At no time did the jury ask the court for further instructions upon the question of self-defense. The complaint is not made on the part of respondent on the ground that no such instruction was given. In our opinion the court properly confined these later instructions to matters requested by the jury, and from the result it appears that the respondent was not prejudiced.

After the jury retired for the last time to deliberate on a verdict, and while the court was in session, and in presence of both counsel, the court officer handed a paper to the court, and the record shows as follows:

"Mr. Riford: (Counsel for Respondent): Is that a communication from the jury?

"The Court: Yes.

Mr. Riford: I think we are entitled to know what that communication is from the jury.

"The Court: I think not.

"Mr. Riford: The circuit judge on the bench has received a communication from the jury. Counsel for respondent respectfully asks the court to know what that is, and the court respectfully declines, and we take an exception."

Error is assigned upon the refusal of the trial court to state the communication sent in by the jury. No statement was made by the court to any person of the nature of this communication; nor was any communication sent by the court in answer thereto. No authorities are cited in support of the contention of respondent, and this court has been unable to find any directly in point. There are authorities which hold that a court may not communicate with a jury after it has retired to deliberate, or in the absence and without the consent of counsel go before the jury for the purpose of instruction. In the instant case the court did not communicate with the jury. It is evident that the jury, or some member of it, communicated upon some matter, in writing, with the court. This was voluntary, and a matter which was not within the control of the court, and apparently was not a request for further

178 MICH.-84.

instructions. Whatever it was, the learned trial judge, without divulging the matter, paid no attention to it. In our opinion this was a reasonable exercise of his judicial discretion. Nothing prejudicial to the respondent appears from this communication, and no error was committed.

We find no prejudicial error in this case. The conviction is affirmed, and the court below is directed to proceed to judgment.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, BROOKE, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

CLOTHIER v. MILLER.

1. TAXATION-AUDITOR GENERAL-CANCELLATION OF SALE. The auditor general is authorized to cancel tax sales which are invalid because of defects in notice, process, or decree; and the sale is equally void whether he takes such action or not.

2. SAME.

Whether or not a change or erasure made in the date of cancellation, as shown on the records in the office of the auditor general, was fraudulent, was not material, where the cancellation, in fact, took place before the issuance of deeds to the applicant for purchase, and was duly made under Act No. 169, Pub. Acts 1899 (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 1910).

3. SAME-NOTICE-LACHES.

Having actual notice in 1900 of a tax title purchase against lands owned by them for taxes of 1887, and having instituted proceedings to secure possession by ejectment in 1906, complainants' bill to annul tax deeds filed in 1909 was barred by laches. 1 Comp. Laws, § 3959 (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 1911). 4. SAME REDEMPTION-DEOREE.

Without some attempt to make a tender or payment into court

of the amount required to redeem, a decree denying the right of redemption was justified after more than six months from due service of notice pursuant to 1 Comp. Laws, §§ 3959, 3960, as amended (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 1911, 1912). The time for redemption is not extended by the commencement and continuation of a suit to determine the validity of the tax deeds.

Appeal from Chippewa; Steere, J. Submitted November 15, 1912. (Docket No. 26.) Decided January 3, 1913.

Bill by Caroline M. Clothier and another against David I. Miller and others for the annulment of certain tax deeds and other conveyances. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

D. W. Closser (Davidson, Hudson & Green, of counsel), for complainants.

Roger I. Wykes, Attorney General (Charles W. McGill and George L. Hauser, of counsel), for defendant auditor general.

John W. Shine, for defendant Miller.

E. S. B. Sutton, for defendant Peninsula Bark & Lumber Co.

BROOKE, J. The opinion of the learned circuit judge who heard this cause very clearly sets forth the facts, and his legal conclusions thereon. It follows:

"This suit is instituted to set aside certain tax deeds and conveyances under them held by certain of the defendants on the following lands in Chippewa county: N.

of the N. E. 4, section 22, township 45 N., range 1 W., N. E. of N. W. t, section 22, township 45 N., range 1 W.; N. E. of S. E. 4, section 22, township 45 N., range 1 W. The bill was filed in August, 1909, following two previous proceedings brought by complainants against the same tax titles. The first was a petition in chancery filed in 1906. After an answer had been filed by defendant Miller, the matter was continued from term to term for

over a year, and finally dismissed for want of prosecution. The second was a suit in ejectment brought in June, 1908. On the trial of that action, plaintiffs, who are complainants in this suit, introduced evidence against the validity of these same tax titles, and sought to defeat them. The action was apparently brought only for that purpose. On the trial, it was shown that the lands were wild and unoccupied. The tax titles were not found to be invalid, but subject to the redemption under the tax law; it being found that certain attempted notices of tax purchase served in 1900 were defective in failing to name the State and county in which the lands were located, and it was therefore held that the complainants were, at that time, entitled to possession as against the defendants.

"Following this decision, new notices were served by defendants, proof of service being filed with the county clerk March 23, 1909. No redemption was made or attempted by complainants, but this bill was filed the following August attacking the validity of the same tax titles on the ground that the auditor general erroneously computed the amount required by law to be paid for the same. It is undisputed that the purchaser paid to the auditor general's office an amount in excess of the sum required by law, but it is claimed that $7.60 was returned which should have been retained. These lands formerly belonged to Arthur Hill, a lumberman of Saginaw, and they had apparently been abandoned as not worth paying the taxes upon, in the same manner as were many other cut over lands purchased by lumbermen for the pine in early days. These lands have been delinquent for taxes for over 20 years. Truman R. French made application in 1900 to purchase these lands, together with others, at the auditor general's office. In connection with the application for the purchase, Mr. French deposited with the auditor general $491.10. Tax deeds were issued on this application, dated March 28, 1900, for the years 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1894, and as a condition of purchase the taxes were paid on the lands for the years 1887, 1890, and other years. On August 14, 1900, French had notice of purchase under tax sale served on Arthur Hill and Arthur Hill Company as the fee owners in the recorded chain of title. Proof of service of notice was filed June 13, 1904. These notices did not contain the name of the State or county in which the lands were situated and were held invalid as heretofore stated.

"The complainants claim title through certain deeds obtained from persons in whom the fee rested through a regular chain of title from the original purchaser. These deeds are quitclaim in form, and the consideration is nominal. The form of conveyance is such that whatever title complainants have acquired is subject to all defects, delinquencies, and laches which could be imputed to their grantors. As to the proper amount legally required to be paid the auditor general for the French purchase, we have three different computations presented and urged, varying according to the claims and theories of the parties in interest. On behalf of the auditor general, it is contended that the sum paid him was the exact amount required by law. In behalf of the defendant Miller, it is contended that the auditor general retained from the amount deposited with him $18 in excess of the legal amount, for interest and fees and unauthorized resales, he having no right to include in his petitions for certain years lands previously sold and then held by the State as State tax lands. The discrepancy of $7.60 between the amount retained by the auditor general and that contended for by complainants arises from the amount computed as due for the years 1887 and 1890, the same being computed by the auditor general on the basis of canceled sales and amount required to be paid as condition of purchase for other years, rather than a purchase for those years; while complainants contend that, the lands having been previously sold for those years and bid in by the State, no legal cancellation had been or could be made by the auditor general and that computation should be on the basis of a purchase rather than a payment of taxes, which would increase the amount required as contended for. The sale for the taxes of 1887 was absolutely void for lack of the dollar mark in the decree, a defect in the form of tax record furnished by the auditor general for that year, and practically uniform throughout the State. This defect was held jurisdictional in the case of Millard v. Truax, 99 Mich. 157 [58 N. W. 70], and has been repeatedly so treated in all our courts. As to that particular year, it has been expressly said by our Supreme Court:

"The land is in a class by itself, under the charge and control of the auditor general.'

'The sale for taxes of 1890 was void for defect in proof of publication and failure of the county treasurer to make