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Foreign Relations of the Senate within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6. ACDA INSPECTOR GENERAL
(a) 2 * * *
(b) SURVEY OF ACDA CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SECURITY.-Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
(1) shall conduct a survey of physical, personnel, document, and communications security programs, procedures, and practices at the Agency for the protection of classified information; and
(2) shall submit a report on the results of that survey, together with such recommendations for improvement of classified information security at the Agency as the Inspector General considers appropriate, to the Director of the Agency and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
2 Subsec. (a) amended title IV of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by adding a new sec. 53 establishing an Office of the Inspector General of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(1) in order to facilitate the effective work of the United States arms control negotiating teams, and to provide for them a dedicated structure capable of supporting their vital tasks on a permanent basis, the Secretary of State should submit to the Congress a report on the feasibility, cost, location, and requirements of a structure to house the United States arms control negotiating teams in Geneva;
(2) this report should be submitted as soon as possible; and
(3) this matter should be included in the consideration of the
1985 supplemental appropriation process. SEC. 706. STUDY OF MEASURES TO ENHANCE CRISIS STABILITY AND
CONTROL. (a) STUDY.—The Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall conduct a detailed and complete study and evaluation of additional measures which both enhance the security of the United States and reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons use by contributing to crisis stability or crisis control capabilities, including specific consideration of the following measures:
(1) Increased redundancy of direct communications link circuits, including the creation of new survivable circuits and terminals, located outside the national capital which have access to the command and control system of the country in which they are located.
(2) Establishment of redundant, survivable direct communications links between and among all nuclear-armed states.
(3) Conclusion of an agreement creating “non-target” sanctuaries only for certain direct communications link circuits to enhance survivability of communications.
(4) Creation in advance of standard operating procedures for communicating, and possibly cooperating, with the Soviet Union and other states in the event of nuclear attacks by third parties on either the United States or Soviet Union.
(5) Addition to the Incidents At Sea agreement of a prohibition on the “locking on” of fire control radars on ships and planes of the other side, an agreement on the separation of naval forces during specified periods of crisis, and other such measures relevant to the Incidents At Sea agreement.
(6) Placement by the United States and the Soviet Union of unmanned launch sensors in the land-based missile fields of both countries.
(7) Establishment of anti-submarine operations free zones designed to enhance the security of ballistic missile submarines.
(8) Installation of permissive action links aboard the ballistic missile submarines of the United States, which might possibly be activated or deactivated at various levels of alert, and encouragement of the Soviet Union to do the same.
(9) Establishment of training programs for National Command Authority officials to familiarize them with alert procedures, communications capabilities, nuclear weapons release authority procedures, and the crisis control and stability implications thereof.
10) aciude in standart operasg proceda
acon in a crisis of a National Com.r.azAstD7 EC DISCE Washington, D.C. to a secure ccaz ca astes 1 le C Z gic command and controi system, azed aro30se de ISCICUN of this procecure o relevant foreiz gyerese by REPORT. -The Secretary of State as the DirecTIse 1 TIS Controi and Disarmament Agency sral soca accrT e study and evaluation 'inder subsectica a totte Cint es : Armed Services and foreign Reiaticas of te Seraz azone Ammittees on Armed Services and orega ta te ELSE I Representatives gy january 1. 1986. Such repcr: secci de 2422
in 1999 adie in born a ciassified, if necessary, and se assised trn: SEC 707. POLICY TOWARD BAWNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS a, FNDINGS. -The Congress finds that
i nemical weapons are among the most terrbie a crs in today s.n.itary arsenais,
2; it is the ocjective of the Cnited States to eC 2 a threat of chemicai wartare rough a comprenensive ad vera apie ban on chemical weapons; 3) the United States is vigorousiy pursuing a
n agreement to ban chemical weapcas;
4, the negotiation of a ver abie, bilateral agreement be tween the United States and the Soviet Union would be a se nificant step toward actrieving a woridwide ban on her weapons;
5) bilateral discussions relating to a ban on chemical reasons took piace in July and Augist of 1984 between the United States and Soviet de egasions to the Conference on Disarmament; and
6, such endeavors could serve the security interests of Ezmankind. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that the President
ilj should be commended for his efforts to negotiate a muitlateral agreement banning chemical weapons;
(2) should continue to pursue vigorously such an agreements and
(3) should seek the continuation and development of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weap
SEC, 708. POLICY REGARDING A JONT STUDY BY THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NU
CLEAR WINTER. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Government of the Soviet Union during any arms control talks held with such Government that,
(1) the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly study the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions, sometimes known as “nuclear winter", and the impact that nuclear winter would have on the national carity of both nations;
(2) such a joint study should include the sharing and exchange of information and findings on the nuclear winter phenomena and make recommendations on possible joint research projects that would benefit both nations; and
(3) at an appropriate time the other nuclear weapons states (the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China) should be involved in the study.