100-456; 102 Stat. 2031))1 that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva or otherwise

(1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force; and

(2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nuclear cruise missiles.

SEC. 1004. REPORT ON ASYMMETRIES IN CAPABILITIES OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

(a) STUDY REQUIRED.-The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the asymmetry in the near-term capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy ballistic missile defenses beyond those permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. The study shall be conducted in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN STUDY.-Subject to subsection (e), the study shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the likelihood of a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty in the next five years and the assumptions used for that assessment.

(2) An assessment of the capability of the Soviet Union to exploit a situation in which the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty do not apply, including a detailed assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Union to produce

(A) space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) launchers and interceptors;

(B) ground-based ABM launchers and interceptors; and (C) the infrastructure for ABM battle management command, control, and communications.

(3) An assessment of the production base of the United States for production of the elements specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (2), including an estimate of how quickly the United States could respond to a breakout by the Soviet Union in each of those elements.

(c) STUDY TO ASSESS POSSIBLE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO SoVIET BREAKOUT. (1) The study shall also include an assessment of the immediate and long-term actions that could be taken by the United States to respond to redress any asymmetry in the potential of the United States and the Soviet Union to exploit a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

(2) That assessment shall include an evaluation of the actions that would be necessary to support

(A) a one-site ABM system (as allowed under the Treaty); or (B) an expanded ABM system unconstrained by the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

1 Sec. 902 of Public Law 100-456 stated a sense of the Congress on START talks identical to par. (1) and (2).

(3) Such assessment shall specifically address the required actions, and the costs associated with those actions, to support both the one-site ABM system and the expanded ABM system to be evaluated under paragraph (2), including (A) the upgrading and expansion of the existing United States radar network, (B) the use of existing inactive ABM components at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and (C) the development and deployment of other required components.

(d) REPORT.-Not later than the date on which the budget for fiscal year 1991 is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the study under subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. The report shall specify the results of the study under subsection (a), including each matter required to be included in the study under this

section.

(e) WAIVER OF REQUIRED STUDY FEATURE.-The study under subsection (a) need not include the assessment referred to in subsection (b)(1) if, before the date of the submission of the report required by subsection (d) with respect to the study, the President submits to Congress the report required by section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2034), regarding antiballistic missile capabilities and activities of the Soviet Union (such report having been required by subsection (c) of such section to be submitted not later than January 1, 1989).

(f) 1972 ABM TREATY DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the term "1972 ABM Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972.

SEC. 1005. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH PROTECTION

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has made substantial progress in developing technologies to defend the United States from a possible ballistic missile attack, be it deliberate or accidental.

(2) Ground-based elements and their associated adjuncts and technologies represent the most mature technologies within the SDI program and should therefore receive priority by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

(3) The United States is a signatory to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(4) There have been several accidents involving ballistic missiles, including the loss of a submarine of the Soviet Union due to inadvertent missile ignition and the inadvertent landing in China of a test missile of the Soviet Union.

(5) The continued proliferation of offensive ballistic missile forces by non-superpower countries hostile to the United States and our allies raises the possibility of future nuclear threats. (b) REAFFIRMATION OF SENSE OF CONGRESS.-Congress hereby reaffirms the sense of Congress expressed in section 224(b) of the

National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 1942)2 stating

(1) that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to give priority to development of technologies and systems for a system capable of protecting the United States from the accidental launch of a strategic ballistic missile against the continental United States; and

(2) that such development of an accidental launch protection system should be carried out with an objective of ensuring that such system is in compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(c) SUBMISSION OF PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED REPORT.-The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress forthwith the report on the status of planning for development of a deployment option for such an accidental launch protection system that was required by section 224(c) of that Act to be submitted not later than March 1, 1989.

SEC. 1006. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR

(a) REAFFIRMATION OF PRIOR FINDINGS.-Congress hereby reaffirms the findings made with respect to the large phased-array radar of the Soviet Union known as the "Krasnoyarsk radar" in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 902(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100180; 101 Stat. 1135), as follows:

(1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

(2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying an ABM system to defend its national territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide defense.

(3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during negotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles.

(4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged to be for ballistic early warning and tracking.

(5) The Krasnoyarsk radar is more than 700 kilometers from the Soviet-Mongolian border and is not directed outward but instead faces the northeast Soviet border more than 4,500 kilometers away.

(6) The Krasnoyarsk radar is identical to other Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars and is ideally situated to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in a nationwide Soviet ballistic missile early warning radar network.

2 Sec. 224(b) of Public Law 100-456, stated the sense of the Congress identical to text in par. (1) and (2).

88-541 95-42

(b) FURTHER FINDINGS.-In addition to the findings referred to in subsection (a), Congress finds with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar that

(1) in 1987 the President declared that radar to be a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;

(2) until the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989, the Soviet Union had rejected demands by the United States that it dismantle that radar without conditions, but the joint statement issued following that meeting states that the government of the Soviet Union "had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station"; and

(3) on October 23, 1989, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress

(1) that the Soviet Union should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar (as announced in the joint statement referred to in subsection (b)(2)) expeditiously and without conditions; and

(2) that until such radar is completely dismantled it will remain a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SEC. 1007. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF TREATY LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS CAPABLE OF THREATENING MILITARY SATELLITES

It is the sense of Congress that, as soon as practicable, the President should explore the feasibility of a mutual and verifiable treaty with the Soviet Union which places the strictest possible limitations, consistent with the security interests of the United States and its allies, on the development, testing, production, and deployment of weapons capable of directly threatening United States military satellites.

SEC. 1008. REPORT ON SATELLITE SURVIVABILITY

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.-The President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on United States antisatellite weapon activities and the survivability of United States satellites against current and potential antisatellite weapons deployed by the Soviet Union. The report shall be submitted by March 15, 1990, and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions. (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN REPORT.-The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Detailed information (including funding profiles, expected capabilities, and schedules for development, testing, and deployment) on all United States antisatellite weapon programs. (2) An analysis of the antisatellite potential of the anticipated deployed version of each Strategic Defense Initiative technology capable of damaging or destroying objects in space.

(3) An assessment of the threat that would be posed to satellites of the United States if the technologies described in paragraphs (1) and (2) were to be tested by the Soviet Union, at levels of performance equal to those intended by the United States, and developed into weapons for damaging or destroying objects in space.

(4) A review of arms control options and satellite survivability measures (including cost data) that would improve the survivability of current and future United States military satellite systems.

(5) A review of alternative means of providing the support to military forces of the United States that is currently provided by United States satellites if those satellites become vulnerable to attack as the result of the deployment by the Soviet Union of antisatellite weapons with the levels of performance contemplated in paragraph (3).

SEC. 1009. REPORT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES

(a) REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT.-The President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report regarding the desirability of an agreement with the Soviet Union to impose limitations on antisatellite capabilities. The President shall include in such report his determination of whether a ban or other limitations on some or all antisatellite weapons would be verifiable and, if so, whether such a ban or other limitation would be in the national interest of the United States.

(b) MATTERS RELATING TO VERIFICATION.-In making the determination referred to in subsection (a), the President shall

(1) consider the extent to which on-site inspection measures (as well as national technical means for verification) can increase confidence in the ability of the United States to monitor and verify various agreed-upon antisatellite limitations; and (2) examine various arms control possibilities, including—

(A) a total ban on antisatellite capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union;

(B) a ban or other limitation on antisatellite weapons with the potential to attack satellites at altitudes above the Van Allen belt; and

(C) a ban or other limitation on antisatellite weapons that operate only in low-Earth orbit.

(c) MATTERS RELATING TO DETERRENCE AND WAR FIGHTING REQUIREMENTS.—In the report required by subsection (a), the President shall also address the following:

(1) The contribution an antisatellite capability of the United States can make toward enhancing deterrence.

(2) The contribution an antisatellite capability can make toward meeting the war fighting requirements of the United States and how such a capability enhances force survivability. (3) The extent to which (based upon a net assessment) the United States would be better able to meet its war fighting requirements and deterrence objectives if—

(A) the Soviet Union possessed an antisatellite capability and the United States did not possess an antisatellite capability;

(B) neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possessed an antisatellite capability;

(C) the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed a limited antisatellite capability;