of the land. The question as to whether the appraisal is in evidence depends upon the following testimony: "Mr. Kemp identifies file handed him as the official file from his office in the law case of the Yale State Bank v. Fred C. Fletcher. "Mr. Weymouth: I offer the files in evidence. "Court: You may offer the papers by title. "Mr. Weymouth: We offer in evidence the writ of attachment entitled in the case of the Yale State Bank v. Fred C. Fletcher, the return under date of May 13, 1909, by William H. Epplett, sheriff, filed May 25, 1909." The testimony elsewhere shows that the writ, inventory, appraisal, and return were all fastened together, and it is the argument of the complainant that, when the writ was admitted in evidence, all the papers were thereby admitted. Whatever merit there may be in this contention, it cannot avail where the trial court in advance suggests that the papers be offered by their title. By this suggestion the trial court said in effect to counsel that, whatever papers he desired admitted, he must make specific offers of them. Because the appraisal was fastened to the writ, as a matter of convenience in making the return, it did not thereby become a part of it, so as to admit it in evidence under a ruling admitting the writ. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide what force the appraisal would have had as evidence of value if it had been properly in the case. Aside from the appraisal, there is no evidence of the value of the 40 acres. When an equity court is asked to set aside a conveyance on the ground of fraud and the amount of land conveyed does not exceed the acreage exempted by the Constitution and statutes, there should be some substantial showing that the value of it exceeds the exempted value, and, until this showing is made, the homesteader ought not to be disturbed in the possession and enjoyment of his exemption. The chancellor has given us no hint as to the reasons which moved him to deny relief to complainant; but we think the denial was fully warranted on this ground, and his decree will be affirmed, but without prejudice to the complainant. The defendants will recover their costs in this court. STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. BARRIS v. EMMONS. 1. ESTATES OF DECEDENTS—FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES—EXEOUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. In a suit by the administrator of an estate to set aside a conveyance, made by deceased to take effect at his death, of a life interest in his homestead to his widow and the remainder to his children by a former marriage, the deed was properly set aside as fraudulent to creditors, though the widow was the principal and largest claimant. 2. SAME-ACCEPTANCE-ESTOPPEL-PAYMENT. The widow could not be held to have accepted the conveyance as payment of her claim because she caused it to be recorded after her husband's death, where there was no recital that payment was intended, nor did her act estop her from objecting to its validity unless the other grantees so acted in reliance thereon as to prejudice their rights if it was set aside. 3. SAME-WIDOW'S RIGHTS-DOWER. Until her dower rights were assigned to the widow, she was entitled to occupy the homestead under 3 Comp. Laws, § 8929, 4 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 10921. 4. SAME. The suit being instituted by the administrator to subject the property of decedent to the rights of creditors, the attitude of the widow was not controlling. 5. SAME RES JUDICATA-FRAUD. The contention that the claim of the widow against the estate was a fraud, was res judicata, after her claim had been allowed by the commissioners on claims and allowed at reduced amount on appeal to the circuit court, from which judgment no further appeal was taken. Appeal from Allegan; Padgham, J. Submitted October 11, 1912. (Docket No. 37.) Decided February 18, 1913. Bill by Ransom J. Barris, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Alfred Emmons, against Emily E. B. Emmons and others, to set aside a conveyance of decedent for the benefit of creditors. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal. Affirmed. C. R. Wilkes, for complainant. BROOKE, J. The facts in this case are clearly stated in the opinion of the learned circuit judge, who heard it, as follows: “The bill in this cause is filed by the administrator of the estate of said Alfred Emmons, deceased, to subject certain real estate (owned by said Emmons at his decease) to the payment of his debts, as allowed against his estate; there being no personal estate with which to pay said debts. The said Alfred Emmons died on, to wit, the 7th day of June, 1907, intestate, and up to that time was the owner in fee of the 'east half of the west half of the southwest quarter of section 14, township 4 north, of range 12 west, Allegan county, Mich.' Afterward, to wit, on the 27th day of January, 1908, the probate court of Allegan county duly appointed the said John A. Beamer administrator of the estate of said Emmons, deceased, who accepted the trust, filed his bond, and received letters of administration of said estate. An inventory and appraisal of said estate was duly made; and the appraisal of said real estate was $3,000, and personal was appraised at the sum of $211. Afterward the widow's statutory allowance set off to her by the probate court, to wit, $200, and allowance to the said widow of $3 per week for the time of one year. This last amount has not been paid. The said Alfred Emmons, at the time of his decease, left a widow, Emily E. B. Emmons, him surviving, and three daughters by a former marriage, whose names are as follows [defendants herein]: Lydia J. Morehead, Esther Ann Bisbee, and Lillie E. Parsons. Commissioners on claims were duly appointed by the probate court, and claims were allowed by them to one Oscar Douglas for the sum of $54.25, and to Emily E. B. Emmons one claim of $65.85, and another claim of $916.57. After the allowance of the said claims by the commissioners, the above-named three daughters, heirs at law of said deceased, appealed from the allowance of the claim of $916.57, aforesaid, to the circuit court for the county of Allegan, which said appeal afterwards came on to be heard before the court without a jury; and, upon such hearing and trial, a verdict was rendered on such claim and appeal by the said court at the sum of $600, and interest at five per cent. from June, 1907. This verdict and judgment now referred to is reported back to the said probate court; the claim aforesaid was the amount found by the circuit court, not having been paid, and no assets available for the payment thereof, except the said land, and the said Alfred Emmons in his lifetime having made a warranty deed thereof to these defendants in this cause, to take effect at his death. The bill in this case was filed to set the same aside to the effect of having the said land subjected to the payment of said claims. The bill was filed under C. L. 1897, § 9363. "This cause came on to be heard before the court on the issue joined herein, and proofs taken in open court. Proofs of the files and proceedings in the probate court in said estate offered and received in evidence, and from which it appears that on, to wit, the 10th day of March, 1910, the aforesaid John A. Beamer deceased, and petition for administrator de bonis non was filed, and Ransom J. Barris was duly appointed as such by the probate court on, to wit, the 7th day of June, 1910. Oral proofs were also offered on the hearing herein by both parties. From the evidence produced in the hearing, it appears that no assets, except as shown by original warrant and inventory and appraisal, ever came into the hands of John A. Beamer, as administrator of said estate, or into the hands of the said Ransom J. Barris, as administrator de bonis non of said estate. And the only available assets of said estate to pay the claims against it, and which are still unpaid, is the said land in question, which is embraced in said deed and running to the defendants in this case. I also find from the proofs that the said deed, so given by Alfred Emmons to defendants, was voluntary on his part, and no consideration therefor was paid by the grantees therein named, nor either of them. The said land, as shown by the proofs in the case, is of the value of from $2,500 to $3,000, and is the homestead of the widow, the said Emily E. B. Emmons, and was the homestead of the said Alfred Emmons at the time of his death. In consideration of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the said deed be set aside for the purpose of subjecting the said land to the payment of the said debts against the estate, subject, however, to the right of said defendants to pay the said claims and the costs of the proceedings in the probate court and in the circuit court upon said appeal from commissioners' findings aforesaid, and, upon such payment, to retain the land in accordance with the terms of said deed. A decree may be prepared in accordance with this finding, for signature. It is suggested that the later papers be entitled in the name of the administrator de bonis non.' " A decree having been entered in favor of complainant, defendants (other than Emily E. B. Emmons, against whom the bill was taken as confessed) have appealed. Appellants first urge that the deed was made for a valuable consideration as to defendant Emily E. B. Emmons, and as to her it operated as a payment on the indebtedness to her; and, as it was in value greater than the amount of the indebtedness, such indebtedness was thereby paid in full. The deed itself does not indicate that it was made in consideration of the debt then owing from Emmons to his wife. Her testimony negatives the assumption, and the circuit judge found the contrary to be the fact. It is clear from the record that the deed was not delivered during the lifetime of the grantor. It is next claimed by appellants that the deed was not void or voidable as to creditors, as it conveyed to the only creditor then existing an interest in land, in value equal to, 178 MICH.--38. |