and file proper proof of sale. The sales for those two years were equally invalid, whether the auditor general so declared and canceled them or not. It is the opinion of this court that he had power to cancel them at any time for the reasons stated, and it is in proof that he did cancel them and the cancellation was determined upon some time before January 4, 1900.

"An examination of the State tax lands list No. 13, produced from the auditor general's office, and offered in evidence, shows that a change had been made on that record in the date of cancellation, it appearing as January 2, 1909, a date immediately prior to French's application to purchase. In behalf of complainants, this is dwelt upon as a serious matter, indicating some favoritism to French and possible dishonesty in making up the records. This changing of records, for which various theories, but no satisfactory reasons, are given, naturally weakens the authenticity of such records and lays them open to suspicion, but, in the view taken by the court of the legal aspect of this case, the alteration or change becomes immaterial from any point of view; it being satisfactorily shown that the cancellation took place before issuing the tax deeds. In making the cancellation, the auditor general was acting under authority of section 139 of the general tax law [Pub. Acts 1899, Act No. 169, 1 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 1910], and as he made the cancellation prior to issuing the deeds or receipts for sales of other years, the exact date is unimportant.

"The manifest object of section No. 139 was to provide ways to enforce the lien of the State and collect its revenues. That object would be more adequately and quickly accomplished by a cancellation followed by a speedy payment of the State lien for that year in connection with the purchase of tax titles of other years than by the slower and more certain process of cancellation, petition for sale, advertising, decree, and resale in the regular course of delinquent tax proceedings. The claim of laches urged by defendants has much force in the opinion of the court. The complainants, holding by quitclaim deeds, have imputed to them, not only their own delinquencies, but those of their grantors. These lands have been returned delinquent for taxes since 1887. The owner was presumed to know that his lands are annually taxed, to know when the taxes fall due, and the process and time of proceeding to enforce the State lien. No attempt or offer was ever

made since 1887 by the complainants or their grantors to pay these taxes, except in connection with the recent attempt to obtain cancellation of the French purchase. As early as 1900 complainants received actual notice of French's tax titles and of his purpose to perfect the same, although the notice was not in legal form to cut off redemption. As early as 1906, complainants' interests were in charge of an attorney, who was instituting proceedings in their behalf. Various letters were received from the auditor general stating the situation. They were fully advised, and had actual notice and knowledge touching these delinquent taxes and the tax titles for over three years before this suit was begun. The rule declared in Hayward v. O'Connor, 145 Mich. 52 [108 N. W. 366], seems to us to be in point in this case and to control. The bill of complaint will be dismissed, with costs.”

We are satisfied that the learned circuit judge reached a correct conclusion as to the validity of the sale on the French application, and that complainants' bill was properly dismissed.

Upon the filing of the opinion in the court below, complainants presented a decree in line with the opinion, but containing the following clause:

"It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that complainants may redeem the lands described in said bill of complaint by depositing with the register in chancery of said court the amount required to redeem said lands, under the provisions of sections 140 and 141 of the general tax law, within 30 days from the date on which solicitor for complainants receives notice of the entry and filing of this decree, and not afterwards."

This decree the circuit judge refused to enter, but, instead, entered a decree dismissing complainants' bill without condition. In this court complainants urge that, if we find the French sale to be valid, we should enter a decree permitting complainants to secure a reconveyance of the property upon complying with the provisions of sections 140 and 141 of the general tax law (1 Comp. Laws, §§ 3959, 3960, 1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 1911, 1912). It appears from the record that proof of service of the notice to

redeem was filed on March 23, 1909. By section 141 of the tax law, it is provided that:

* in the regular

"Any grantee or grantees chain of title * ** shall be entitled to receive from the person so claiming under and by virtue of such tax deed, at any time within six months after the personal service of such notice or the date of mailing said notice by registered mail * * * a reconveyance of such interest in such lands so held, together with all certificates and tax receipts * upon payment to the owner of such tax deed or the register in chancery * * * the amount paid upon such purchase, together with 100 per cent, in addition thereto.

* *

It is therefore apparent that complainants had a right upon compliance with this section to demand a reconveyance from defendants at any time prior to September 23, 1909. No attempt was made by complainants to secure such reconveyance within the time limited by the statute, but, instead of so doing, they commenced this suit on August 4, 1909. This was within the six months, during which the statute confers the right to secure a reconveySection 142 of the tax law, as amended by Act 142 of the Public Acts of 1905, provides that the purchaser at the tax sale shall not enter into possession of the lands so purchased until six months after he has given notice to the parties in interest. This section contains the further provision:

ance.

"Provided, that if suit or other proceedings is commenced before the expiration of the said six months by the owner of the land so purchased, or one having a redeemable interest therein, to set aside the sale thereof, the purchaser under tax sale or his grantee shall not enter into possession of the land until the final determination of such suit or other proceeding."

It would seem to be the contention of complainants that the commencement of the suit to test the validity of the tax sale not only prevents the purchaser from taking possession during the pendency of the proceeding, but likewise operates to extend the period fixed by section 141

during which a reconveyance may be secured. To so hold would give the complainants the right to redeem more than three years after the expiration of the six months allowed by statute. The right to redeem under this section has been held to expire six months after the sheriff's return of service of the statutory notice has been filed. Pike v. Richardson, 136 Mich. 414 (99 N. W. 398); Holmes v. Loud, 149 Mich. 410 (112 N. W. 1109). In the case of McDonald v. Miller, 162 Mich. 81 (127 N. W. 262), a decree dismissing complainant's bill of complaint, but reserving the right of the complainant to obtain a reconveyance under the provisions of sections 140143 of the general tax law within 30 days after the final determination of the cause, was affirmed by this court. The right of the circuit court to make such decree does not appear, however, to have been questioned in that case, and in this court the defendant asked that complainant be given the right to redeem. We can perceive no good reason for extending the scope of the statute by a strained construction, even if that were possible. Complainants could readily have protected their rights by paying into court the amount necessary to secure a reconveyance at the time suit was started. The fact that they did not do 80 would seem to indicate that at that time they did not care to place themselves in the position of being compelled to accept a reconveyance in case of the failure of their attack upon the validity of the French sale. If the situation has now changed, and they find, when too late, that it would be to their interest to secure a reconveyance under the statute, they cannot complain.

The decree is affirmed, without costs to either party.

MOORE, MCALVAY, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. STEERE, C. J., and KUHN, J., did not sit.

LILLIE v. AUDITOR GENERAL.

TAXATION-MANDAMUS-REDEMPTION-CERTIFICATE OF ERROR. During the pendency of a suit involving relator's right to redeem from a tax sale, mandamus will not lie to determine the same issues and to compel the auditor general to issue a certificate of error and permit the relator to redeem from the sale without paying the statutory penalty.

Mandamus by Walter I. Lillie, trustee of the estate of Mary A. White, deceased, against Oramel B. Fuller, auditor general, to compel the issuance of a certificate of error as against certain sales of State tax lands, and for other relief. Submitted December 19, 1912. (Calendar No. 25,388.) Writ denied January 3, 1913.

Walter I. Lillie, in pro. per.

Roger I. Wykes, Attorney General (Charles W. McGill and George L. Hauser, of counsel), for respondent.

BROOKE, J. This is an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the auditor general to issue a certificate of error canceling two certain tax deeds conveying lands belonging to the estate of which relator is trustee. Relator further prays:

"That your petitioner be allowed to redeem from the sale of said property for the tax thereon assessed for the year 1908 and sold as State tax land at the sale made in May, 1912, without paying the 100 per cent. as required by section 140 of the tax law of the State of Michigan."

Inasmuch as it appears from the petition and answer that relator on July 3, 1912, filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court for the county of Ottawa, in chancery, wherein the purchaser at the tax sale, his attorney in fact, and the respondent herein were made defendants, in which proceeding substantially the same questions are in