Julius Firmicus 'de Erroribus Profanarum Religionum,' cap. 29.: "Liberum te Deus fecit: in tuâ manu est, ut aut vivas aut pereas, quia te per abrupta præcipitas."

St. Ambrose, in exposit. Psalm. 40.: "Homini dedit eligendi arbitrium quod sequatur; ante hominem vita et mors; si deliqueris, non natura in culpa est, sed eligentis affectus."

Gaudentius Brixianus tertio tractat. super Exod.: "Horum concessa semel voluntatis libertas non aufertur, ne nihil de eo judicare possit, qui liber non fuerit in agendo."

Boetius libro de Consolatione Philosophiæ:""Quæ cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus libertas arbitrii."

Though it were easy to bring very many more testimonies to this purpose, yet I have omitted them because the matter is known to all learned persons, and have chosen these, because they testify that our liberty of choice remains after the fall: that if we sin, the fault is not in our nature, but in our persons and election: that still it is in our own powers to do good or evil; that this is the sentence of the church: that he who denies this, is not a catholic believer.'

15. And this is so agreeable to nature, to experience, to the sentence of all wise men, to the nature of laws, to the effect of reward and punishments, that I am persuaded no man would deny it, if it were not upon this mistake; for many wise and learned men dispute against it, because they find it affirmed in Holy Scripture every where, that grace is necessary; that we are servants of sin; that we cannot come to God unless we be drawn;' and very many more excellent things, to the same purpose. Upon the account of which they conclude, that therefore our free-will is impaired by Adam's fall, since without the grace of God we cannot convert ourselves to godliness,—and being converted, without it we cannot stand,—and if we stand, without it we cannot go on, and going on, without it we cannot persevere. Now though all this be very true, yet there is a mistake in the whole question. For when it is affirmed, that Adam's sin did not, could not, impair our liberty, but all that freedom of election which was concreated with his reason, and is essential to an understanding creature, did remain inviolate, there is no more said: but that after Adam's fall, all that which was natural, remained, and that what Adam could na

turally do, all that he and we can do afterward. But yet this contradicts not all those excellent discourses, which the church makes of the necessity of grace, of the necessity and effect of which, I am more earnestly persuaded, and do believe more things, than are ordinarily taught in the schools of learning but when I say, that our will can do all that it ever could, I mean all that it could ever do naturally, but not all that is to be done supernaturally.

:

But then this I add, that the things of the Spirit, that is, all that belongs to spiritual life, are not naturally known, not naturally discerned; but are made known to us by the Spirit; and when they are known, they are not naturally amiable, as being in great degrees, and many regards contradictory to natural desires; but they are made amiable by the proposition of spiritual rewards, and our will is moved by God in ways not natural, and the active and passive are brought together by secret powers; and after all this, our will, being put into a supernatural order, does, upon these presuppositions, choose freely, and work in the manner of nature. Our will is after Adam naturally as free as ever it was, and in spiritual things it is free, when it is made so by the Spirit; for nature could never do that: according to that saying of Celestine : "Nemo nisi per Christum libero arbitrio bene utitur. Omnis sancta cogitatio et motus bonæ voluntatis ex Deo est:" "A man before he is in Christ, hath free-will, but cannot use it well. He hath motions and operations of will; but without God's grace they do not delight in holy things."

But then in the next place there is another mistake also, when it is affirmed in the writings of some doctors, that the will of man is depraved; men presently suppose, that depravation is a natural or physical effect, and means a diminution of powers; whereas it signifies nothing but a being in love with, or having chosen an, evil object, and not an impossibility or weakness to do the contrary: but only because it will not; for the powers of the will cannot be lessened by any act of the same faculty, for the act is not contrary to the faculty, and therefore can do nothing towards its destruction.

III. As a consequent of this I infer, that there is no natural necessity of sinning; that is, there is no sinful action to which naturally we are determined; but it is our own

choice that we sin. This depending upon the former, stands or falls with it. But because God hath superinduced so many laws, and the devil superinduces temptations upon our weak nature, and we are to enter into a supernatural state of things; therefore it is that we need the helps of supernatural grace to enable us to do a supernatural duty in order to a divine end; so that the necessity of sinning which we all complain of, though it be greater in us than it was in Adam before his fall, yet is not absolute in either, nor merely natural, but accidental and superinduced; and in-remedy to it, God also hath superinduced and promised his Holy Spirit to them that ask him,'

SECTION IV.

Adam's Sin is not imputed to us to our Damnation. 16. BUT the main of all is this; that this sin of Adam is not imputed unto us to eternal damnation. For eternal death was not threatened to Adam for his sin, and therefore could not from him come upon us for that which was none of ours. Indeed, the Socinians affirm, that the death which entered into the world by Adam's sin, was death eternal; that is, God then decreed to punish sinners with the portion of devils. It is likely he did so, but that this was the death introduced for the sin of Adam upon all mankind, is not at all affirmed in Scripture: but temporal death is the effect of Adam's sin; in Adam we all die,' and the death that Adam's sin brought in, is such as could have a remedy or recompense by Christ; but eternal death hath no recompense, and shall never be destroyed; but temporal death shall. But that which I say is this; that for Adam's sin alone, no man but himself is or can justly be condemned to the bitter pains of eternal fire.

This depends also upon the former accounts, because mere nature brings not to hell, but choice. "Nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas," said St. Bernard; and since original sin is not properly ours, but only by imputation, if God should impute Adam's sin so as to damn any one for it, all our good we receive from God, is much less than that

evil; and we should be infinitely to seek for justification of God's justice and glorifications of his mercy, or testimonies of his goodness.

But now the matter is on this side so reasonable in itself, that let a man take what side he will, he shall have parties enough, and no prejudices, or load of a consenting authority, can be against him, but that there shall be on the side of reason as great and leading persons, as there are those who have been abused by error and prejudice. In the time of St. Austin, Vincentius, Victor, and some others, did believe, that infants dying without baptism should nevertheless be saved, although he believed them guilty of original sin: Bucer, Peter Martyr, and Calvin, affirmed the same of the children of faithful parents, but Zuinglius affirmed it of all, and that no infant did lose heaven for his original stain and corruption.

Something less than this was the doctrine of the Pelagians; who exclude infants unbaptized, from the kingdom of heaven but promised to them an eternal and a natural beatitude, and for it St. Augustine* reckons them for heretics, as indeed being impatient of every thing almost which they said. But yet, the opinion was embraced lately by Ambrosius Catherinus, Albertus Pighius, and Hieronymus Savanarola. And though St. Austin sometimes calls as good men as himself by the name of Pelagians, calling all them so that assign a third place or state to infants; yet besides these now reckoned, St. Gregory Nazianzen and his scholiast Nicetes did believe and teach it; and the same is affirmed also by St. Athanasius, or whoever is the author of the Questions to Antiochus' usually attributed to him, and also by St. Ambrose, or the author of the commentaries on St. Paul's epistles, who lived in the time of Pope Damasus, that is, before four hundred years after Christ and even by St. Austin himself expressly in his third book de Libero Arbitrio,' cap. 23.—But when he was heated with his disputations against the Pelagians, he denied all, and said that a middle place or state was never heard of in the church.

m

For all this, the opinion of a middle state for unbaptized infants continued in the church, and was expressly affirmed Orat. in Sanctum Baptis. Quæst. 114. in cap. 5. Rom,

Lib. de Hæresib. c. 18.

by Pope Innocent the Third"; who although he says, infants shall not see the face of God, yet he expressly denies that they shall be tormented in hell: and he is generally followed by the schoolmen ; who almost universally teach, that infants shall be deprived of the vision beatifical; but shall not suffer hell-torments; but yet they stoop so much towards St. Austin's harsh and fierce opinion, that they say, this deprivation is a part of hell, not of torment, but of banishment from God, and of abode in the place of torment. Among these they are also divided, some affirming, that they have some pain of sense, but little and light: others saying they have none, even as they pleased to fancy; for they speak wholly without ground, and merely by chance and interest; and against the consent of antiquity, as I have already instanced. But Gregorius Ariminensis, Driedo, Luther, Melancthon, and Tilmanus Heshusius, are fallen into the worst of St. Austin's opinion, and sentence poor infants to the flames of hell for original sin, if they die before baptism.

To this I shall not say much more than what I have said otherwhere but that no catholic writers for four hundred years after Christ did ever affirm it, but divers affirmed the contrary. And indeed if the unavoidable want of baptism should damn infants, for the fault which was also unavoidable, I do not understand how it can in any sense be true, that Christ died for all, if at least the children of Christian parents should not find the benefit of Christ's death, because that without the fault of any man they want the ceremony, Upon this account some good men, observing the great sadness and the injustice of such an accident, are willing upon any terms to admit infants to heaven, even without baptism, if any one of their relatives desire it for them, or if the church desires it; which in effect admits all Christian infants to heaven; of this opinion were Gerson, Biel, Cajetan, and some others. All which to my sense seems to declare, that if men would give themselves freedom of judgment, and speak what they think most reasonable, they would speak honour of God's mercy, and not impose such fierce and un

De Verb. Apost. serm. 25. Lib. 3. decretat. tit. de bapt. et ejus effectu: cap. majores.

17 tom. 3. serm. de Nativ. B. Mariæ in Concit. const. lib. 4. dist. 4, q, 2. in 3. Thom. q. 68. Act. 1. 2. 11