(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).

SUBTITLE B-INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES

SEC. 1611. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States has been seeking to contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials.

(2) With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a leading military threat to the national security of the United States and its allies.

(3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 31, 1992, that "proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and committed to taking appropriate action to prevent proliferation from occurring.

(4) Aside from the five declared nuclear weapon states, a number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities.

(5) The IAEA is a valuable international institution to counter proliferation, but the effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear materials may be adversely affected by financial constraints.

(6) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies world consensus against further nuclear proliferation and is scheduled for review and extension in 1995.

(7) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 declared that the United States is committed to continued strong support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened and more effective IAEA, and established that it is United States policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.

(b) COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY.-In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it should be the policy of the United States to pursue a comprehensive policy to end the further spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, with the following additional objectives:

(1) Successful conclusion of all pending nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements with all the republics of the former Soviet Union and their secure implementation.

(2) Full participation by all the republics of the former Soviet Union in all multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts and acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities.

(3) Strengthening of United States and international support to the IAEA so that the IAEA has the technical, financial, and political resources to verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments.

(4) Strengthening of nuclear export controls in the United States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions on individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States.

(5) Reduction in incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation agreements.

(6) Support for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials. (7) Reaching agreement with the Russian Federation to end the production of new types of nuclear warheads.

(8) Pursuing, once the START I treaty and the START II treaty are ratified by all parties, a multilateral agreement to significantly reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation to below the levels of the START II treaty, with lower levels for the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China.

(9) Reaching immediate agreement with the Russian Federation to halt permanently the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and working to achieve worldwide agree

ments to

(A) end in the shortest possible time the production of weapons-usable fissile material;

(B) place existing stockpiles of such materials under bilateral or international controls; and

(C) require countries to place all of their nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards.

(10) Strengthening IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, and financial support necessary to implement the necessary safeguard reforms.

(11) Conclusion of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.-(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report, in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, on the actions the United States has taken and the actions the United States plans to take during the succeeding 12-month period to implement each of the policy objectives set forth in this section.

(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, which

(A) addresses the implications of the adoption by the United States of a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons;

(B) addresses the implications of an agreement with the other nuclear weapons states to adopt such a policy; and

(C) addresses the implications of a verifiable bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapons states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons.

(d) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section:

(1) The term "IAEA" means the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(2) The term "IAEA safeguards" means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(3) The term "non-nuclear weapon state" means any country that is not a nuclear weapon state.

(4) The term "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

(5) The term "nuclear weapon state" means any country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

(6) The term "weapons-usable fissile materials" means highly enriched uranium and separated or reprocessed plutonium.

(7) The term "policy of no first use of nuclear weapons” means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weap

ons.

(8) The term "START II treaty" means the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 1993.

SEC. 1612.14 CONDITION ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PLUTONIUM STORAGE FACILITY.

(a) LIMITATION.-Until a certification under subsection (b) is made, no funds may be obligated or expended by the United States for the purpose of assisting the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia to construct a storage facility for surplus plutonium from dismantled weapons.

(b) 15 CERTIFICATION OF RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT TO HALT CHEMICAL SEPARATION OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM.-The prohibition in subsection (a) shall cease to apply upon a certification by the President to Congress that Russia

(1) is committed to halting the chemical separation of weapon-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel; and

14 22 U.S.C. 5952 note.

18 The President delegated functions authorized under subsections (b) and (d) to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of March 10, 1994 (59 f.R. 14079).

(2) is taking all practical steps to halt such separation at the earliest possible date.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PLUTONIUM POLICY.-It is the sense of Congress that a key objective of the United States with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be to obtain a clear and unequivocal commitment from the Government of Russia that it will (1) cease all production and separation of weapon-grade plutonium, and (2) halt chemical separation of plutonium produced in civil nuclear power reactors.

(d) REPORT.-Not later than June 1, 1994, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the status of efforts by the United States to secure the commitments and achieve the objective described in subsections (b) and (c). The President shall include in the report a discussion of the status of joint efforts by the United States and Russia to replace any remaining Russian plutonium production reactors with alternative power sources or to convert such reactors to operation with alternative fuels that would permit their operation without generating weapon-grade plutonium. SEC. 1613. NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:

(1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

(2) Any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material that is within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty at any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable material in that state is under safeguards.

(4) North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapons state in December 1985.

(5) North Korea, after acceding to that Treaty, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty.

(6) Inspections of North Korea's nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency suggested discrepancies in North Korea's declarations regarding special nuclear materials.

(7) North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation for those discrepancies.

(8) North Korea refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with full access to two sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(9) When called upon by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty,

North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the
Treaty, effective after the required three months notice.

(10) After intensive negotiations with the United States, North Korea agreed to suspend its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on providing access to its suspect sites.

(11) In an attempt to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the United States has offered to discuss with North Korea specific incentives that could be provided for North Korea once (A) outstanding inspection issues between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency are resolved, and (B) progress is made in bilateral talks between North Korea and South Korea.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS.-The Congress

(1) notes that the continued refusal of North Korea nearly eight years after ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards raises serious questions regarding a possible North Korean nuclear weapons program;

(2) notes that possession by North Korea of nuclear weapons (A) would threaten peace and stability in Asia, (B) would jeopardize the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and (C) would undermine the goal of the United States to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 review conference;

(3) urges continued pressure from the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council on North Korea to adhere to the Treaty and provide full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the shortest time possible;

(4) urges the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council to press for continued talks between North Korea and South Korea on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula;

(5) urges that no trade, financial, or other economic benefits be provided to North Korea by the United States or United States allies until North Korea has (A) provided full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency, (B) satisfactorily explained any discrepancies in its declarations of bomb-grade material, and (C) fully demonstrated that it does not have or seek a nuclear weapons capability; and

(6) calls on the President and the international community to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

SEC. 1614. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States has joined with other nations in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts the transfer of missiles or equipment or technology that could contribute to the design, development, or production of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.