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in the INF negotiations, and whether the United States has reliable assurances that those missiles will be destroyed; and
(2) a report on whether the Krasnoyarsk radar, which the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union admitted is a clear violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, has been verifiably dismantled
in accordance with United States criteria. FORM OF REPORTS.—The reports under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) should be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.
f. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990
Partial text of Public Law 101-189 (H.R. 2461), 103 Stat. 1352 at 1539,
approved November 29, 1989
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military ac
tivities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE X-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL
SEC. 1001. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF A STRA.
TEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT ON TRIDENT PRO.
GRAM (a) REPORT.-Not later than April 1, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the Trident program under a possible Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement. The report shall address the following issues:
(1) The objective for the size of the Trident submarine force fleet both with and without a START agreement.
(2) The implications for United States strategic force posture under a START agreement of a fleet of 21 or more Trident submarines, each with 192 warheads on 24 ballistic missiles, under two different assumptions, as follows:
(A) All such warheads are accountable under START limits.
(B) The warheads on one-to-three Trident submarines are not accountable under START limits. (3) A net assessment of the implications for United States security of a START agreement that allows the Soviet Union as well as the United States to have an equivalent number of warheads on submarines that are not accountable under START limits.
(4) The technical feasibility and cost implications of various options for reducing the number of warheads on Trident submarines, including those submarines already built, those under construction, and those yet to be built.
(5) The verification challenges to the United States posed by such options if the Soviet Union were to adopt them in its bal
listic missile submarine forces. (b) FORM OF REPORT.-The President shall submit the report under subsection (a) in both classified and unclassified versions.
(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) if he has signed a START agreement or other strategic
FINDINGS. Trited States muest Strateg
he positieva wat bethe strate confide findings:
arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union before the date by which the report is otherwise required to be submitted. SEC. 1002. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE VERIFICATION WORK THAT
HAS BEEN CONDUCTED WITH REGARD TO MOBILE ICBMs
UNDER A START AGREEMENT (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States must have confidence that any agreement achieved through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) in Geneva will be effectively verifiable.
(2) The position of the United States at the START negotiations, from 1985 until September 1989, was to ban the deploy. ment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) under a START regime unless an effective verification regime could be identified and implemented. In September 1989, the United States announced that it was withdrawing its proposal for the ban of mobile ICBMs, contingent upon Congress providing funds for mobile ICBMs to be deployed by the United States.
(3) The Soviet Union has deployed two mobile ICBM sys. tems, the SS-24 and the SS-25.
(4) The President conducted a strategic review during the period between January 20, 1989, and the resumption of the START negotiations on June 15, 1989. (b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.-Not later than March 31, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in classified and unclassified form) describing all studies that have been performed between March 1985 and August 1989 by agencies of the United States Government with regard to the capability of the United States to monitor and verify a START agreement which allows mobile ICBMs. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of each study conducted by United States Government agencies during the strategic review referred to in subsection (a)(4) to determine the ability of the United States to verify limitations on mobile ICBMs of the Soviet Union under a START agreement, including a summary of the conclu. sions reached under each such study.
(2) A description of any so-called “Red Team" study conducted between March 1985 and August 1989 with regard to the existence of mobile ICBMs under a START regime, including a summary of the conclusions reached under each such study.
(3) A description of each study conducted by United States Government agencies between March 1989 and August 1989 to assess the value of various options relating to the verification of mobile ICBMs (such options to include the option known as "tagging" and the establishment of designated deployment areas), including a summary of the conclusions reached under
each such study. SEC. 1003. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON START TALKS
Congress hereby reaffirms the sense of Congress expressed in the second session of the 100th Congress (in section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law
100_456; 102 Stat. 2031)) 1 that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva or otherwise)
(1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force; and
(2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nu
clear cruise missiles. SEC. 1004. REPORT ON ASYMMETRIES IN CAPABILITIES OF UNITED
STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS (a) STUDY REQUIRED.-The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the asymmetry in the near-term capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy ballistic missile defenses beyond those permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. The study shall be conducted in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN STUDY.—Subject to subsection (e), the study shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the likelihood of a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty in the next five years and the assumptions used for that assessment.
(2) An assessment of the capability of the Soviet Union to exploit a situation in which the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty do not apply, including a detailed assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Union to produce
(A) space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) launchers and interceptors;
(B) ground-based ABM launchers and interceptors; and
(C) the infrastructure for ABM battle management command, control, and communications. (3) An assessment of the production base of the United States for production of the elements specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (2), including an estimate of how quickly the United States could respond to a breakout
by the Soviet Union in each of those elements. (c) STUDY TO ASSESS POSSIBLE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO SoVIET BREAKOUT.-(1) The study shall also include an assessment of the immediate and long-term actions that could be taken by the United States to respond to redress any asymmetry in the potential of the United States and the Soviet Union to exploit a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty.
(2) That assessment shall include an evaluation of the actions that would be necessary to support,
(A) a one-site ABM system (as allowed under the Treaty); or
(B) an expanded ABM system unconstrained by the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
VDET STUDY Mbiet Union United paragraph its specifi
1 Sec. 902 of Public Law 100 456 stated a sense of the Congress on START talks identical to par. (1) and (2).
(3) Such assessment shall specifically address the required actions, and the costs associated with those actions, to support both the one-site ABM system and the expanded ABM system to be evaluated under paragraph (2), including (A) the upgrading and expansion of the existing United States radar network, (B) the use of existing inactive ABM components at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and (C) the development and deployment of other required components.
(d) REPORT.-Not later than the date on which the budget for fiscal year 1991 is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the study under subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. The report shall specify the results of the study under subsection (a), including each matter required to be included in the study under this section.
(e) WAIVER OF REQUIRED STUDY FEATURE.—The study under subsection (a) need not include the assessment referred to in subsection (b)(1) if, before the date of the submission of the report required by subsection (d) with respect to the study, the President submits to Congress the report required by section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100_456; 102 Stat. 2034), regarding antiballistic missile capabili. ties and activities of the Soviet Union (such report having been required by subsection (c) of such section to be submitted not later than January 1, 1989).
(f) 1972 ABM TREATY DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, the term “1972 ABM Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972. SEC. 1006. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO ACCIDENTAL
LAUNCH PROTECTION (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has made substantial progress in developing technologies to defend the United States from a possible ballistic missile attack, be it deliberate or accidental.
(2) Ground-based elements and their associated adjuncts and technologies represent the most mature technologies within the SDI program and should therefore receive priority by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.
(3) The United States is a signatory to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
(4) There have been several accidents involving ballistic missiles, including the loss of a submarine of the Soviet Union due to inadvertent missile ignition and the inadvertent landing in China of a test missile of the Soviet Union.
(5) The continued proliferation of offensive ballistic missile forces by non-superpower countries hostile to the United States
and our allies raises the possibility of future nuclear threats. (b) REAFFIRMATION OF SENSE OF CONGRESS.-Congress hereby reaffirms the sense of Congress expressed in section 224(b) of the