conception of divine wisdom and love may differ from the popular conception, or the theological dogma which bears that name. He believes in a moral law, and a necessary and everlasting distinction between right and wrong, however his standard of moral obligation may clash, in some particulars, with the commonly received ecclesiastical code. He believes in an Infinite Good, in eternal spiritual realities, however he may dissent from the popular view of the life to come. Hear the confession of one who was counted an atheist in his time, and is still so regarded by most theologians: "Experience had taught me," says Spinoza, "that all which life commonly offers is worthless and vain. I therefore determined to know if there were any genuine good which might be attained, and with which the soul, abandoning every thing else, might be content; the discovery and appropriation of which would yield a continual and supreme satisfaction. That which mankind, if we judge from their actions, regard as the highest good, is either wealth, honor, or sensual enjoyment. The pleasure derived from these is delusive, and only an infinite and everlasting good can impart pure joy to the soul. Therefore I resolved to collect myself, that I might lay hold of this supreme good." And what was the supreme good in his apprehension? "The supreme good," he continues, con sists in becoming partaker of a more excellent nature, and in realizing the intimate relation which connects the individual soul with the universe of things." And so this remarkable man, a Jew by birth, but excommunicated from the Jewish synagogue for his opinions, lived a life of strict seclusion, devoting him self to meditation and inquiry concerning the deepest mystery of things, refusing lucrative offices which were tendered to him, and maintaining his frugal existence by mechanical labor. Thus we see that the nominal unbeliever may cherish in his heart a sublime faith which explains the moral anomaly of his life. But we deceive ourselves, if we suppose that such cases are frequent; and that even this negative purity of life (for usually it amounts to nothing more) is a common accompaniment of what is called infidelity. Such combinations are exceptions, not the rule. If we search for the saints of history, for the moral heroes, the men and the women who stand pre-eminent in moral excellence, choice examples of heroic virtue, we find them, not in the ranks of unbelief, but among the disciples and among the confessors of a given religion. If speculative unbelief is sometimes associated with purity of life, practical unbelief, on the other hand, is inseparably connected with moral corruption. By practical unbelief, I mean inward aversion; alienation of the heart from spiritual truths which, however, may not be contradicted by the understanding, and which are outwardly acknowledged by formal compliance with the uses of the Church. I have spoken of depraved men who seek to atone for their vices by their Orthodoxy. There are men who are not depraved in that sense of the term; who are guilty of no misdemeanors; whose life is regular, their manners irreproachable; but whose hearts are selfish and filled with vicious affections, envy, hatred, and lust; — there are such, I say, who formally assent to the truths of religion; who never entertained a speculative doubt; who never dreamed of questioning the creed of their communion; who deem such questioning impious, and burn with righteous indignation against all who so question, all so-called infidels; but who no more believe in that creed with a genuine appreciative faith than they believe in Brahmanism. Their theological creed is one thing; their practical belief, another and a very different thing. Ecclesiastically, they subscribe to the Athanasian Creed, or the Apostles' Creed, or the Thirty-nine Articles, or the Westminster Catechism; but, if they would confess the secret conviction of their hearts, their creed would be, "I believe in one supreme and all-sufficient good, -the good of riches, the good of honor, the good of enjoyment. These three are one good; the same in substance, equal in value and satisfaction. I believe that the chief end of man is to get gain and lay up much good for many years. I believe that religion is the necessary safeguard of life and property, and must be maintained with strict conformity and punctual observance. believe in success. I believe in respectability. I believe that the respectable are the children of God and shall inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world; but the needy and the vagabond, the profane rabble, shall be cast into outer darkness, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth." I It is commonly supposed, that the understanding is competent, in and of itself, with no aid but its own inductions, and no method but its own law, to discover and establish the truths of religion. This supposition is contradicted by the history both of science and religion. The understanding possesses no such capacity; otherwise, the truths of religion would long since have ceased to be matters of debate. What the understanding is competent to decide, it does decide beyond the possibility of question. If by its own methods, in its own right, it could decide these questions, there would be no more difference of opinion concerning them than there is concerning the properties of a circle or a triangle. There are no open questions in mathematics. There is but one theory in astronomy, in mechanics, in any department of inquiry of which the understanding is an adequate judge. Accordingly, recent philosophers have excluded from their survey of human knowledge all ideas of God and spirit, whatever transcends the facts of sense and the methods of the understanding, as without the pale of legitimate inquiry. To all the revelations of faith and feeling they oppose their socalled "positive philosophy." -- The truths of religion are not discovered by the understanding: they are not laid hold of by scientific inquiry. The understanding has no God, no spiritual high calling, no immortal destination. Whoever would know of these things must arrive at them by a different way he must follow the dictates of faith; he must obey the law written in the heart; he must live in them and for them. To the mere understanding, the world is as intelligible and as satisfactory without a God as with one. If the only use of belief in a God were to furnish a theory of the material universe, to account for the origin of things, by means of a "First Cause" and a supermundane, creative Power to aid the under standing in the solution of its problems, - humanity could do without this idea, which, after all, does not solve the problem of existence to the intellect, but only replaces it by a new one, and gives us, instead of an inexplicable world, a more inexplicable God. If the understanding were the only or principal source and organ of truth, mankind would have lived to this day without God in the world, and would never have felt the want of the Being whom we so name; would never have felt the inadequacy of a world without a God. But there are other faculties and functions in man; other sources of perception and conviction than the understanding; and other necessities and cravings than those which the understanding can supply. There are moral and spiritual sentiments and aspirations, - the sense of duty, of moral obligation and accountableness; the longing of the soul for an infinite good; the loyalty of the affections to an invisible Supreme; faith, devotion, hope. These demand a God and providence and grace, a spiritual world, and everlasting life. The greatest philosopher of the last century employed the penetrating analysis of the keenest powers that ever dealt with metaphysical problems, in a critical examination of human ideas and belief, with a view to ascertain what portion of our supposed knowledge could be absolutely legitimated by scientific demonstration. He could find no logical foundation, no critical authority, for those ideas with which religion is conversant,— the sublimest convictions of the human mind, God, infinity, eternity. And he wrote a book, in which he denied to these ideas any basis in pure reason, any scientific value. But our philosopher was too wise not |