tions of old principles are required. Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. Div. 365.

"Whatever tends to injustice or oppression, restraint of liberty, restraint of legal right; whatever tends to the obstruction of justice, a violation of a statute, or the obstruction or perversion of the administration of the law; whatever tends to interfere with or control the administration of the law as to executive, legislative or other official action, whenever embodied in and made the subject of a contract, the contract is against public policy, and therefore void, and not susceptible of enforcement.'

If the contract made between the parties here was faithfully carried out, it is difficult to see how the public would be harmed. Prosecuting attorneys are so often members of a firm of lawyers that we might take judicial notice of the fact that such partnerships exist. The statutes of the State take notice of the fact, and provisions are made regulating the conduct of the members of the partnership. Sections 2567, 2568, 1 Comp. Laws (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 1162, 1163). From our knowledge of attorneys we can readily see that it may be a great advantage to the people of the State if the prosecuting attorney, who is usually a young man, has the benefit of being associated with a lawyer or lawyers of greater experience. We are not satisfied that the public is harmed by such a contract. In Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256 (21 N. W. 336), the following language was used:

"(1) We think the judge committed no error in his instructions respecting the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this subject is thus stated in an early New York case. The right of a partner to dissolve, it is said, 'is a right inseparably incident to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership. Every partner has an indefeasible right to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by publishing his own volition to that effect; and, after such publication, the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with each other that the partnership shall continue seven years, either partner may dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his determination for that purpose; the only con

sequence being that he thereby subjects himself to a claim for damages for a breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to another to make joint contracts for them both is not only a revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of the capacity to revoke it. Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. [N. Y.] 513, 538 [10 Am. Dec. 286]. To the same effect are Mason v. Connell, 1 Whart. [Pa.] 381, and Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 155 [98 Am. Dec. 248]. There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to make it specially injurious; but no question of equitable restraint arises here. When one partner becomes dissatisfied, there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compelling a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure, subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that responsibility would exist in breaking a contract of partnership as in other cases."

This language would seem to justify the decree that was made.

It should be affirmed, with costs, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

LUSCOMBE v. PETERSON.

DEEDS--DELIVERY-ESCROW.

Complainant entered into possession of his brother's farm, as claimed by him, under an agreement to work the land during the brother's lifetime and to have the proceeds thereof, paying the taxes and keeping up the place: complainant also averred that his brother some years later stated that he had fixed the title so that it would pass at his death to complainant. The brother denied any agreement to convey title. In

reliance on such arrangement, complainant claimed to have built a house on the premises. In fact the brother had prepared a deed, which he left in escrow with a justice of the peace whereby complainant and his wife were to have a life estate after the grantor's death, their son to have a life estate and the remainder to their grandson. Said grantor afterwards being advised that the deed was invalid, prepared a new instrument which he intended to take effect after his death, but delivered to complainant who handed it to the scrivener. It was not recorded. Held, that the transaction operated as a delivery to complainant, that title passed and the grantor could not later recall the deed and execute a conveyance to third persons.1 OSTRANDER, STONE, and BIRD, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Montcalm; Davis, J. Submitted June 7, 1912. (Docket No. 47.) Decided December 17, 1912. Rehearing denied February 18, 1913.

Bill by John B. Luscombe and others against Peter Peterson and another for the cancellation of a deed, and other relief. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

R. A. Hawley, for complainants.

I. L. Hubbell and F. C. Miller, for defendants.

BROOKE, J. I am of the opinion that the learned circuit judge reached a proper conclusion in this cause. After Lyman W. Luscombe learned from Wilson, who drew the original papers, that they were no good, he went back to Wilson with the complainant, John B. Luscombe, for the purpose of correcting the error he had been told was made.

He testified:

"Q. Before you made the change you told your brother John, and you and John went to Wilson together, didn't you?

'As to effect of delivery of deed to grantee, subject to a future extrinsic condition, see note in 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941.

Delivery of deed to third person to be delivered to grantee after grantor's death upon performance of conditions by grantee, see note in 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317

"A. Yes; he said it was no good.

"Q. You fixed it up so it was good?

"A. I supposed so.

"Q. So your brother would have it after you passed away while he and his wife lived and then Robert should have it?

Wilson, the scrivener, testified in part as follows:

"A. He wanted to deed it to his brother, John, and at his death and his wife's death he wanted his son, Robert, John's son Robert, to have it as long as he lived. Then he wanted Robert's oldest son to have it. I can't say as I remember any further conversation before drawing up the papers. Might by jogging my memory; a good many years ago. I believe he stated John lived on the place at that time. If he told me how long John had lived there, I don't remember. I made out a deed at that time.

"Q. I wish you would describe what was in the instrument, as near as you can remember.

"A. The deed was filled out as Lyman Luscombe as party of the first part to John B. Luscombe as party of the second. The consideration, if I remember right, was $1. Then the description of the land was given, and then, after the description was given, it further stated that at the time of John's death and his wife's he wanted Robert Luscombe to have it, his son, John's son; and at the time of his death, Robert's death, he wanted Robert's oldest son to have it. After I drew the document, I read it to him. It was drawn on a warranty deed headed 'Long Form,' containing the usual covenants.

"Q. After the deed was drawn and read to him what was done?

"A. He told me he wanted to leave it with me. "Q. Did he sign it?

"A. Yes, sir; he signed the deed.

"Q. Will you state as to whether it was witnessed or

not?

"A. Yes; signed, witnessed, and acknowledged. I don't remember who the witnesses were. There were two of them. I was a notary, and took the acknowledgment. Nothing further said or done about it any further than he

told me to keep it. He wanted to leave the papers with

"Q. When he came to your office in 1904, as you remember it, in relation to this property, do you know how he happened to come there at that time?

"A. My attention was called on the street or in the People's Savings Bank over here by Mr. Lambertson to an article in the Northwestern Review, stating that a deed made in that kind of manner there had to be a transfer made.

"Q. Delivery you mean?

"A. Yes, sir; delivery of the deed. I had left my papers there at the bank, and Mr. Lambertson knew they were there, and I brought up that matter about him. I said there was no delivery made there. We talked the matter over. So I called Lyman's attention to it.

"Q. In what way?

"Ă. I have forgot whether-I think I spoke to him. I told him I was informed there had to be a delivery made of the deed, and I think I wrote to John, his brother. I think I wrote to him, and says I, 'If that is the case, we had better fix these matters up.' So he and John came into the store together, to the best of my remembrance, and I told him that this deed that he drew up formerly looked to me as though it was entailing the property. I told him, if I was in his place, I would change it, and have only one name mentioned in it besides John's. He told me I might draw up another one. So I drew up another deed of the same property, and with just Robert's name mentioned besides John's.

"Q. How was that deed worded, as near as you can remember it?

"A. It was worded like the first one, copied from the first one, with the exception of Robert's oldest son. "Q. That was left out?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Now was that deed read over to Lyman Luscombe? "A. To the best of my remembrance it was.

"Q. When he came there on each occasion, as I understand you, or on the first occasion when he came there, he told you he wanted a deed made of his property? "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. To John? And he stated he wanted it fixed so it would not have to be probated?

"A. Yes, sir.