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National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100_456; 102 Stat. 1942) 2 stating
(1) that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to give priority to development of technologies and systems for a system capable of protecting the United States from the accidental launch of a strategic ballistic missile against the continental United States; and
(2) that such development of an accidental launch protection system should be carried out with an objective of ensuring that such system is in compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis
sile Treaty. (c) SUBMISSION OF PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED REPORT.-The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress forth with the report on the status of planning for development of a deployment option for such an accidental launch protection system that was required by section 224(c) of that Act to be submitted not later than March 1, 1989. SEC. 1006. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS
CONCERNING THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR (a) REAFFIRMATION OF PRIOR FINDINGS.—Congress hereby reaffirms the findings made with respect to the large phased-array radar of the Soviet Union known as the “Krasnoyarsk radar" in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 902(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100 180; 101 Stat. 1135), as follows:
(1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
(2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying an ABM system to defend its national territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide defense.
(3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during negotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles.
(4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged to be for ballistic early warning and tracking.
(5) The Krasnoyarsk radar is more than 700 kilometers from the Soviet-Mongolian border and is not directed outward but instead faces the northeast Soviet border more than 4,500 kilometers away.
(6) The Krasnoyarsk radar is identical to other Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars and is ideally situated to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in a nationwide Soviet ballistic missile early warning radar network.
2 Sec. 224(b) of Public Law 100_456, stated the sense of the Congress identical to text in par. (1) and (2)
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(b) FURTHER FINDINGS.-In addition to the findings referred to in subsection (a), Congress finds with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar that,
(1) in 1987 the President declared that radar to be a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
(2) until the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989, the Soviet Union had rejected demands by the United States that it dismantle that radar without conditions, but the joint statement issued following that meeting states that the government of the Soviet Union "had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station"; and
(3) on October 23, 1989, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— It is the sense of Congress
(1) that the Soviet Union should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar (as announced in the joint statement referred to in subsection (b)(2)) expeditiously and without conditions; and
(2) that until such radar is completely dismantled it will re
main a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SEC. 1007. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EXPLORING THE FEA
SIBILITY OF TREATY LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS CAPA.
BLE OF THREATENING MILITARY SATELLITES It is the sense of Congress that, as soon as practicable, the President should explore the feasibility of a mutual and verifiable treaty with the Soviet Union which places the strictest possible limitations, consistent with the security interests of the United States and its allies, on the development, testing, production, and deployment of weapons capable of directly threatening United States military satellites. SEC. 1008. REPORT ON SATELLITE SURVIVABILITY
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.— The President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on United States antisatellite weapon activities and the survivability of United States satellites against current and potential antisatellite weapons deployed by the Soviet Union. The report shall be submitted by March 15, 1990, and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN REPORT.-The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Detailed information (including funding profiles, expected capabilities, and schedules for development, testing, and deployment) on all United States antisatellite weapon programs.
(2) An analysis of the antisatellite potential of the anticipated deployed version of each Strategic Defense Initiative technology capable of damaging or destroying objects in space.
(3) An assessment of the threat that would be posed to satellites of the United States if the technologies described in paragraphs (1) and (2) were to be tested by the Soviet Union, at levels of performance equal to those intended by the United States, and developed into weapons for damaging or destroying objects in space.
(4) A review of arms control options and satellite survivability measures (including cost data) that would improve the survivability of current and future United States military satellite systems.
(5) A review of alternative means of providing the support to military forces of the United States that is currently provided by United States satellites if those satellites become vulnerable to attack as the result of the deployment by the Soviet Union of antisatellite weapons with the levels of performance con
templated in paragraph (3). SEC. 1009. REPORT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON ANTI
SATELLITE CAPABILITIES (a) REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT.-The President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report regarding the desirability of an agreement with the Soviet Union to impose limitations on antisatellite capabilities. The President shall include in such report his determination of whether a ban or other limitations on some or all antisatellite weapons would be verifiable and, if so, whether such a ban or other limitation would be in the national interest of the United States.
(b) MATTERS RELATING TO VERIFICATION.-In making the determination referred to in subsection (a), the President shall
(1) consider the extent to which on-site inspection measures (as well as national technical means for verification) can increase confidence in the ability of the United States to monitor and verify various agreed-upon antisatellite limitations; and (2) examine various arms control possibilities, including
(A) a total ban on antisatellite capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union;
(B) a ban or other limitation on antisatellite weapons with the potential to attack satellites at altitudes above the Van Allen belt; and
(C) a ban or other limitation on antisatellite weapons
that operate only in low-Earth orbit. (c) MATTERS RELATING TO DETERRENCE AND WAR FIGHTING REQUIREMENTS.-- In the report required by subsection (a), the President shall also address the following:
(1) The contribution an antisatellite capability of the United States can make toward enhancing deterrence.
(2) The contribution an antisatellite capability can make toward meeting the war fighting requirements of the United States and how such a capability enhances force survivability.
(3) The extent to which (based upon a net assessment) the United States would be better able to meet its war fighting requirements and deterrence objectives if
(A) the Soviet Union possessed an antisatellite capability and the United States did not possess an antisatellite capability;
(B) neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possessed an antisatellite capability;
(C) the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed a limited antisatellite capability;
(D) the United States and the Soviet Union both pos
sessed an unrestricted antisatellite capability. (d) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.-The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than May 1, 1990, and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions. SEC. 1010. REPORT ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREE.
MENTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR TESTING (a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Energy shall prepare a report, in classified form, assessing the possible effects on the abilities of the United States to verify compliance by the Soviet Union with any agreement (presently in effect or under negotiation) to limit testing of nuclear devices should any information or data now obtained under any cooperative agreement with any controlled country and used to verify the degree of such compliance be curtailed or become unavailable due to a change in, or severing of, diplomatic relations with such a controlled country. The report shall assess, in particular, whether compliance by the Soviet Union with any such agreement to limit testing of nuclear devices can be fully and reliably verified should such a cooperative agreement be curtailed or terminated. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.
(b) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—The report prepared under subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) CONTROLLED COUNTRY DEFINITION.–For purposes of this section, the term "controlled country” means a country listed in section 620(1)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)(1). SEC. 1011. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
AND UNITED STATES MODERNIZATION POLICY (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States is currently engaged in a wide range of arms control negotiations in the areas of strategic nuclear forces, strategic defenses, conventional force levels, chemical weapons, and security and confidence building measures.
(2) On May 30, 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a “Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control and Disarmament” which placed a special emphasis on arms control as a means of enhancing security and stability in Europe.
(3) The President has stated that arms control is one of the highest priorities of the United States in the area of security and foreign policy and that the United States will pursue a dynamic, active arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries.
(4) The United States has already made major proposals at the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks, convened on March 6, 1989, which would result in a dramatic reduction in Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.
(5) The President, on September 25, 1989, made a major new arms control proposal in the area of chemical weapons. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that
(1) the President is to be commended for pursuing a wide array of arms control initiatives in the context of a multitude
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of arms control negotiations, all of which have been designed to enhance global security and result in meaningful, militarily significant reductions in military forces;
(2) Congress fully supports the arms control efforts of the President and encourages the government of the Soviet Union to respond favorably to United States arms control proposals which would require the Soviet Union to reduce its massive quantitative superiority in military weaponry;
(3) the President should seek arms control agreements that would not limit the United States to levels of forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and
(4) the President's efforts to negotiate such agreements is dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required for a pru
dent defense posture. (c) REAFFIRMATION OF PROHIBITION RELATING TO ENTERING INTO CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.-Congress hereby reaffirms the proviso in the first sentence of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573) that no action may be taken under that Act or any other Act that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress. SEC. 1012. REPORT ON EFFECT OF SPACE NUCLEAR REACTORS ON
GAMMA-RAY ASTRONOMY MISSIONS Not later than April 30, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the potential for interference with gamma-ray astronomy missions that could be caused by the placement in Earth orbit of space nuclear reactors. SEC. 1013. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIA
TIONS (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The proliferation of chemical weapons and the repeated use of chemical weapons represent a grave threat to the security and interests of the United States.
(2) The most comprehensive and effective response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons is the completion of an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.
(3) The successful completion of a treaty banning all chemical weapons through the negotiations at the multinational United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be one of the highest arms control priorities of the United
States. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that,
(1) the President should continue ongoing efforts to establish an agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries establishing a mutual and effectively verifiable agreement to stop the production, proliferation, and stockpiling of all lethal chemical weapons; and