Sidor som bilder
PDF
ePub

DIVISION -DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZA. TIONS

TITLE XX-DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL

SECURITY PROGRAMS

PART C—MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 31 40. REPORT ON SCHEDULE FOR RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR

TESTING TALKS AND TEST BAN READINESS PROGRAM. (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union share a special responsibility to resume the Nuclear Testing Talks to continue negotiations toward additional limitations on nuclear weapons testing.

(b) REPORT.-Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing a proposed schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks and identifying the goals to be pursued in those talks.

(c) NUCLEAR TEST BAN READINESS PROGRAM. Of the funds appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1992 for weapons activities, $20,000,000 shall be available to conduct the nuclear test ban readiness program established pursuant to section 1436 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100_456; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note). SEC. 3141. WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT AND MATERIAL DISPOSAL. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On September 27, 1991, the President announced as part of a unilateral initiative designed to “enhance stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war," that the United States should explore with the Soviet Union "joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear weapons”.

(2) On October 5, 1991, the President of the Soviet Union stated in response that "We hereby stress readiness to embark on a specific dialogue with the United States on the elaboration of safe and ecologically responsible technologies for the storage and transportation of nuclear warheads and nuclear charges, and to design jointly measures to enhance nuclear safety".

(3) The President's initiative and the Soviet response hold out the prospect of enhancing stability and reducing the risk

of nuclear war. (b) CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT.-Congress strongly endorses the initiative proposed by the President and the Soviet response and looks forward

(1) to hearing the proposed initiatives of the President during the congressional review of the President's proposed budget for fiscal year 1993; and

(2) to helping facilitate such initiatives through appropriate legislative measures which are requested by the President.

[ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]

e. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 Partial text of Public Law 101-510 (H.R. 4739), 104 Stat. 1485 at 1689,

approved November 5, 1990 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for military activities of

the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE XIVGENERAL PROVISIONS

Part D-ARMS CONTROL MATTERS
*

*

SEC. 1441. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR RISK RE.

DUCTION MEASURES (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On June 1, 1990, the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union signed a document entitled “Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability”.

(2) In that document, the two nations pledged to pursue additional confidence-building and predictability measures “that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them”.

(3) As a result of the recent increase in ethnic, national, economic, and political tensions within the Soviet Union, concern has heightened regarding the possible unauthorized or accidental use of Soviet nuclear weapons.

(4) It has been four years since the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive review of its nuclear control procedures and failsafe mechanisms.

(5) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment, concluded that with the recent changes in the global security environment “the risk of nuclear deterrence failing is assessed to be low and at this moment to be decreasing".

(6) While Congress is concerned about continued strategic offensive and defensive modernization by the Soviet Union and the unpredictable status of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, at this stage the lessened prospects that nuclear weapons of the United States might have to be employed may afford an opportunity to reconsider past reluctance to use certain positive control measures, such as the installation of permissive action links (PALs) on nuclear weapons deployed at sea by the United States and the installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States, as long as appropriate security measures can be developed to protect the integrity of such destruct mechanisms.

(7) On September 15, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in Washington and Moscow.

(8) The NRRCs have made a useful contribution to lowering the risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war and are ca

pable of taking on expanded roles. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress

(1) that the President of the United States and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are to be commended for their June 1, 1990, joint statement to pursue additional nuclear confidence-building measures; and

(2) that, in keeping with that joint statement, the President,

(A) should invite the Soviet Union to join with the United States in conducting separate but parallel, comprehensive reviews of each nation's own nuclear control procedures and failsafe mechanisms; and

(B) should propose to the Soviet Union that representatives of the two nations engage in discussions with the objective of agreeing on additional roles and functions that could be assigned to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to further lessen the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war as the result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or acci

dent. (c) REPORT ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES.-Not later than March 1, 1991, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in both classified and unclassified form) assessing additional nuclear risk reduction measures which could be implemented pursuant to the joint statement of June 1, 1990, referred to in subsection (b), including the following:

(1) Assigning to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) such expanded roles as the following:

(A) Serving as a forum for discussions between the two nations on responding to possible nuclear terrorism.

(B) Transmitting notifications that may be required under future arms control treaties.

(C) Transmitting non-urgent notifications and information requests required under Article 5 of the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Betwren the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(D) Providing a forum for discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation.

destruct me and sub United

(E) Serving as a meeting place for high-level military discussions on nuclear doctrines, forces and activities, and

regional security concerns. (2) Installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States.

(3) Installation by the United States of permissive action

links (PALs) on all nuclear weapons at sea. SEC. 1442. START AND STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva.

(2) In the Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms signed in June 1990, the two sides reaffirmed their determination to have a START agreement completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990.

(3) Under the provisions of a START agreement, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms.

(4) In the Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms.

(5) The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries.

(6) The President's effort to negotiate such agreements is dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required for a prudent defense posture.

(7) The Soviet Union has maintained a robust strategic modernization program throughout the course of the START nego

tiations which continues today. (b) It is the sense of the Congress that,

(1) the Congress fully supports United States efforts to enhance strategic stability; and

(2) the United States should pursue stabilizing strategic arms reduction agreements while maintaining a vigorous research and development and modernization program for United States strategic forces as required for a prudent defense

posture. SEC. 1443. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AGREEMENT

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— It is the sense of the Congress that the President, before concluding an agreement in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, should provide to Congress

(1) a report on whether the SS-23 INF missiles of Soviet manufacture, which the Soviet Union has confirmed have been stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic and in the territories of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, constitute a violation of the INF Treaty or constitute deception

« FöregåendeFortsätt »