus explained the idea of Cause or the doctrine of Causation in its primary sense, Dr. Newman expounds with no less effect the secondary sense of Causation as Law or Order--an ordinary succession of antecedents and consequents, or what is called the Order of Nature. This he considers • another first principle or notion derived from experience;' and sets forth its genesis and true character as follows:

"By natural law I mean the fact that things happen according to fixed circumstances, and not without them and at random; that is that they happen in an order. ... Thus we have experience, for instance, of the regularity of our physical functions, such as the beating of the pulse and the heaving of the breath; of the recurring sensations of hunger and thirst; of the alternation of waking and sleeping, and the succession of youth and age. In like manner we have experience of the great recurring phenomena of the heavens and earth, of day and night, summer and winter. . . . . Also by scientific analysis we are led to the conclusion that phenomena, which seem very different from each other, admit of being grouped together as modes of the operation of one hypothetical law, acting under varied circumstances. For instance, the motion of a stone falling freely, of a projectile, and of a planet, may be generalised as one and the same property, in each of them, of the particles of matter; and this generalisation loses its character of hypothesis, and becomes a probability, in proportion as we have reason for thinking on other grounds that the particles of all matter really move and act towards each other in one way in relation to space and time, and not in half a dozen ways; that is, that nature acts by uniform laws. And thus we advance to the general notion or first principle of the sovereignty of law throughout the universe.

• There are philosophers who go farther, and teach, not only a general, but an invariable, and inviolable, and necessary uniformity in the action of the laws of nature, holding that everything is the result of some law or laws, and the exceptions are impossible; but I do not see on what ground of experience or reason they take up this position. Our


experience is directly adverse to such a doctrine, for no one example of an unvarying law can be pointed out as a fact in the whole universe.' (Pp. 66–68.)

He gives various illustrations, and then concludes :

• But it may be urged, if a thing happens once, it must happen always; for what is to hinder it? Nay, on the contrary, why, because one particle of matter has a certain property, should all particles have the same? Why, because particles have instanced the property a thousand times, should the thousand and first instance it also ? It is primâ facie unaccountable that an accident should happen twice, not to speak of its happening always. If we expect a thing to happen twice, it is because we think it is not an accident, but has a cause. What has brought about a thing once, may bring it about twice. What is to hinder its happening ? rather what is to make it happen? Here we are thrown back from the question of Order to that of Causation. A law is not a cause, but a fact; but when we come to the question of cause, then, as I have said, we have no experience of any cause but Will. If, then, I must answer the question, What is to alter the order of nature? I reply, That which willed it;—that which willed it, can unwill it; and the invariableness of law depends on the unchangeabless of that Will.

* And here I am led to observe that, as cause implies a will, so order implies a purpose. Did we see flint celts, in their various receptacles all over Europe, scored always with certain special and characteristic marks, even though those marks had no assignable meaning or final cause whatever, we should take that very repetition, which, indeed, is the principle of order, to be a proof of intelligence. The agency then which has kept and keeps up the general laws of nature energising at once in Syrius and on the earth, and on the earth in its primary period as well as in the nineteenth century, must be Mind and nothing else, that Mind at least as wide and as enduring in its living action, as the immeasurable

ages and spaces of the universe on which that agency has left its traces. (Pp. 69, 70.)

These passages show sufficiently with what clearness and force Dr. Newman can argue; and there are many,


passages and even trains of reasoning throughout the volume equally felicitous and just. We may instance the whole treatment in the fifth chapter of the function of Conscience in evolving and vivifying the idea of God--an exposition which, while containing nothing new or in any respect original, is admirable alike in its simplicity and depth. The same may be said of many parts of the concluding chapter on the Christian Evidences, or · Religious Inferences, as he entitles it. It is pleasant to feel ourselves in union with the author in such expositions both of the great intellectual principles lying at the basis of Theism and of the surpassing claims of the Christian revelation upon our acceptance; and it would be possible, as

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