(D) the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed an unrestricted antisatellite capability. (d) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.-The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than May 1, 1990, and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions. SEC. 1010. REPORT ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR TESTING (a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.-The Secretary of Energy shall prepare a report, in classified form, assessing the possible effects on the abilities of the United States to verify compliance by the Soviet Union with any agreement (presently in effect or under negotiation) to limit testing of nuclear devices should any information or data now obtained under any cooperative agreement with any controlled country and used to verify the degree of such compliance be curtailed or become unavailable due to a change in, or severing of, diplomatic relations with such a controlled country. The report shall assess, in particular, whether compliance by the Soviet Union with any such agreement to limit testing of nuclear devices can be fully and reliably verified should such a cooperative agreement be curtailed or terminated. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. (b) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.-The report prepared under subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) CONTROLLED COUNTRY DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section, the term "controlled country" means a country listed in section 620(f)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)(1)). SEC. 1011. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND UNITED STATES MODERNIZATION POLICY (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States is currently engaged in a wide range of arms control negotiations in the areas of strategic nuclear forces, strategic defenses, conventional force levels, chemical weapons, and security and confidence building measures. (2) On May 30, 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a "Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control and Disarmament" which placed a special emphasis on arms control as a means of enhancing security and stability in Europe. (3) The President has stated that arms control is one of the highest priorities of the United States in the area of security and foreign policy and that the United States will pursue a dynamic, active arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. (4) The United States has already made major proposals at the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks, convened on March 6, 1989, which would result in a dramatic reduction in Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. (5) The President, on September 25, 1989, made a major new arms control proposal in the area of chemical weapons. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that (1) the President is to be commended for pursuing a wide array of arms control initiatives in the context of a multitude of arms control negotiations, all of which have been designed to enhance global security and result in meaningful, militarily significant reductions in military forces; (2) Congress fully supports the arms control efforts of the President and encourages the government of the Soviet Union to respond favorably to United States arms control proposals which would require the Soviet Union to reduce its massive quantitative superiority in military weaponry; (3) the President should seek arms control agreements that would not limit the United States to levels of forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and (4) the President's efforts to negotiate such agreements is dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required for a prudent defense posture. (c) REAFFIRMATION OF PROHIBITION RELATING TO ENTERING INTO CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.-Congress hereby reaffirms the proviso in the first sentence of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573) that no action may be taken under that Act or any other Act that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress. SEC. 1012. REPORT ON EFFECT OF SPACE NUCLEAR REACTORS ON GAMMA-RAY ASTRONOMY MISSIONS Not later than April 30, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the potential for interference with gamma-ray astronomy missions that could be caused by the placement in Earth orbit of space nuclear reactors. SEC. 1013. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings: (1) The proliferation of chemical weapons and the repeated use of chemical weapons represent a grave threat to the security and interests of the United States. (2) The most comprehensive and effective response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons is the completion of an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. (3) The successful completion of a treaty banning all chemical weapons through the negotiations at the multinational United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be one of the highest arms control priorities of the United States. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that (1) the President should continue ongoing efforts to establish an agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries establishing a mutual and effectively verifiable agreement to stop the production, proliferation, and stockpiling of all lethal chemical weapons; and (2) the United States negotiators in Geneva should take concrete steps to initiate proposals regarding the composition of the verification regime for such an agreement that will meet the legitimate concerns of other parties while addressing the security concerns of the United States. SEC. 1014. UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS UNDER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (a) FINDINGS CONCERNING ON-SITE INSPECTION PERSONNEL.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States is currently engaged in multilateral and bilateral negotiations seeking to achieve treaties or agreements to reduce or eliminate various types of military weapons and to make certain reductions in military personnel levels. These negotiations include negotiations for (A) reductions in strategic forces, conventional armaments, and military personnel levels, (B) regimes for monitoring nuclear testing, and (C) the complete elimination of chemical weapons. (2) Requirements for monitoring these possible treaties or agreements will be extensive and will place severe stress on the monitoring capabilities of United States national technical means. (3) In the case of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated, and are currently using, on-site inspection procedures to complement and support monitoring by national technical means. Similar on-site inspection procedures are being negotiated for inclusion in possible future treaties and agreements referred to in paragraph (1). (4) During initial implementation of the provisions of the INF Treaty, the United States was not fully prepared for the personnel requirements for the conduct of on-site inspections. The Director of Central Intelligence has stated that on-site inspection requirements for any strategic arms reduction treaty or agreement will be far more extensive than those for the INF Treaty. The number of locations within the Soviet Union that would possibly be subject to on-site inspections under a START agreement have been estimated to be approximately 2,500 (compared to 120 for the INF Treaty). (5) On-site inspection procedures are likely to be an integral part of any future arms control treaty or agreement. (6) Personnel requirements will be extensive for such on-site inspection procedures, both in terms of numbers of personnel and technical and linguistic skills. Since verification requirements for the INF Treaty are already placing severe stress on current personnel resources, the requirements for verification under START and other possible future treaties and agreements may quickly exceed the current number of verification personnel having necessary technical and language skills. (7) There is a clear need for a database of the names of individuals who are members of the Armed Forces or civilian employees of the United States Government, or of other citizens and nationals of the United States, who are qualified (by reason of technical or language skills) to participate in on-site inspections under an arms control treaty or agreement. (8) The organization best suited to establish such a database is the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) of the Department of Defense, which was created by the President to implement (for the United States) the on-site inspection provisions of the INF Treaty. (b) STATUS OF THE OSIA. (1) Congress finds that (A) the Director of the OSIA (currently a brigadier general of the Army) is appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of the President; (B) the Secretary of Defense provides to the Director appropriate policy guidance formulated by the interagency arms control mechanism established by the President; (C) most of the personnel of the OSIA are members of the Armed Forces (who are trained and paid by the military departments within the Department of Defense) and include linguists, weapons specialists, and foreign area specialists; (D) the Department of Defense provides the OSIA with substantially all of its administrative and logistic support (including military air transportation for inspections in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); and (E) the facilities in Europe and the United States at which OSIA personnel escort personnel of the Soviet Union conducting inspections under the on-site inspection terms of the INF Treaty are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (or under the jurisdiction of entities that are contractors with the Department of Defense). (2) In light of the findings in paragraph (1) and the report submitted pursuant to section 909 of Public Law 100-456 entitled "Report to the Congress on U.S. Monitoring and Verification Activities Related to the INF Treaty" (submitted on July 27, 1989), Congress hereby determines that by locating the On-Site Inspection Agency within the Department of Defense for the purposes of administrative and logistic support and operational guidance, and integrating on-site inspection responsibilities under the INF Treaty with existing organizational activities of that Department, the President has been able to ensure that sensitive national security assets are protected and that obligations of the United States under that treaty are fulfilled in an efficient and cost-effective manner. (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONNEL DATABASE. (1) In light of the findings in subsection (a), the Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency shall establish a database consisting of the names of individuals who could be assigned or detailed (in the case of Government personnel) or employed (in the case of non-Government personnel) to participate in the conduct of on-site inspections under any future arms control treaty or agreement that includes provisions for such inspections. (2) The database should be composed of the names of individuals with skills (including linguistic and technical skills) necessary for the conduct of on-site inspections. (d) INF TREATY DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the term "INF Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In |