Note: M. Main. S. South. B. Berlin. D. Dutton. G. Grand. We presume, though the record does not so show, that the exhibit was taken from the respondent's house. Evidence was given by at least one inmate of the house that, under the direction of respondent, she used said exhibit, that she called "Ethel " and "Mrs. Roberts" "because there was some man up there." After the jury had retired the foreman called for the exhibit. At this time neither respondent nor her counsel were present. The court directed the exhibit to be delivered to the jury. This was done, and shortly thereafter a verdict of guilty was returned.

But one error is assigned, viz.:

"The court erred in permitting the jury to have during its deliberation people's Exhibit A.”

Respondent relies upon the case of People v. Dowdigan, 67 Mich. 92 (34 N. W. 411), where this court said:

"We do not think the court was justified in sending the papers to the jury room. It is a dangerous practice even in civil cases, and one not often to be indulged in, and in

criminal cases never.'

In the case there under consideration the papers sent to the jury consisted of the original complaint of the complaining witness, Mary Penasa, her evidence reduced to writing taken on her examination before the magistrate, together with the written evidence of another witness

taken at the preliminary examination. These papers were sent to the jury room over the objection of counsel for respondent. The case now before us presents no such question as was involved in the Dowdigan Case. Here the exhibit in question was simply a card containing certain names and telephone numbers. Respondent, as well as the people, had offered testimony touching the use to which the exhibit had been put by respondent, and the exhibit itself had been passed around and examined by the jury during the trial. In Tubbs v. Insurance Co., 84 Mich. 646 (48 N. W. 296), after reviewing the cases upon this question, it is said:

"" 'The true rule seems to be that, where exhibits have been fully proven and admitted in evidence, and their authenticity is unquestioned, and there is no testimony to impeach their contents, it is within the discretion of the trial court to allow them to be taken to the jury room, although objection is made."

See, also, Farrell v. Haze, 157 Mich. 374 (122 N. W. 197). It will be noted that this language was used in a civil suit. While the practice pursued in the case at bar is not to be commended, we are of opinion that it does not constitute reversible error, for the reason that the respondent could not have been prejudiced through the submission of the exhibit in question to the jury.

The conviction is affirmed.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

HAYES v. CITY OF ST. CLAIR.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NOTICE OF CLAIM - PERSONAL INJURIES.

Where plaintiff's notice to a city of the fourth class claiming damages by reason of personal injuries sustained in falling on a defective sidewalk contained a statement of her injuries as follows: "She was severely wrenched, strained, and bruised; her back and legs and the tendons and ligaments thereof were wrenched, bruised, and strained; she had, some two years prior to that time, undergone a surgical operation and that the attachments formed after such operation were torn loose and that she was severely and permanently injured internally, the extent of which is unknown to your petitioner at this time; that at the time of said accident she was in a family way and said fall caused her to have a miscarriage; that ever since said fall she has suffered great mental and physical pain, and has been incapacitated from doing any labor, and prevented from having any amusement, recreation, and pleasure; that she is advised that her injuries are permanent and further developments may show other and different injuries than have so far become known," it was a sufficient statement of the extent of injury to permit her to recover for injury to the pedicle of the left ovary and consequent hindrance to proper circulation, rupture of blood vessels, adhesion to the intestines and inflammation of the surrounding organs.1

2. SAME.

A liberal construction of statutes requiring such notice is favored so as to permit a recovery if a substantial statement of the injury is made."

3. SAME-DECLARATION-AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS.

Plaintiff was not improperly permitted to amend her declaration after the trial had proceeded about eight days, the court granting to defendant an adjournment for two weeks, where the amendment changed the averment of the declaration 'As to sufficiency of description of injury in notice of claim, see note in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804.

As to validity of requirement of notice of injury as a condition of municipal liability, see note in 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1136.

that plaintiff had previously enjoyed good health and substituted for it allegations showing the operation, its effect on her health and described exactly and correctly the injuries sustained.

4. SAME-EVIDENCE-TRIAL-SPECIAL QUESTIONS.

And after admitting testimony that adhesions formed after plaintiff's fall and that it might have torn them loose, the court's charge that the evidence so admitted was incompetent, but submitting to the jury special questions based on the excluded testimony was misleading and prejudicial.

5. SAME.

It was also improper to admit testimony as to an operation performed on plaintiff which had nothing to do with the fall or injuries caused thereby.

Error to St. Clair; Tappan, J. Submitted January 24, 1912. (Docket No. 120.) Decided February 18, 1913. Rehearing denied March 21, 1913.

Case by Ida Hayes against the city of St. Clair for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

Reversed.

Lincoln Avery and Thomas Sawyer, for appellant. Walsh & Walsh and Hart & Pepper, for appellee.

MCALVAY, J. This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant to recover damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff by falling upon a sidewalk within the defendant city, claimed to have been caused on account of the negligence of the officers and agents of defendant in permitting the sidewalk to remain out of repair and in a condition not reasonably safe for public travel. The trial resulted in a verdict against defendant, upon which a judgment was entered, and from which the defendant has brought the case to this court for review upon writ of error.

This claimed injury occurred March 29, 1909, on one of the public streets of the defendant city, which is a municipal corporation, operating under the general charter for

fourth-class cities, as provided by law. By a provision of the law under which defendant is organized, before bringing any suit by any individual claiming damages, for injuries sustained by reason of any defective street or sidewalk within said city, a written notice must be given within 60 days after such injury shall have occurred, as follows (section 1 of chapter 22, Act No. 215, Pub. Acts 1895):

"No city subject to the provisions of this act shall be liable in damages sustained by any person in such city, either to his person or property, by reason of any defective street, sidewalk, crosswalk or public highway, or by reason of any obstruction, ice, snow or other incumbrance upon such street, sidewalk, crosswalk or public highway, situated in such city, unless such person shall serve, or cause to be served, within sixty days after such injury shall have occurred, a notice in writing upon the clerk or the deputy clerk of such city, which notice shall set forth substantially the time when and place where such injury took place, the manner in which it occurred and the extent of such injury as far as the same has become known, and that the person receiving such injury intends to hold such city liable for such damages as may have been sustained by him.”

A notice, duly verified, under the provisions of the above section, was duly filed and served by the plaintiff upon the city clerk May 26, 1909, within the limit of 60 days, which contained all the necessary requirements of such notices. The portion of this notice, which sets forth the extent of plaintiff's injuries, is as follows:

"Your petitioner shows that by reason of said fall she was severely wrenched, strained, and bruised. Her back and legs, and the tendons and ligaments thereof, were wrenched, bruised, and strained. She had, some two years prior to that time, undergone a surgical operation, and that the attachments formed after such operation was torn loose, and that she was severely and permanently injured internally, the extent of which is unknown to your petitioner at this time; that at the time of said accident she was in a family way, and said fall caused her to have a miscarriage; that ever since said fall she has suffered