still more so in its progress. The chairman, Mr. Porter, withdrew from Congress, and Mr. C. found himself at the head of the committee, which, in addition to its peculiar duties, was charged, by a vote of the House, with a large portion of those properly belonging to the Committee on Military Affairs. Few individuals with so little parliamentary experience have ever been placed in so responsible a situation. He had never before served in a deliberative body except for two short sessions in the Legislature of his own state, making together but nine weeks. With such limited experience, it is difficult to conceive a situation of the kind more arduous than that in which he was placed at the head of such a committee at such a period, when party spirit was at its height and the opposition under the guidance of leaders distinguished for their talents and experience; and yet, so ample were his resources, and so great his aptitude for business, that he not only sustained himself, but acquired honour and distinction for the ability with which he discharged the duties of his station.

It will not be attempted to trace Mr. Calhoun's course through this laborious and long-to-be-remembered session. It is sufficient to say that he exhibited throughout the same zeal and ability with which he commenced it. Near its close he reported and carried through the bill declaring war against Great Britain—a war under all circumstances fairly entitled to its appellation as the second war of independence. The proceedings were in secret session, contrary to his opinion and wishes.

Such was the brilliant career of Mr. Calhoun during his first session, and that under the most responsible and trying circumstances. Much of his success is to be attributed to his early and wise determination not to come forward till he had laid the foundation in a solid education, and fully prepared himself to act his part in life. Without them, the mere force of natural talents could not have carried him successfully through the difficulties he had to encounter at the outset of his congressional career.

The declaration of war fixed the policy of the government for the time, and the discussions in Congress during its continuance turned, for the most part, on questions relating to the finances, the army, the navy, the mode of conducting the war, and its success and disasters. These gave rise to many warm and animated debates of deep interest and excitement at the time, and in most of which Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part, and fully sustained the reputation he had acquired for ability and eloquence; but as the subjects were generally of a temporary character, and have long since lost much of their interest, the object of this sketch does not require that they should be particularly noticed. They will, accordingly, be passed in silence, and the notice of the events of the period confined to those that may be regarded as exceptions to the ordinary party discussions of the day. This course is the more readily adopted, because it is believed that the whole country is disposed to do ample justice to the patriotism, the intelligence, and ability with which he performed his part during this eventful period of our history.

tees.

The first incident that will be noticed took place at the commencement of the session immediately succeeding the declaration of war. South Carolina had in that Congress an unusual number of men of talents: General D. R. Williams, Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, and the subject of this sketch, all of whom were entitled to prominent positions in the arrangement of commitMr. Calhoun was the youngest. The speaker was embarrassed. There was a difficulty in placing so many from one state, and that a small one, at the head of prominent committees, and Mr. Calhoun, with his characteristic disinterestedness, cheerfully assented to be placed second on that at the head of which he had served with so much distinction at the preceding session. Mr. Smilie, an old and highly-respectable member from Pennsylvania, was placed at the head of the committee. At its first meeting the chairman, without pre*viously intimating his intention, moved that Mr. Calhoun should be elected

chairman. He objected, and insisted that Mr. Smilie should act as chairman, and declared his perfect willingness to serve under him; but he was, notwithstanding, unanimously elected, and the strongest proof that could be given of the highly satisfactory manner in which he had previously discharged his duty was thus afforded. In this conviction, and as illustrative of the same disinterested character, when the speaker's chair became vacant by the appointment of Mr. Clay as one of the commissioners to negotiate for peace, Mr. Calhoun was solicited by many of the most influential members of the party to become a candidate for it; but he peremptorily refused to oppose his distinguished colleague, Mr. Cheves, who was elected.

At an early period of the same session, a question out of the ordinary course, and which excited much interest at the time, became the subject of discussion, that of the merchants' bonds. The Non-importation Act (one of the restrictive measures) was in force when war was declared. Under its operation a large amount of capital had been accumulated abroad, and especially in England, the proceeds of exports that could not be returned in consequence of the prohibition of imports. The owners, when they saw war was inevitable, became alarmed, and gave orders for the return of their property. It came back, for the most part, in merchandise, which was subject to forfeiture under the act. The owners petitioned for the remission of the forfeiture, and permission to enter the goods on paying the war duties. The secretary of the treasury, on the other hand, proposed to remit the forfeiture on condition that the amount of the value of the goods should be loaned to the government by the owners. Mr. Cheves, who was at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means, reported in favour of the petition, and supported his report by an able speech. The question had assumed much of a party character, but it did not deter Mr. Calhoun from an independent exercise of his judgment. He believed that the act never contemplated a case of the kind, and that to enforce, under such circumstances, a forfeiture amounting to millions, which would embrace a large class of citizens, would be against the spirit of the criminal code of a free and enlightened people. But waving these more general views, he thought the only alternative was to remit the forfeiture, as prayed for by the owners, or to enforce it according to the provisions of the act: that, if the importation was such a violation as justly and properly incurred the forfeiture, then the act ought to be enforced; but if not, the forfeiture ought to be remitted; and that the government had no right, and if it had, it was unbecoming its dignity to convert a penal act into the means of making a forced loan. Thus thinking, he seconded the effort of his distinguished colleague, and enforced his views in a very able speech. The result was, that the forfeiture was remitted, and the goods admitted on paying duties in conformity to the course recommended by the committee.

There was another case in which, at this period, he evinced his firmness and independence. The administration still adhered to the restrictive policy, and even after the war was declared the President recommended the renewal of the Embargo. Mr. Calhoun, as has been shown, opposed, on principle, the whole system as a substitute for war, and he was still more opposed to it as an auxiliary to it. He held it, in that light, not only as inefficient and delusive, but as calculated to impair the means of the country, and to divert a greater share of its capital and industry to manufactures than could be, on the return of peace, sustained by the government on any sound principles of justice or policy. He thought war itself, without restrictions, would give so great a stimulus, that no small embarrassment and loss would result on its termination, in despite of all that could be done for them, while, at the same time, he expressed his willingness, when peace came, to protect the establishments that might grow up during its continuance, as far as it could be fairly done.

The Embargo failed on the first recommendation; but, at the next session, Deing recommended again, it succeeded. Mr. Calhoun, at the earnest entreaties

of friends, and to prevent division in the party when their union was so necessary to the success of the war, gave it a reluctant vote.

But the time was approaching when an opportunity would be afforded him to carry out successfully his views in reference to the restrictive system, and that with the concurrence of the party. The disasters of Bonaparte in the Russian campaign, his consequent fall and dethronement in the early part of 1814, and the triumph of Great Britain, after one of the longest, and, altogether, the most remarkable contests on record, offered that opportunity, which he promptly seized. This great event, which terminated the war in Europe, left Great Britain, flushed with victory, in full possession of all the vast resources, in men, money, and materials, by which she had brought that mighty conflict to a successful termination, to be turned against us. It was a fearful state of things; but, as fearful as it was of itself, it was made doubly so by the internal condition of the country, and the course of the opposition. Blinded by party zeal, they beheld with joy or indifference what was calculated to appal the patriotic. Forgetting the country, and intent only on a party triumph, they seized the opportunity to embarrass the government. Their great effort was made against the Loan Bill-a measure necessary to carry on the war. Instead of supporting it, they denounced the war itself as unjust and inexpedient; and they proclaimed its farther prosecution, in so unequal a contest, as hopeless, now that the whole power of the British Empire would be brought to bear against us. Mr. Calhoun replied in a manner highly characteristic of the man, undaunted, able, and eloquent. None can read this speech, even at this distance of time, without kindling under that elevated tone of feeling, which wisdom, emanating from a spirit lofty and self-possessed under the most trying circumstances, only can inspire. In order to show the justice and expediency of the war, he took an historical view of the maritime usurpations of Great Britain, from the celebrated order in council of 1756, to the time of the discussion, and demonstrated that her aggressions were not accidental, or dependant on peculiar circumstances, but were the result of a fixed system of policy, intended to establish her supremacy on the ocean. After giving a luminous view of the origin and character of the wrongs we had suffered from her, he clearly showed the flimsiness of the pretext by which she sought to justify her conduct, as well as that of the opposition to excuse her, and dwelt upon the folly of hoping to obtain redress by sheathing the sword or throwing ourselves on her justice. The following extract, taken from the conclusion, will afford an example of his lofty and animating eloquence:

"This country is left alone to support the rights of neutrals. Perilous is the condition, and arduous the task. We are not intimidated. We stand opposed to British usurpation, and, by our spirit and efforts, have done all in our power to save the last vestiges of neutral rights. Yes, our embargoes, non-intercourse, non-importation, and, finally, war, are all manly exertions to preserve the rights of this and other nations from the deadly grasp of British maritime policy. But (say our opponents) these efforts are lost, and our condition hopeless. If so, it only remains for us to assume the garb of our condition. We must submit, humbly submit, crave pardon, and hug our chains. It is not wise to provoke where we cannot resist. But first let us be well assured of the hopelessness of our state before we sink into submission. On what do our opponents rest their despondent and slavish belief? On the recent events in Europe? I admit they are great, and well calculated to impose on the imagination. Our enemy never presented a more imposing exterior. His fortune is at the flood. But I am admonished by universal experience, that such prosperity is the most precarious of human conditions. From the flood the tide dates its ebb. From the meridian the sun commences his decline. Depend upon it, there is more of sound philosophy than of fiction in the fickleness which poets attribute to fortune. Prosperity has its weakness, adversity its strength. In

many respects our enemy has lost by those very changes which seem so very much in his favour. He can no more claim to be struggling for existence; no more to be fighting the battles of the world in defence of the liberties of mankind. The magic cry of French influence' is lost. In this very hall we are not strangers to that sound. Here, even here, the cry of French influence,' that baseless fiction, that phantom of faction now banished, often resounded. I rejoice that the spell is broken by which it was attempted to bind the spirit of this youthful nation. The minority can no longer act under cover, but must come out and defend their opposition on its own intrinsic merits. Our example can scarcely fail to produce its effects on other nations interested in the maintenance of maritime rights. But if, unfortunately, we should be left alone to maintain the contest, and if, which may God forbid, necessity should compel us to yield for the present, yet our generous efforts will not have been lost. A mode of thinking and a tone of sentiment have gone abroad which must stimulate to future and more successful struggles. What could not be effected with eight millions of people will be done with twenty. The great cause will never be yielded-no, never, never! Sir, I hear the future audibly announced in the past-in the splendid victories over the Guerriere, Java, and Macedonian. We, and all nations, by these victories, are taught a lesson never to be forgotten. Opinion is power. The charm of British naval invincibility is gone."

Such was the animated strain by which Mr. Calhoun roused the spirit of the government and country under a complication of adverse circumstances calculated to overwhelm the feeble and appal the stoutest. Never faltering, never doubting, never despairing of the Republic, he was at once the hope of the party and the beacon light to the country.

But he did not limit his efforts to repelling the attacks of the opposition, and animating the hopes of the government and country. He saw that the very events which exposed us to so much danger, made a mighty change in the political and commercial relations of Continental Europe, which had been so long closed against foreign commerce, in consequence of the long war that grew out of the French Revolution, and of those hostile orders and decrees of the two great belligerents, which had for many years almost annihilated all lawful commerce between the Continent of Europe and the rest of the world. The events that dethroned Bonaparte put an end to that state of things, and left all the powers of Europe free to resume their former commercial pursuits. He saw in all this that the time had come to free the government entirely from the shackles of the restrictive system, to which he had been so long opposed; and he, accordingly, followed up his speech by a bill to repeal the Embargo and the Non-importation Act. He rested their repeal on the ground that they were a portion of the restrictive policy, and showed that the ground on which it had been heretofore sustained was, that it was a pacific policy, growing out of the extraordinary state of the world at the time it was adopted, and, of course, dependant on the continuance of that state. "It was a time," he said, "when every power on the Continent was arrayed against Great Britain, under the overwhelming influ ence of Bonaparte, and no country but ours interested in maintaining neutral rights. The fact of all the Continental ports being closed against her, gave to our restrictive measures an efficacy which they no longer had, now that they were open to her." He admitted that the system had been continued too long, and been too far extended, and that he was opposed to it as a substitute for war, but contended that there would be no inconsistency on the part of the government in abandoning a policy founded on a state of things which no longer existed. "But now," said he, "the Continental powers are neutrals, as between us and Great Britain. We are contending for the freedom of trade, and ought to use every exertion to attach to our cause Russia, Sweden, Holland, Denmark, and all other nations which have an interest in the freedom of the seas. The maritime rights assumed by Great Britain infringe on the

rights of all neutral powers, and if we should now open our ports and trade to the nations of the Continent, it would involve Great Britain in a very awkward and perplexing dilemma. She must either permit us to enjoy a very lucrative commerce with them, or, by attempting to exclude them from our ports by her system of paper blockades, she would force them to espouse our cause. The option which would thus be tendered her would so embarrass her as to produce a stronger desire for peace than ten years' continuance of the present system, inoperative as it is now rendered by a change of circumstances." These views had the desired effect, and the bill passed.

The subsequent session (that of 1814-15) was the last of the war sessions. It was short, terminating on the 4th of March. It was one of much excitement, but was principally distinguished for the project of a bank, submitted by the administration, and intended for the relief of the financial difficulties of the government. Upon this measure Mr. Calhoun differed from the administration and a large portion of the party.

It so happened that he was detained at home by sickness, and did not take his seat for several weeks after the commencement of the session, and his place as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations was filled by the late secretary of state, Mr. Forsyth. He found, on his arrival, the plan of a bank agreed on, and he was especially requested by the secretary of the treasury, with whom he had the kindest relations, and several members of the Committee of Ways and Means, to give it his particular attention, which he promised to do. His predisposition was strongly in favour of a bank of some kind. It was then generally thought to be indispensable to the prosecution of the war. With this disposition, and a strong desire to meet what were the views of the secretary and the administration, and of his friends on the Ways and Means, he took up the plan for examination. The whole subject of banking, theoretically and practically, was, in a great measure, new to him. He had never given it a serious and careful examination, and his mind, though favourably disposed to the plan, was open to the reception of truth.

The leading features of the plan were a bank of $50,000,000 of capital, to consist, with the exception of a few millions of specie, entirely of the stock issued by the government for loans made to carry on the war. It was not to pay specie during the war, nor till three years after its termination, and was to lend the government, whenever required, $30,000,000, at six per cent., to carry on the war. With all his prepossessions in its favour, he was soon struck by the fact, that the great leading object was to create a machine for lending money, not on the means or credit of the bank, or the individuals to be incorporated, but of the government itself; for the bank would not be bound to pay its notes, and would have little or nothing on which to lend but the stock of the governThe whole contrivance was, virtually, under the specious show of a loan, for the government to borrow back its own credit at six per cent., for which it had already stipulated to pay a high interest-not less, on an average, than eight per cent. Those who had lent the government, alleging that they had loaned all they had, modestly proposed to lend it, on its own credit, as much as it might need to carry on the war, if it would incorporate them under the magic name of "a bank," exempt them from the payment of their debts as a corporation, give them the use of the public money, and not only endorse their notes by receiving them for its dues, but also pay them away as money in their disbursements.

ment.

It was impossible for a mind constituted as Mr. Calhoun's not to see the whole effects of the scheme, or to give its assent to it, by whomsoever contrived, or by whatever name called. To him, no alternative was left but to sacrifice his judgment, or to differ from the administration and many of his friends who were anxious to have his support; but, as responsible and painful as was the alternative, he did not hesitate.