g. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989

Partial text of Public Law 100–456 [H.R. 4481], 102 Stat. 1918, approved September 29, 1988

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1989 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE IX-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

SEC. 901. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Approximately two years have passed since the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adjourned in Stockholm following the adoption of measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe.

(2) To date, there have been seven formal observations and challenge inspections which have been conducted in accordance with the Stockholm agreements.

(3) The military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have concluded that the Stockholm observations and inspections have positively contributed to an improved understanding of Warsaw Pact forces and capabilities.

(4) The Conventional Stability Talks (CST), which may begin before the end of 1988, will likely require careful and potentially prolonged negotiation.

(5) New negotiations will also begin under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a follow-on to the Stockholm conference.

(6) The confidence-building measures established at Stockholm could, if expanded, contribute significantly to the success of the CDE follow-on conference and also to the establishment of a procedural framework for verifying a future CST agreement.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the President should give high priority to developing, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies of the United States, stabilizing and verifiable proposals for expanding the regime of confidence-building measures in conjunction with the follow-on to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the new Conventional Stability Talks (CST).

SEC. 902.1 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON START TALKS

It is the sense of Congress that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva or otherwise)

(1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force, and

(2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nuclear cruise missiles.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE POLICIES

It is the sense of Congress

(1) that Congress, in exercising its authority under the Constitution "to raise and support Armies" and "provide and maintain Navies" and, in the case of the Senate, to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties, has a role to play in formulating arms control and defense policies of the United States, but

(2) that Congress, in exercising that authority, should not usurp, undermine, or interfere with the authority of the President under the Constitution to negotiate and implement treaties, especially in the case of treaties which affect arms control and defense policies of the United States.

SEC. 904. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE FIVE-YEAR ABM TREATY REVIEW

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, With Associated Protocol (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "ABM Treaty" or the "Treaty") in Article XIV, Paragraph 2, reads as follows: "Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.".

(2) Such Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, and the third five-year anniversary date specified for the conduct of the review contemplated in the Treaty, therefore, was October 3, 1987.

(3) As a fundamental principle of the canons of legal construction, a specified number of years after a specific and determinable date means the specified anniversary of such date and therefore the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty should have begun on or about October 3, 1987.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty have not met as required by the Treaty because the United States refused to meet on the date specified in the Treaty for such meeting (October 3, 1987) and has refused since such date to propose a date for the meeting.

1 Sec. 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1541), reaffirmed this sense of the Congress.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the President should, without any further delay, propose an early date to conduct the overdue five-year review of the ABM Treaty. The President shall inform Congress of the results of that review immediately after it takes place.

SEC. 905. REVISION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS (a) 2 * * *

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect beginning with the report to be submitted under section 1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, in 1990.

SEC. 906.3 ANNUAL REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY

(a) IN GENERAL.-The President shall submit to Congress each year, not later than December 1, a report containing a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the arms control strategy of the United States. The President shall include in each such report the following:

(1) A description of the nature and sequence of the future arms control efforts of the United States.

(2) A net assessment of the current effects of arms control agreements on the status of, and trends in, the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.

(3) A comprehensive data base on the military balance of forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the balance of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, that are affected by arms control agreements in existence as of the time of the report between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an explanation of the methodology used to analyze the effects on such forces.

(4) A net assessment of the effect that proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would likely have on United States force plans and contingency plans, including an assessment of the effect that such proposed agreements would have on the risks and costs to the United States.

(5) An assessment of the effect that proposed treaty sub-ceilings, asymmetries, and other factors or qualifications affecting a treaty or arms control proposal would have on the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an assessment of how such factors increase deterrence and reduce the risk and cost of war.

(6) A statement of the strategy the United States and NATO will use to verify and deter noncompliance with proposed arms

2 Sec. 905(a) amended sec. 1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 22 U.S.C. 2592a). 322 U.S.C. 2592b.

control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

(7) A discussion of the extent to which and the manner in which the United States intends to consult with its allies regarding proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

(8) A discussion of how the United States proposes to tailor its defense structure in order to ensure that the national security can be preserved with or without arms control agreements. (b) EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY.-In reporting on the current effect of arms control agreements on the status of, and trends in, the military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (required under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a)), the President shall

(1) specify the methodology used in analyzing the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and express the results of such analyses in terms of (A) static comparisons, and (B) comparisons that include dynamic factors; and

(2) discuss all major scenarios, assumptions, and contingencies, including political confrontation, full-scale war, and serious confrontations not involving full-scale war.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.-The President shall submit such report in both classified and unclassified form.

SEC. 907. REPORT ON ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION

(a) STUDY.-The President shall conduct a study regarding the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union. In conducting the study, the President shall assess each of the following:

(1) The military capabilities and significance of the extensive network of large-phased array radars of the Soviet Union.

(2) Whether the Soviet Union is developing or producing mobile or transportable engagement radars in violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

(3) The ability of the Soviet Union to develop an effective exoatmospheric antiballistic missile defense without using widespread deployments of traditional engagement radars.

(4) The ability of air defense interceptor missiles of the Soviet Union, now and in the future, to destroy warheads of ballistic missiles in flight.

(5) Whether silos or other hardened facilities of the Soviet Union located outside of the existing antiballistic missile site permitted near Moscow under the terms of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty are or could be associated with antiballistic missile defenses not permitted under that Treaty.

(6) Whether the Soviet Union is developing terminal antiballistic missile defenses.

(7) Whether the existing antiballistic missile site near Moscow that is permitted under the terms of that Treaty conceals or could conceal development, testing, or deployment by the Soviet Union of a widespread antiballistic missile system.

(8) Activities of the Soviet Union regarding boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles.

(9) The status of laser programs, particle-beam programs, and other advanced technology programs of the Soviet Union comparable to programs conducted by the United States under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

(10) The consequences for the United States of a successful effort by the Soviet Union to deploy an effective nationwide or limited antiballistic missile system.

(b) ASSESSMENT OF ABILITY OF UNITED STATES TO COUNTER A SOVIET ABM SYSTEM.-In conducting the study required by subsection (a), the President shall also assess the ability of the United States to counter effectively an effective antiballistic missile system deployed by the Soviet Union. Such assessment shall consider both the deployment by the Soviet Union of a nationwide, and of a limited, antiballistic missile system. In assessing the ability of the United States to counter effectively such a system, the President

(1) shall consider the ability of the United States to modify (A) existing strategic offensive forces (including modifications involving the development of additional penetration aids), and (B) current strategic doctrine and tactics; and

(2) shall consider whether the actions of the United States described in paragraph (1) could be accomplished over the same period of time that the Soviet Union would require to deploy such an antiballistic missile system.

(c)4 REPORT.-Not later than January 1, 1989, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both a classified and an unclassified version, specifying the results of the study conducted pursuant to this section. The report shall include such recommendations as the President considers appropriate, including recommendations with regard to maintaining the deterrent value of the strategic forces of the United States in light of the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union described in the report.

SEC. 908. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES FOR THE UNITED STATES UNDER A POTENTIAL START TREATY

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in talks regarding the reduction of strategic nuclear

arms.

(2) Such talks could result in a treaty requiring deep reductions in the strategic forces of the United States.

(3) Any such Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) cannot be ratified without the advice and consent of the Senate. (4) Any such START Treaty should result in a stable balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union which enhances the security of the United States.

4 Sec. 1004(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1542) waived a requirement for a study outlined in sec. 1004(a) of that Act, if "before the date of submission of the report required by [subsection (d) of that Act] *** the President submits to Congress the report required by section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 * * * regarding antiballistic missile capabilities and activities of the Soviet Union * *