Sidor som bilder
PDF
ePub

(2) Missile technology is indistinguishable from, and interchangeable with, space launch vehicle technology.

(3) Transfers of missile technology or space launch vehicle technology cannot be safeguarded in a manner that would provide timely warning of diversion for military purposes.

(4) It has been United States policy since agreeing to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime to treat the sale or transfer of space launch vehicle technology as restrictively as the sale or transfer of missile technology.

(5) Previous congressional action on missile proliferation, notably title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1738), has explicitly supported the policy described in paragraph (4) through such actions as the statutory definition of the term "missile" to mean "a category I system as defined in the MTCR Annex, and any other unmanned delivery system of similar capability, as well as the specially designed production facilities for these systems".

(6) There is strong evidence that emerging national space launch programs in the Third World are not economically viable.

(7) The United States has been successful in dissuading other countries from pursuing space launch vehicle programs in part by offering to cooperate with those countries in other areas of space science and technology.

(8) The United States has successfully dissuaded other MTCR adherents, and countries who have agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines, from providing assistance to emerging national space launch programs in the Third World.

(b) STRICT INTERPRETATION OF MTCR.-The Congress supports the strict interpretation by the United States of the Missile Technology Control Regime concerning

(1) the inability to distinguish space launch vehicle technology from missile technology under the regime; and

(2) the inability to safeguard space launch vehicle technology in a manner that would provide timely warning of the diversion of such technology to military purposes.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government and the governments of other nations adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime should be recognized by the international community for

(1) the success of those governments in restricting the export of space launch vehicle technology and of missile technology; and

(2) the significant contribution made by the imposition of such restrictions to reducing the proliferation of missile technology capable of being used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

(d) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section, the term "Missile Technology Control Regime" or "MTCR" means the policy statement, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments thereto.

88-541 95-41

c. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993

Partial text of Public Law 102-484 [H.R. 5006], 106 Stat. 2315, approved October 23, 1992; amended by Public Law 103-160 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; H.R. 2401], 107 Stat. 1547, approved November 30, 1993; Public Law 103-337 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; S. 2182], 108 Stat. 2663, approved October 5, 1994 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to provide for defense conversion, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993".

[blocks in formation]

Subtitle C-Matters Relating to the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

SEC. 1321.1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On February 1, 1992, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation agreed in a Joint Statement that "Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries" and stated further that, "We will work to remove any remnants of cold war hostility, including taking steps to reduce our strategic arsenals".

(2) In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for the non-nuclear-weapon states agreeing not to seek a nuclear weapons capability nor to assist other non-nuclear-weapon states in doing so, the United States agreed to seek the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide, as declared in the preamble to the Treaty, which states that it is a goal of the parties to the Treaty to "facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination

122 U.S.C. 5901 note.

from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" as well as in Article VI of the Treaty, which states that each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

(3) Carrying out a policy of seeking further significant and continuous reductions in the nuclear arsenals of all countries, besides reducing the likelihood of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increasing the likelihood of a successful extension and possible strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, when the Treaty is scheduled for review and possible extension, has additional benefits to the national security of the United States, including—

(A) a reduced risk of accidental enablement and launch of a nuclear weapon, and

(B) a defense cost savings which could be reallocated for deficit reduction or other important national needs.

(4) The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty and the agreement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of each country to a level between 3,000 and 3,500 weapons are commendable intermediate stages in the process of achieving the policy goals described in paragraphs (1) and (2).

(5) The current international era of cooperation provides greater opportunities for achieving worldwide reduction and control of nuclear weapons and material than any time since the emergence of nuclear weapons 50 years ago.

(6) It is in the security interests of both the United States and the world community for the President and the Congress to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in every country through multilateral agreements and other appropriate means.

(7) In a 1991 study, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that: "The appropriate new levels of nuclear weapons cannot be specified at this time, but it seems reasonable to the committee that U.S. strategic forces could in time be reduced to 1,000-2,000 nuclear warheads, provided that such a multilateral agreement included appropriate levels and verification measures for the other nations that possess nuclear weapons. This step would require successful implementation of our proposed post-START U.S.-Soviet reductions, related confidence-building measures in all the countries involved, and multilateral security cooperation in areas such as conventional force deployments and planning.”.

(b) UNITED STATES POLICY.-It shall be the goal of the United States

(1) to encourage and facilitate the denuclearization of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan, as agreed upon in the Lisbon ministerial meeting of May 23, 1992;

(2) to rapidly complete and submit for ratification by the United States the treaty incorporating the agreement of June 17, 1992, between the United States and the Russian Federa

tion to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons in each country's arsenal to a level between 3,000 and 3,500;

(3) to facilitate the ability of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan to implement agreed mutual reductions under the START Treaty, and under the Joint Understanding of June 16-17, 1992 between the United States and the Russian Federation, on an accelerated timetable, so that all such reductions can be completed by the year 2000;

(4) to build on the agreement reached in the Joint Understanding of June 16-17, 1992, by entering into multilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China, and, at an appropriate point in that process, enter into negotiations with other nuclear armed states in order to reach subsequent stage-bystage agreements to achieve further reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in all countries;

(5) to continue and extend cooperative discussions with the appropriate authorities of the former Soviet military on means to maintain and improve secure command and control over nuclear forces;

(6) in consultation with other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies, to initiate discussions to bring tactical nuclear weapons into the arms control process; and

(7) to ensure that the United States assistance to securely transport and store, and ultimately dismantle, former Soviet nuclear weapons and missiles for such weapons is being properly and effectively utilized.

(c) ANNUAL REPORT.-By February 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on

(1) the actions that the United States has taken, and the actions the United States plans to take during the next 12 months, to achieve each of the goals set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (b); and

(2) the actions that have been taken by the Russian Federation, by other former Soviet republics, and by other countries to achieve those goals.

Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary.

SEC. 1322. VOLUNTEERS INVESTING IN PEACE AND SECURITY (VIPS) PROGRAM. *

*

Subtitle G-Other Matters

SEC. 1364. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MINE CLEARING EFFORTS IN REFUGEE SITUATIONS.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

* For amendment to 10 U.S.C. 1801-1805, see Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1994, vol. I-B. Freestanding subsections of sec. 1322 may also be found in that volume.

(1) an estimated 10-20 million mines are scattered across Cambodia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola, and other countries which have experienced conflict; and

(2) refugee repatriation and other humanitarian programs are being seriously hampered by the widespread use of antipersonnel mines in regional conflicts and civil wars.

(b) REPORT.-(1) The President shall provide a report on international mine clearing efforts in situations involving the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. (2) The report shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of mine clearing needs in countries to which refugees and displaced persons are now returning, or are likely to return within the near future, including Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mozambique, and an assessment of current international efforts to meet the mine clearing needs in the countries covered by the report.

(B) An analysis of the specific types of mines in the individual countries assessed and the availability of technology and assets within the international community for their removal.

(C) An assessment of what additional technologies and assets would be required to complete, expedite or reduce the costs of mine clearing efforts.

(D) An evaluation of the availability of technologies and assets within the United States Government which, if called upon, could be employed to augment or complete mine clearing efforts in the countries covered by the report.

(E) An evaluation of the desirability, feasibility and potential cost of United States assistance on either a unilateral or multilateral basis in such mine clearing operations.

(3) The report shall be submitted to the Congress not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 1365.3 LANDMINE EXPORT MORATORIUM.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Anti-personnel landmines, which are specifically designed to maim and kill people, have been used indiscriminately in dramatically increasing numbers, primarily in insurgencies in poor developing countries. Noncombatant civilians, including tens of thousands of children, have been the primary victims. (2) Unlike other military weapons, landmines often remain implanted and undiscovered after conflict has ended, causing untold suffering to civilian populations. In Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Angola, tens of millions of unexploded landmines have rendered whole areas uninhabitable. In Afghanistan, an estimated hundreds of thousands of people have been maimed and killed by landmines during the 14-year civil war. In Cambodia, more than 20,000 civilians have lost limbs and another 60 are being maimed each month from landmines.

(3) Over 35 countries are known to manufacture landmines, including the United States. However, the United States is not a major exporter of landmines. During the past ten years the Department of State has approved ten licenses for the commer

322 U.S.C. 2778 note.

« FöregåendeFortsätt »