the difficulty of procuring the primary indispensable articles for the support of the army, is daily increasing in an almost incalculable ratio. The impression upon my mind at present is, that the enemy will be under the necessity of falling back upon their resources: for I have no idea that it will be possible, during the winter months and rainy season, to forward adequate supplies from Salamanca, or any other depôts in Spain, considering the length and impracticability of the roads. Lord Wellington has certainly conducted the whole of this campaign with great ability and prudence; and no one can reasonably refuse him the character of a great general. 66 My dear Sir, We will give an extract of another letter from behind these farfamed lines, as it affords us some little insight into the then state of Portugal. "We still remain quiet in winter quarters, without any movement of consequence; the enemy apparently suffering great hardships from want of supplies, but continuing in the same position, and carrying on their communications with the frontiers of Spain with great difficulty, and by means of numerous detachments. "Nothing can exceed the misery of this part of Portugal. Every article of human subsistence has long been consumed or destroyed. The poor inhabitants are kept from perishing by the contributions of the officers (British) of the different divisions of the army. This division daily feeds above three hundred: but for this resource, the greater part must have perished. "My dear Sir, All the world knows that Massena, after wasting his resources before Torres Vedras was obliged to retreat discomfited before an army of not one-third his numerical force. In addition to the account of these operations to be found in Mr. Robinson's work, we add a letter of our own from General Picton, which will be read with the greatest interest. "I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 12th of March, and one by Mr. whom I took the earliest opportunity of recommending to the particular attention of Mr. Kennedy, the commissary-general, who, I am sure, will give him every opportunity of becoming useful to the public, and eventually to himself. This letter is written, as you will not fail to observe, from Spain. We have effectually driven the French out of Portugal, with the single exception of Almeida, (where they have a small garrison,) which we have invested, but cannot besiege, for want of battering cannon; but as it is entirely cut off from any possible communication with the French army in Spain, it must submit in the course of a few weeks. Whilst we have been employed in pursuing Massena, the rascally Spaniards took an opportunity of treacherously giving the enemy possession of Badajos, which obliged Lord Wellington, in the midst of his movements after Massena, to detach Sir W. C. Beresford, and a principal division of the army, consisting of sixteen British regiments, and nearly as many Portuguese battalions, to oppose Marshal Mortier, who is now shut up in Badajos with about five thousand. If he succeeds in compelling him to surrender, as we confidently hope he will, the business of Portugal will be completely settled for some time; but from all I have seen of the Spaniards, I have little, indeed no hopes of their ever being able to do any thing. "I find Maitland goes out to Sicily; he will be an honour to his country wherever he is employed. "If any thing can be done to prevent my being engaged with Mr. M'Donald's affairs, pray endeavour to effect it. I would willingly make great sacrifices to get rid of this last West Indian concern, which hangs so heavily about my neck. "Nothing can be worse than the existing government of this country, and unless the Princess Regent of Portugal determines to get rid of all the rascally factions, by appointing Lord Wellington Vice-Regent, with full powers to administer the government, every thing will shortly be as bad as ever here. The Portuguese army, for want of being properly recruited, is rapidly falling off every day. They scarcely bring twenty thousand bayonets into the field now, and in the course of another year they will not bring fifteen thousand, unless some more effectual mode of executing the existing laws be had recourse to. Two regiments attached to my division, the establishment of which is two thousand five hundred men, do not bring one thousand two hundred into the field, and this is pretty generally the proportion throughout the army. The men are well disposed, good subjects, and I have found them, on all occasions, show an excellent spirit, and no want of courage in the face of the enemy. "Your very faithful, "Humble servant, "T. PICTON." At this period, Picton's fame rose rapidly. The troops under his command were called, par excellence, the fighting division, and he and they were in continual contact with the enemy. As we beat the enemy out of Portugal, Picton was continually opposed to the gallant and unfortunate Ney, who commanded the rear-guard of the French; and our hero (for such we have a right to call him) pays the marshal very high and merited eulogium. We cannot here record the almost daily battles that took place between divisions and brigades. The battle of Fuentes de Onoro ensued, and added fresh laurels to the leader of "the fighting division." In the mean time, Wellington, wishing much to reduce Badajos, had ordered Marshal Beresford to invest it. The following letter will not be misplaced here. "MY DEAR SIR, "Peno Dona, 8th May, 1812. "I had the pleasure of your letter by Mr. Henwell, who arrived in the camp before Badajos on the morning previous to the assault of that place, and fortunately participated in that event. He was, in consequence, recommended for an ensigncy in the 43rd regiment, to which there is little doubt of his succeeding. After the capture of Badajos, we were under the necessity of moving rather expeditiously northward, as Marshal Marmont had made an incursion during our absence, with the view of drawing us from our main object, the siege of Badajos; but in this expectation he was disappointed, by the celerity of our operations, which he did not calculate upon. He, however, did very considerable injury in the province, and carried off cattle and other booty of no inconsiderable value; and, what is of very great importance, he has taught us what value to place upon a militia force, which the ministerial papers, with you, have so frequently and so loudly cried up as nowhere yielding to regulars. The militia of the northern provinces, under their generals, two English and one Portuguese, of established reputation, and whose names and exploits have frequently figured in the gazettes, were driven from the strong post of Guarda, and perfectly dispersed and dissipated by about five hundred French horse. If we rely upon our vast establishment of the kind, we shall, some day or other, be woefully disappointed. These people, like ours, had sufficient mechanical discipline, and were equal in appearance and equipment to any regulars: but war is a practical science, and is only to be learned in collision with the enemy. I seriously apprehend that our military system will eventually lead to a great national misfortune, unless it be more practically organized in time. "We are now approaching the river Douro, in order to be near our depôts of provisions, whilst our means of transport are employed in supplying Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo with provisions; and I shall profit of this movement to visit Oporto, and, on my return, if MajorGeneral Colville should be sufficiently recovered from his wounds to take charge of the division, I shall take my passage for England, where my affairs require my presence. The public despatches will let you know what we have been about, and I trust you will not think we have been idle or uselessly employed. The general idea is that we shall again move southward, to carry on offensive operations on that side, but we are not in sufficient force to act, at the same time, on the offensive there, and the defensive here. We want at least fifteen thousand English troops more to do any thing decisive. I shall probably see you in August. My dear Sir, "T. PICTON." Soult advanced to relieve Badajos, and Wellington to check Soult, and thus the streams of war were all poured simultaneously towards that de voted city. Picton with his division was ordered with most of the army into this field of operations. Wellington being now most anxious to get possession of the city, before Soult could relieve it, hurried on the operations against it with unheard-of rapidity. Generals Picton and Houston invested the place; but owing to other distant manœuvres, the siege was abandoned, and turned into a lax blockade. During this, Picton wrote to Mr. Marryat the following almost desponding letter. "Smith, I see, has a large support in the House. The ministry support him to cover their own ignorance and folly in the appointment; and his former connexions, the Whigs and abolitionists, will not forsake an old friend in distress. You know I was always against puppet-show legislature in the country, and I have hitherto seen nothing to make me change my opinion. Generally speaking, and with few exceptions, it is a society composed of materials unfit to be trusted with the important power of legislation. It will be enough to give them good laws, and respectable, responsible people to execute them with impartiality. "The approach of Soult and Marmont determined Lord Wellington to raise the siege, or rather, blockade of Badajos, and we have now taken up a defensive line on the right bank of the Guadiana, behind the fortresses of Elvas and Campo Major. "There is no probability of our undertaking offensive operations. Indeed, we are in no situation to attempt any thing of the kind, considering the relative situations of the two armies: for, independent of the mixed materials we are composed of, in numerical force they exceed us at least by one third. You appear every where to entertain sanguine expectations of our ulterior successes. I am concerned that I cannot say any thing to keep up so pleasant a delusion, but believe me, it cannot last long. "Ministry represent the Portuguese force as amounting to forty thousand regulars, and fifty thousand militia. The regulars do not amount to twenty thousand, and, as for the militia, they are scarcely worth bringing into the account. If it is intended to carry on the war with a paper force of this kind, you will all very shortly be undeceived. There are independent bands of freebooters who harass the French considerably in several parts of Spain, but they are equally formidable to the Spanish inhabitants, who dread them to the full as much as they do the enemy. And you may depend upon it, the great mass of the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces have submitted to the French yoke, and are not disposed to make any further struggle. We are playing, in my opinion, a very losing game in carrying on the war with our own money, at an immense expense, whilst the French army are wholly supported by the resources of Spain. This kind of contest cannot last long. Portugal, whatever your wise heads may say to the contrary, is a mere caput mortuum, or a dead weight upon our hands in the contest, and does not supply any force or co-operation of consideration for the 2,000,000l. she receives. Dec. 1835.-VOL. XIV.-NO. LVI. A A Unless the whole resources of this country are made subservient and applicable to her defence, the contest cannot be carried on with any reasonable probability of ultimate success. "You will think me a gloomy predictor, but I fear, in the end, it will turn out that I have drawn legitimate conclusions. I shall be most happy to find them disproved by more favourable events than I look forward to at present; but I must continue under similar impressions until that period. 66 My dear Sir, "T. PICTON.". After this, partial affairs were continually occurring, in all which General Picton bore a distinguished part. We refer the reader to the encounter of the 22nd of September, recorded in the work before us, to show the nature of these actions, and of the vast importance the properly conducting of them was to the safety of the whole army. The following letter, written about this time, will be found to bear upon the matter then at issue, and to be generally interesting. "We are again restored to our old theatre between the Coa and Agueda, and most probably shall move forward and cross the latter. The insuperable difficulty (from distance, and the nature of the roads) to the transporting forward the heavy ordnance and stores for a siege, will effectually prevent our attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, but we shall push on towards Salamanca, for the purpose of drawing the French armies from the rich countries where they are now cantoned. If this purpose should be effected by our manœuvre, we shall have gained a most important point. As soon as they find us moving, in force, upon Salamanca, they will be obliged to concentrate the whole of their force, now cantoned in the rich countries about Talavera de la Reyna, Placencia, and Coria, and march without loss of time upon Ciudad Rodrigo, when Lord Wellington, having effected his purpose, that of drawing them into a country where they cannot exist without separating, may either fight them to advantage, or take up a position behind the Agueda, in readiness to profit by any false movement they may make. If Buonaparte's attention should be taken up in the North, so as to prevent his amply reinforcing his armies in the Peninsula, I think we shall be able to afford him plenty of amusement here; but this war cannot be carried on without money, and if we cannot afford a liberal supply, we had better give it up at once. With money we can command abundant supplies on the frontiers of Spain, and can manœuvre to great advantage over an enemy who is under the necessity of separating continually to collect his means of subsistence, but without, we shall not be able to effect any thing of consequence, as all our movements will depend upon the procuring supplies, which we draw from the sea ports by a long, difficult land carriage. Our movements are not nearly as expeditious as they would be, were we not dependent on such considerations. As long as we |