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(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, which

(A) addresses the implications of the adoption by the United States of a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons;

(B) addresses the implications of an agreement with the other nuclear weapons states to adopt such a policy; and

(C) addresses the implications of a verifiable bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapons

states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons. (d) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

(1) The term "IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(2) The term "IAEA safeguards” means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(3) The term “non-nuclear weapon state” means any country that is not a nuclear weapon state.

(4) The term “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

(5) The term “nuclear weapon state" means any country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

(6) The term "weapons-usable fissile materials” means highly enriched uranium and separated or reprocessed plutonium.

(7) The term “policy of no first use of nuclear weapons" means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

(8) The term "START II treaty" means the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January

3, 1993. SEC. 1612.14 CONDITION ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA FOR CONSTRUC.

TION OF PLUTONIUM STORAGE FACILITY. (a) LIMITATION.–Until a certification under subsection (b) is made, no funds may be obligated or expended by the United States for the purpose of assisting the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia to construct a storage facility for surplus plutonium from dismantled weapons.

(b) 15 CERTIFICATION OF Russia's COMMITMENT TO HALT CHEMICAL SEPARATION OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM.—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall cease to apply upon a certification by the President to Congress that Russia

(1) is committed to halting the chemical separation of weapon-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel; and

14 22 U.S.C. 5952 note.

16 The President delegated functions authorized under subsections (6) and (d) to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of March 10, 1994 (59 f.R. 14079).

(2) is taking all practical steps to halt such separation at the earliest possible date. (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PLUTONIUM POLICY.—It is the sense of Congress that a key objective of the United States with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be to obtain a clear and unequivocal commitment from the Government of Russia that it will (1) cease all production and separation of weapon-grade plutonium, and (2) halt chemical separation of plutonium produced in civil nuclear power reactors.

(d) REPORT.-Not later than June 1, 1994, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the status of efforts by the United States to secure the commitments and achieve the objective described in subsections (b) and (c). The President shall include in the report a discussion of the status of joint efforts by the United States and Russia to replace any remaining Russian plutonium production reactors with alternative power sources or to convert such reactors to operation with alternative fuels that would permit their operation without generating weapon-grade plutonium. SEC. 1613. NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERA.

TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

(2) Any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material that is within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty at any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable material in that state is under safeguards.

(4) North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapons state in December 1985.

(5) North Korea, after acceding to that Treaty, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty.

(6) Inspections of North Korea's nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency suggested discrepancies in North Korea's declarations regarding special nuclear materials.

(7) North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation for those discrepancies.

(8) North Korea refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with full access to two sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(9) When called upon by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty,

North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the
Treaty, effective after the required three months notice.

(10) After intensive negotiations with the United States, North Korea agreed to suspend its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on providing access to its suspect sites.

(11) In an attempt to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the United States has offered to discuss with North Korea specific incentives that could be provided for North Korea once (A) outstanding inspection issues between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency are resolved, and (B) progress is made in bilateral talks between North Korea and South Korea. (b) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS.—The Congress

(1) notes that the continued refusal of North Korea nearly eight years after ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards raises serious questions regarding a possible North Korean nuclear weapons program;

(2) notes that possession by North Korea of nuclear weapons (A) would threaten peace and stability in Asia, (B) would jeopardize the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and (C) would undermine the goal of the United States to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 review conference;

(3) urges continued pressure from the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council on North Korea to adhere to the Treaty and provide full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the shortest time possible;

(4) urges the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council to press for continued talks between North Korea and South Korea on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula;

(5) urges that no trade, financial, or other economic benefits be provided to North Korea by the United States or United States allies until North Korea has (A) provided full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency, (B) satisfactorily explained any discrepancies in its declarations of bomb-grade material, and (C) fully demonstrated that it does not have or seek a nuclear weapons capability; and

(6) calls on the President and the international community to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear non

proliferation regime. SEC. 1614. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO THE PROLIFERATION

OF SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States has joined with other nations in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts the transfer of missiles or equipment or technology that could contribute to the design, development, or production of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

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(2) Missile technology is indistinguishable from, and interchangeable with, space launch vehicle technology.

(3) Transfers of missile technology or space launch vehicle technology cannot be safeguarded in a manner that would provide timely warning of diversion for military purposes.

(4) It has been United States policy since agreeing to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime to treat the sale or transfer of space launch vehicle technology as restrictively as the sale or transfer of missile technology.

(5) Previous congressional action on missile proliferation, notably title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1738), has explicitly supported the policy described in paragraph (4) through such actions as the statutory definition of the term “missile” to mean "a category I system as defined in the MTCR Annex, and any other unmanned delivery system of similar capability, as well as the specially designed production facilities for these systems”.

(6) There is strong evidence that emerging national space launch programs in the Third World are not economically viable.

(7) The United States has been successful in dissuading other countries from pursuing space launch vehicle programs in part by offering to cooperate with those countries in other areas of space science and technology.

(8) The United States has successfully dissuaded other MTCR adherents, and countries who have agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines, from providing assistance to emerging na

tional space launch programs in the Third World. (b) STRICT INTERPRETATION OF MTCR.—The Congress supports the strict interpretation by the United States of the Missile Technology Control Regime concerning

(1) the inability to distinguish space launch vehicle technology from missile technology under the regime; and

(2) the inability to safeguard space launch vehicle technology in a manner that would provide timely warning of the diver

sion of such technology to military purposes. (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government and the governments of other nations adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime should be recognized by the international community for

(1) the success of those governments in restricting the export of space launch vehicle technology and of missile technology; and

(2) the significant contribution made by the imposition of such restrictions to reducing the proliferation of missile technology capable of being used to deliver weapons of mass de

struction. (d) DEFINITION.–For purposes of this section, the term “Missile Technology Control Regime" or "MTCR” means the policy statement, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCŘ Annex, and any amendments thereto.

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c. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993

Partial text of Public Law 102484 (H.R. 6006), 106 Stat. 2315, approved October 23, 1992; amended by Public Law 103–160 (National Defense Author ization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; HR. 2401), 107 Stat. 1647, approved November 30, 1993; Public Law 103-337 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995; S. 2182), 108 Stat. 2663, approved October 6, 1994

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for military activities of

the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to provide for defense conversion, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993”. * * *

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TITLE XIII–MATTERS RELATING TO ALLIES AND OTHER

NATIONS

Subtitle C—Matters Relating to the Former Soviet Union

and Eastern Europe SEC. 1321.- NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On February 1, 1992, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation agreed in a Joint Statement that “Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries” and stated further that, “We will work to remove any remnants of cold war hostility, including taking steps to reduce our strategic arsenals”.

(2) In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for the non-nuclear-weapon states agreeing not to seek a nuclear weapons capability nor to assist other non-nuclear-weapon states in doing so, the United States agreed to seek the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide, as declared in the preamble to the Treaty, which states that it is a goal of the parties to the Treaty to "facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination

122 U.S.C. 5901 note.

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