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sider United States Government assessments of Russia's compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention; and

(6) as the President encourages increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities to deter violations of, and enhance compliance with, the Biological Weapons Convention, the President should also take appropriate actions to ensure that the United States is prepared to counter the effects of use of biological weapons by others.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS.-Not later than February 1, 1995, not later than June 1, 1995, and not later than October 1, 1995, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, containing an assessment of the extent of compliance of the independent states of the former Soviet Union with the Biological Weapons Convention and other international agreements relating to the control of biological weapons.

(d) CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall include the following: (1) MATTERS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE.

(A) An evaluation of the extent of control and oversight by the government of the Russian Federation over the former Soviet military and dual civilian-military biological warfare programs.

(B) The extent, if any, of the biological warfare agent stockpile in any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(C) The extent and scope, if any, of continued biological warfare research, development, testing, and production by such states, including the sites and types of activity at those sites.

(D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of possible delivery systems of biological weapons, including tube and rocket artillery, aircraft, and ballistic missiles.

(E) An assessment of measures taken by the Russian Government to complete the steps noted and agreed to in the 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons referred to in subsection (b)(3), including a determination of the extent to which Russia has

(i) agreed to permit visits to military and nonmilitary biological sites in order to attempt to resolve ambiguities;

(ii) provided information about biological weapons dismantlement accomplished to date, and further clarification of information provided in its United Nations Declarations regarding biological weapons;

(iii) been cooperative in exchanging information on a confidential, reciprocal basis concerning past offensive biological weapons programs not recorded in detail in its declarations to the United Nations;

(iv) cooperated in reviewing potential additional measures to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and modalities for testing such

measures;

(v) agreed to an examination of the physical infrastructure of its biological facilities to determine wheth

er there is specific equipment or excess capacity inconsistent with their stated purpose;

(vi) helped identify ways to promote cooperation and investment in the conversion of biological weapons facilities; and

(vii) agreed to exchanges of scientists at biological facilities on a long-term basis.

(2) MATTERS RELATED TO UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES.—
(A) An evaluation of United States capabilities to detect
and monitor biological warfare research, development,
testing, production, and storage.

(B) On the basis of the assessment and evaluations referred to in other provisions of the report, recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the improvement of United States biological warfare defense and counter-measures.

(e) LIMITATION.-Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, $25,000,000 may not be obligated until the President submits to Congress the first report required under subsection (c).

SEC. 1208. COORDINATION OF CERTAIN COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.

(a) MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT PROGRAMS.-(1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs may be obligated for activities under a military-to-military contact program until the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State submit to Congress a joint report on the coordination of military-to-military contact programs and comparable activities carried out under their respective jurisdictions. (2) The report shall cover the following programs and activities: (A) Defense and military-to-military contact programs to be carried out using funds authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

(B) Military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are authorized by section 168 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 1316.

(C) Programs authorized under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.).

(3) The report shall include a discussion of how the programs and activities referred to in paragraph (2) are carried out to maximize

(A) the effect of such programs and activities in enhancing United States foreign policy objectives; and

(B) cost-efficiency in the conduct of the programs and activities.

(b) REPORT.-Section 1207 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1777; 22 U.S.C. 5956), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(5) A description of how all of the activities carried out under the authority of this title and other laws providing authority for cooperative threat reduction are coordinated with similar activities that are carried out under any other authority, including activities relating to military-to-military contacts, environmental restoration, and housing.".

SEC. 1209. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING SAFE AND SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL.

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) It is a pressing national security challenge for the United States to expedite the safe and secure dismantlement of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.

(2) In particular, it is essential to expedite the return of strategic nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and to expedite the safe and secure dismantlement of the nuclear delivery vehicles of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

(3) Leakage of nuclear materials and technology, and the continuing threat of emigration of scientists and technicians from the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex, pose a grave threat to United States national security and to international stability.

(4) Congress has authorized so-called "Nunn-Lugar" funds to enable the Department of Defense to carry out cooperative activities with states of the former Soviet Union to address the threats described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that

(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should continue to give their serious attention to carrying out a coordinated strategy for addressing the urgent national security issues described in subsection (a);

(2) the United States should expedite the availability and effective application of so-called "Nunn-Lugar" funds;

(3) although activities conducted with those funds should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United States technology and expertise, the United States should work with local contractors in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine when doing so would expedite more effective use of those funds; and

(4) efforts should be made to make the Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev, designed to slow the emigration of scientists and technicians from the former Soviet weapons complex, fully operational on an expedited basis.

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4. Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993

Title XII of Public Law 103–160 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; H.R. 2401], 107 Stat. 1547 at 1777, approved November 30, 1993; amended by Public Law 103-337 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; S. 2182], 108 Stat. 2663, approved October 5, 1994

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United State of America in Congress assembled,

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TITLE XII-COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH
STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION

SEC. 1201.1 SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993".

SEC. 1202.2 FINDINGS ON COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION.

The Congress finds that it is in the national security interest of the United States for the United States to do the following:

(1) Facilitate, on a priority basis, the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and elimination of nuclear and other weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including— (A) the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(B) the dismantlement of (i) intercontinental ballistic missiles and launchers for such missiles, (ii) submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and launchers for such missiles, and (iii) heavy bombers; and

(C) the elimination of chemical, biological and other weapons capabilities.

(2) Facilitate, on a priority basis, the prevention of proliferation of weapons (and components of weapons) of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union and the establishment of verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons and components.

(3) Facilitate, on a priority basis, the prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise of the independent states of the former Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third world countries.

122 U.S.C. 5951 note.

222 U.S.C. 5951.

(4) Support (A) the demilitarization of the defense-related industry and equipment of the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and (B) the conversion of such industry and equipment to civilian purposes and uses.

(5) Expand military-to-military and defense contacts between the United States and the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

SEC. 1203.3 AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAMS TO FACILITATE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may conduct programs described in subsection (b) to assist the independent states of the former Soviet Union in the demilitarization of the former Soviet Union. Any such program may be carried out only to the extent that the President determines that the program will directly contribute to the national security interests of the United States.

(b) AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS.-The programs referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) Programs to facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage, of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles.

(2) Programs to facilitate the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weap

ons.

(3) Programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related technology and expertise.

(4) Programs to expand military-to-military and defense contacts.

(5) Programs to facilitate the demilitarization of defense industries and the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities.

(6) Programs to assist in the environmental restoration of former military sites and installations when such restoration is necessary to the demilitarization or conversion programs authorized in paragraph (5).

(7) Programs to provide housing for former military personnel of the former Soviet Union released from military service in connection with the dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapons, when provision of such housing is necessary for dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapons and when no other funds are available for such housing.

(8) Other programs as described in section 212(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102-228; 22 U.S.C. 2551 note) and section 1412(b) of the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.).

(c) UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.-The programs described in subsection (b) should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United States technology and expertise, especially from the private sector of the United States.

322 U.S.C. 5952.

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