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3. Cooperative Threat Reduction With States of Former
Partial text of Public Law 103_337 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; S. 2182), 108 Stat. 2663 at 2882, approved October 5, 1994
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
DIVISION A-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS
TITLE XII-COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH
STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION
For purposes of section 301 and other provisions of this Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are the programs described in section 1203(b) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1778; 22 U.S.C. 5952(b)). SEC. 1202.* EXTENSION OF SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS. * * * SEC. 1203. REPORT ON ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED STATES ASSIST.
ANCE. (a) REPORT.-(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts made by the United States (including efforts through the use of audits, examinations, and on-site inspections) to ensure that assistance provided under cooperative threat reduction programs is fully accounted for and that such assistance is being used for its intended purposes.
(2) The report shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall include the following:
(1) A list of cooperative threat reduction assistance that has been provided before the date of the report.
(2) A description of the current location of the assistance provided and the current condition of such assistance.
122 U.S.C. 5952 note.
2 Sec. 1202 amended sec. 1207 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1782).
(3) A determination of whether the assistance has been used for its intended purpose.
(4) A description of the activities planned to be carried out during fiscal year 1995 to ensure that cooperative threat reduction assistance provided during that fiscal year is fully ac
counted for and is used for its intended purpose. (c) COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT.-Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report of the Secretary under subsection (a) is submitted to Congress, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report giving the Comptroller General's assessment of the report and making any recommendations that the Comptroller General considers appropriate. SEC. 1204. REPORT ON CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF MATERIAL
RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on progress being made in each state of the former Soviet Union that is a recipient of assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs toward the development of an effective system of control and accountability for material related to weapons of mass destruction in that country. Under such a system, officials of the United States and of the recipient country should have an accurate accounting of the weapons of mass destruction in that country and the fissile and chemical materials from those weapons. The report shall be submitted not later than three months after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 1205.3 MULTIYEAR PLANNING AND ALLIED SUPPORT.
(a) FUNDING REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report as described in subsection (b) on funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with states of the former Soviet Union. The report shall be submitted at the time of the transmission to Congress of the budget justification materials for the funding request in the fiscal year 1996 budget for such Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT.-The Secretary of Defense shall include in the report under subsection (a) the following:
(1) An estimate of the total amount that will be required to be expended by the United States in order to achieve the objectives of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
(2) A multiyear plan for the use of amounts and other resources provided by the United States for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and to provide guidance for preparation of
annual budget submissions. (c) SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS TO REPORT.-The Secretary of Defense shall submit an updated version of the report under subsection (a) for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996 for which the budget of the President proposes that funds be appropriated to the Department of Defense for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
(d) FISCAL YEAR 1995 LIMITATION.—Of the amount authorized in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the sum of $50,000,000 may not be obligated until the President certifies to Congress that the United States is making a concerted effort to ensure that allies of the United States are increasing their levels of support for activities that will aid in accomplishing the objectives of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. SEC. 1206. FUNDING LIMITATIONS ON COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUC.
322 U.S.C. 5952 nole.
TION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995. (a) PROGRAM AMOUNTS.-Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs
(1) not more than $60,000,000 may be obligated for the demilitarization of defense industries and the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities;
(2) not more than $200,000,000 may be obligated for Weapons Dismantlement, Destruction, and Denuclearization;
(3) not more than $60,000,000 may be obligated for Safety and Security, Transportation, and Storage;
(4) not more than $40,000,000 may be obligated for Nonproliferation;
(5) not more than $20,000,000 may be obligated for Defense and Military-to-Military Contacts; and
(6) not more than $20,000,000 may be obligated for other authorized programs and activities. (b) LIMITED AUTHORITY TO EXCEED INDIVIDUAL LIMITATION AMOUNTS.—(1) If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the national interest, the Secretary may, subject to paragraph (2), obligate amounts for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs of subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified for those purposes in that paragraph. However, the total amount obligated for the purposes stated in the paragraphs in subsection (a) may not by reason of the use of the authority provided in the preceding sentence exceed the sum of the amounts specified in those paragraphs.
(2) An obligation for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified in that paragraph may be made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) only after
(A) the Secretary submits to Congress a notification of the intent to do so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doing so; and
(B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notifica
tion. SEC. 1207. REPORT ON OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
OF THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has identified nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a high priority in the conduct of United States national security policy.
(2) The United States is seeking universal adherence to global regimes that control nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and is promoting new measures that provide increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.
(3) In early 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin indicated to former United States President George Bush that Russia still had an offensive biological weapons program.
(4) A United States Government report dated January 19, 1993, on arms control noncompliance noted that Russian declarations up to that date had dramatically underestimated the size, scope, and maturity of the former Soviet biological weapons program.
(5) Despite President Yeltsin's decree of April 11, 1993, stating that activities in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention are illegal, questions continue to arise regarding offensive biological weapons research, development, testing, production, and storage in Russia as well as in other countries.
(6) A United States Government report, dated June 23, 1994, states the following: “The United States has determined that the offensive biological warfare program that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union violated the Biological Weapons Convention through at least March 1992. The Soviet offensive biological weapons program was massive, and included production, weaponization, and stockpiling. The status of the program since that time remains unclear and the U.S. remains concerned about the Russian biological warfare program.".
(7) The Joint Statement on Biological Weapons issued by officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14, 1992, confirmed the commitment of the three governments to full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and outlined steps designed to increase confidence in that commitment.
(8) The Presidents of Russia and the United States are scheduled to hold a summit meeting in Washington during the month of September 1994. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that,
(1) the President should continue to urge all signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention to comply fully with the terms of that convention and with other international agreements relating to the control of biological weapons;
(2) the President should keep the Congress fully and currently informed regarding any Russian activities related to offensive biological weapons;
(3) the President should continue to insist that the Russian Government complete the steps noted and agreed to in the Joint Statement on Biological Weapons issued by officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14, 1992;
(4) subsequent meetings of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on biological weapons and the September 1994 summit meeting in Washington provide opportunities for the President to again emphasize the importance of resolving the issues related to compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention;
(5) in assessing the President's fiscal year 1996 budget request for foreign assistance funds for Russia, and for other programs and activities to provide assistance to Russia, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, Congress will con
at the resident pliances and
sider United States Government assessments of Russia's compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention; and
(6) as the President encourages increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities to deter violations of, and enhance compliance with, the Biological Weapons Convention, the President should also take appropriate actions to ensure that the United States is prepared to counter the ef
fects of use of biological weapons by others. (c) PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS.-Not later than February 1, 1995, not later than June 1, 1995, and not later than October 1, 1995, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, containing an assessment of the extent of compliance of the independent states of the former Soviet Union with the Biological Weapons Convention and other international agreements relating to the control of biological weapons. (d) CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall include the following: (1) MATTERS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE.—
(A) An evaluation of the extent of control and oversight by the government of the Russian Federation over the former Soviet military and dual civilian-military biological warfare programs.
(B) The extent, if any, of the biological warfare agent stockpile in any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
(C) The extent and scope, if any, of continued biological warfare research, development, testing, and production by such states, including the sites and types of activity at those sites.
(D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of possible delivery systems of biological weapons, including tube and rocket artillery, aircraft, and ballistic missiles.
(E) An assessment of measures taken by the Russian Government to complete the steps noted and agreed to in the 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons referred to in subsection (b)(3), including a determination of the extent to which Russia has
(i) agreed to permit visits to military and nonmilitary biological sites in order to attempt to resolve ambiguities;
(ii) provided information about biological weapons dismantlement accomplished to date, and further clarification of information provided in its United Nations Declarations regarding biological weapons;
(iii) been cooperative in exchanging information on a confidential, reciprocal basis concerning past offensive biological weapons programs not recorded in detail in its declarations to the United Nations;
(iv) cooperated in reviewing potential additional measures to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and modalities for testing such measures;
(v) agreed to an examination of the physical infrastructure of its biological facilities to determine wheth