of victory is to keep those passions and appetites from doing any criminal action abroad: so the worst they can do, is to engage and force the man to sin, and that against his will, even whether he list or no. But concerning this article, we are entirely determined by the words of St. Paul; "He that is in Christ, hath crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts P;" that is, the passions and desires of the flesh are mortified in all the regenerate: and therefore a state of passion is a state of death. But whatever the principle be, yet we must be infinitely careful we do not mistake a broken resolution for an entire piety. He that perpetually resolves, and yet perpetually breaks his resolution, does, all the way, sin against his conscience, and against his reason, against his experience, and against his observation; and it will be a strange offer at an excuse, for a man to hope for, or to pretend to, pardon, because he sinned against his conscience. 59. There is in this article some little difference in the case of young persons, the violence of whose passions, as it transports them infallibly to evil, so it helps to excuse some of it; but this is upon a double account: 1. Because part of it is natural, 'naturale vitium ætatis,' 'the defect and inherent inclination of their age.' 2. And because their passions being ever strongest when their reason is weakest, the actions of young men are imperfect and incomplete. For deliberation being nothing else but an alternate succession of appetites, it is an unequal intercourse that a possessing, natural, promoted passion should contest against a weak, overborn, beginning, inexperienced, uninstructed reason: this alteration of appetites is like the dust of a balance weighing against a rock; the deliberation itself must needs be imperfect, because there is no equality. And therefore the Roman lawyers did not easily, upon a man under twenty-five years of age, inflict punishment, at least not extreme. They are the words of Tryphonius; "In delictis autem minor annis non xxv, meretur in integrum restitutionem, utique atrocioribus nisi quatenus interdum miseratio ætatis ad mediocrem pœnam judicem produxerit." This, I say, is only a lessening of their fault, not imputing it. God is ready to pity every thing that is pitiable; and, therefore, is apt to instruct them more, and to forbear them longer, and to exP Gal. v. 24. 9 L, Auxil. sect, in delictis ff. de minoribus. pect and to assist their return, and strikes them not so soon, nor so severely; but what other degrees of pardon God will allow to their infirmities, he hath no where told us. For as to the whole, it is true in all laws divine and human: "In criminibus quidem, ætatis suffragio minores non juvantur : etenim malorum mores infirmitas animi non excusat:” « Infirmity of mind does not excuse evil manners: and therefore in criminal actions, young persons are not excused by their age." "In delictis, ætate neminem excusari constat," said Diocletian and Maximianus. The age excuses not; well may it lessen, but it does not quite extinguish, the guilt. 60. VIII. The greatness or violence of a temptation does not excuse our sin, or reconcile it to the state of grace, and an actual consistence with God's favour. The man that is highly tempted, and so falls, cannot say, it was by an unavoidable infirmity. For God never suffers any man to be tempted above his strength; and therefore when he suffers him to fall into a great trial, he hath beforehand prepared him with great aids: and a temptation is not such a formidable thing to a considering Christian. All that it can say is nothing, but that sin is pleasant: and suppose that true; yet so is drink to an hydropic person, and salt meats to a fantastic stomach; and yet they that are concerned, do easily abstain from these temptations, and remember that it is a greater pleasure to be in health, than with a little cold water or a broiled fish to please their palate: and therefore a temptation which can be overcome by an argument from so small an interest, cannot stand the shock of a noble and a Christian resolution and discourse. But every temptation puts on its strength as the man is. Sometimes a full meal will not prejudice our health; and at another time half so much would be a surfeit: and some men take cold with leaving off a half-shirt, who at another time might leave off half their clothes. The indisposition is within: and if men did not love to be tempted, it would not prevail at all. Wine is no temptation to an abstemious man, nor all the beauties of Potiphar's wife to Joseph, the devil could not prevail with such trifles; but half such an offer would overthrow all the trifling purposes of the effeminate. To say, that such a temptation is great, is to say, that you love the sin too FL. Unicâ Cod. si adversus delictum. . well to which you are tempted. For temptations prevail only by our passions and our appetites: leave to love the sin, and the temptation is answered; but if you love it, then complain of nothing but thyself, for thou makest the temptation great, by being in love with life and sin, by preferring vanity before eternal pleasures. In the apophthegms of the Egyptian Anachorets, I read of one who had an apparition in the likeness of Christ. A vain and a proud person would have hugged himself and entertained the illusion. But he, shutting his eyes, said, 'I shall see Christ in heaven; it is enough for me to hope and to believe, while I am on earth.' This or the like did and did not prevail by our weaknesses, not by their own strength: and to pretend the strength of a temptation, is to say, we are to be excused, because we love sin too well, and are too much delighted with baser objects, and we cannot help it, because we love to die. 61. IX. The smallest instance, if it be observed, ceases to be a sin of infirmity; because by being observed, it loses its pretence and excuse, for then it is done upon the account of the will. For here the rule is general, and it sums up this whole question. 62. X. A man's will hath no infirmity, but when it wants the grace of God; that is, whatsoever the will chooses, is imputed to it for good or bad. For the will can suffer no violence; it is subject to nothing, and to no person, but to God and his laws, and therefore whenever it does amiss, it sins directly against him. The will hath no necessity, but what God and herself impose; for it can choose in despite of all arguments and notices from the understanding. For if it can despise an argument from reason, it can also despise an argument from sense; if it can refuse a good argument, it can also refuse a foolish one: if it can choose and not yield to religion, it can also choose and not yield to interest. If it can reject profit, it can reject pleasure; if it can refuse every argument, it can refuse all, and will because it will; it can as well be malicious as do unreasonably: and there could be no sin at all, if the will never did amiss, but when it were deceived: and even when the will chooses pleasure before heaven, it is not because that seems better, but because it will choose against all reason, only upon its own ac Bibl. PP. tom. 9. p. 286. count. For it is certain, he that chooses any thing upon that which he knows is but a seeming and a fallacious reason, may, if he please, do it without all reason: and so the will can do, against reason, in despite of powers, and hopes, and interest, and threatening. And therefore whatsoever is voluntarily chosen, let it be taken care of, that it be good; for if it be not, there can no excuse come from thence. 63. The will is the only fountain and proper principle of sin, insomuch as the fact is no sin, if it be involuntary; but the willing is a sin, though no act follows. "Latro est etiam antequam inquinet manus," said Seneca; "Fecit enim quisquam, quantum voluit." If he hath willed it, he hath done it before God. To this purpose is that saying of Tertullian: "Voluntas facti origo est, quæ ne tunc quidem liberatur, cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem ejus intercepit. Ipsa enim sibi imputatur, nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat." Want of power excuses every thing but the will, because this always hath power to do its own work; and what cannot be done besides, as it is nothing to the will, so it is nothing to its excuse, 'To will' is the formality of sin, and therefore whatever action had its commission from thence, is not a sin of infirmity. For nothing is a sin of infirmity, but what is in some sense, involuntary. 64. The sum is this. Sin puts on its excuse, and becomes a sin of infirmity upon no account, but upon the account of ignorance, or something analogical to it, such as are inadvertency, or surprise, which are to ignorance as acts are to habits. The weak brother,' in St. Paul's dialect, is 'he that hath no knowledge.' For since nothing leads the will but the understanding, unless it goes alone, and moves by its own act or principle; if the understanding be inculpably misled, the will may be in error, but not in sin; it is abused, but shall not be condemned. For no man can be tied to do more or better than he understands; for that would be to do more than he can. If the understanding abuse the will, there is evil in it, but no sin: but if the will abuse the understanding, then it is criminal. That is, where the man understands not, or cannot consider, or deliberate, all his actions, by being less human, are less imputable. t Rom. xiv. 1. 10. Δύναται γὰρ ἴσον τῷ δρᾷν τὸ νοεῖν ". But where there is no knowledge, there is no power, and no choice, and no sin. They increase and decrease by each other's measures. St. James's rule is the full measure of this discourse: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin *." The same with that of Philo. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ κρείτ τονος διαμαρτάνοντι συγγνώμη δίδοται· ὁ δ ̓ ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἀδικῶν ἀπολογίαν οὐκ ἔχει, προεαλωκὼς ἐν τῷ τοῦ συνειδότος δικαστηρίῳ. To him that sins ignorantly, pardon is given, that is, easily: but he who sins knowingly, hath no excuse. And therefore the Hebrews use to oppose y 'sin,' to 'ignorance;' that is, the issues of a wicked from the issues of a weak mind: according to that saying of our blessed Saviour; 'If ye were blind, ye should have no sin';" that is, no great or very unpardonable sin. Ignorance, where of itself it is no sin, keeps the action innocent; but as the principle is polluted, so also is the emanation.. SECTION VIII. Practical Advices to be added to the foregoing Considerations. 65. I, SINCE our weak nature is the original of our imperfections and sinful infirmities, it is of great concernment that we treat our natures so, as to make them aptly to minister to religion, but not to vice. Nature must be preserved as a servant, but not indulged to as a mistress; for she is apt to be petulant, and after the manner of women, She will insult impotently, and rule tyrannically. Nature's provisions of meat and drink are to be retrenched and moderate, that she may not be luxuriant and irregular; but she ought to be refreshed so as to be useful, and healthful, and cheerful, even in the days of expiation and sorrow. For he that fasts to kill his lust, and by fasting grows peevish, which to very many men is a natural effect of fasting, and was u Comed. vet. Gr. y John, x. 41. * James, iv. 17. |
