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(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the President should, without any further delay, propose an early date to conduct the overdue five-year review of the ABM Treaty. The President shall inform Congress of the results of that review immediately after it takes place. SEC. 906. REVISION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE
WITH ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS (a) 2 * * *
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect beginning with the report to be submitted under section 1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, in 1990. SEC. 906.- ANNUAL REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to Congress each year, not later than December 1, a report containing a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the arms control strategy of the United States. The President shall include in each such report the following:
(1) A description of the nature and sequence of the future arms control efforts of the United States.
(2) A net assessment of the current effects of arms control agreements on the status of, and trends in, the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
(3) A comprehensive data base on the military balance of forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the balance of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, that are affected by arms control agreements in existence as of the time of the report between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an explanation of the methodology used to analyze the effects on such forces.
(4) A net assessment of the effect that proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would likely have on United States force plans and contingency plans, including an assessment of the effect that such proposed agreements would have on the risks and costs to the United States.
(5) An assessment of the effect that proposed treaty sub-ceilings, asymmetries, and other factors or qualifications affecting a treaty or arms control proposal would have on the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an assessment of how such factors increase deterrence and reduce the risk and cost of war.
(6) A statement of the strategy the United States and NATO will use to verify and deter noncompliance with proposed arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
2 Sec. 905(a) amended sec. 1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 22 U.S.C. 2592a).
322 U.S.C. 2592b.
(7) A discussion of the extent to which and the manner in which the United States intends to consult with its allies regarding proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
(8) A discussion of how the United States proposes to tailor its defense structure in order to ensure that the national secu
rity can be preserved with or without arms control agreements. (b) EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY.-In reporting on the current effect of arms control agreements on the status of, and trends in, the military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (required under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a)), the President shall
(1) specify the methodology used in analyzing the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and express the results of such analyses in terms of (A) static comparisons, and (B) comparisons that include dynamic factors; and
(2) discuss all major scenarios, assumptions, and contingencies, including political confrontation, full-scale war, and se
rious confrontations not involving full-scale war. (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The President shall submit such report in both classified and unclassified form. SEC. 907. REPORT ON ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES AND
ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION (a) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a study regarding the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union. In conducting the study, the President shall assess each of the following:
(1) The military capabilities and significance of the extensive network of large-phased array radars of the Soviet Union.
(2) Whether the Soviet Union is developing or producing mobile or transportable engagement radars in violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.
(3) The ability of the Soviet Union to develop an effective exoatmospheric antiballistic missile defense without using widespread deployments of traditional engagement radars.
(4) The ability of air defense interceptor missiles of the Soviet Union, now and in the future, to destroy warheads of ballistic missiles in flight.
(5) Whether silos or other hardened facilities of the Soviet Union located outside of the existing antiballistic missile site permitted near Moscow under the terms of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty are or could be associated with antiballistic missile defenses not permitted under that Treaty.
(6) Whether the Soviet Union is developing terminal antiballistic missile defenses.
(7) Whether the existing antiballistic missile site near Moscow that is permitted under the terms of that Treaty conceals or could conceal development, testing, or deployment by the Soviet Union of a widespread antiballistic missile system.
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(8) Activities of the Soviet Union regarding boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles.
(9) The status of laser programs, particle-beam programs, and other advanced technology programs of the Soviet Union comparable to programs conducted by the United States under the Strategic Defense Initiative.
(10) The consequences for the United States of a successful effort by the Soviet Union to deploy an effective nationwide or
limited antiballistic missile system. (b) ASSESSMENT OF ABILITY OF UNITED STATES TO COUNTER A SOVIET ABM SYSTEM.—In conducting the study required by subsection (a), the President shall also assess the ability of the United States to counter effectively an effective antiballistic missile system deployed by the Soviet Union. Such assessment shall consider both the deployment by the Soviet Union of a nationwide, and of a limited, antiballistic missile system. In assessing the ability of the United States to counter effectively such a system, the President
(1) shall consider the ability of the United States to modify (A) existing strategic offensive forces (including modifications involving the development of additional penetration aids), and (B) current strategic doctrine and tactics; and
(2) shall consider whether the actions of the United States described in paragraph (1) could be accomplished over the same period of time that the Soviet Union would require to de
ploy such an antiballistic missile system. (c) 4 REPORT.-Not later than January 1, 1989, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both a classified and an unclassified version, specifying the results of the study conducted pursuant to this section. The report shall include such recommendations as the President considers appropriate, including recommendations with regard to maintaining the deterrent value of the strategic forces of the United States in light of the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union described in the report. SEC. 908. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE
POSTURES FOR THE UNITED STATES UNDER A POTEN.
TIAL START TREATY (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in talks regarding the reduction of strategic nuclear arms.
(2) Such talks could result in a treaty requiring deep reductions in the strategic forces of the United States.
(3) Any such Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) cannot be ratified without the advice and consent of the Senate.
(4) Any such START Treaty should result in a stable balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union which enhances the security of the United States.
4 Sec. 1004(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1542) waived a requirement for a study outlined in sec. 1004(a) of that Act, if "before the date of submission of the report required by (subsection (d) of that Act) * * * the President submits to Congress the report required by section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 * * * regarding antiballistic missile capabilities and activities of the Soviet Union * * *".
(5) Congress should provide funds for the forces permitted under such a treaty that are required to ensure the stability of the force balance under such a treaty.
(6) Congress faces critical resource choices for fiscal year 1989 and subsequent fiscal years, and the resource choices made by Congress for those years could substantially influence the strategic force posture of the United States in the period
after such a treaty goes into effect. (b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.-Before entering into any Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or other agreement with the Soviet Union for the reduction of strategic arms, but not later than September 15, 1988, the President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the implications such a treaty or agreement might have on the strategic force postures of the United States during the 1990s. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of alternative force postures that might be permitted for the United States under such an arms reduction agreement, including the posture recommended by the President.
(2) The estimated costs, over at least a seven-year period, associated with each alternative force posture.
(3) The damage limitation capability, the survivability, and the retaliatory potential of such force posture, and the implications for strategic stability, assessed with regard to the likely force postures of the Soviet Union under such an agreement and the first-strike potential of such force postures.
(4) The likely effect of a breakout by the Soviet Union from such an arms control agreement on the survivability and of the force posture of the United States under such an agreement
recommended by the President under paragraph (1). (c) FORM OF REPORT.-The President shall submit the report under subsection (b) in both classified and unclassified form. SEC. 909. ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY
(a) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.-(1) Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the officers named in paragraph (2) shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate an unclassified report, with classified annexes as necessary, on the responsibility of each such officer for the monitoring and verification of arms control agreements. Each such report,
(A) shall address specifically any responsibility the officer submitting the report has with respect to on-site inspections (whether inspections of facilities of the United States or inspections of facilities of another party to the agreement); and
(B) shall set forth the organizational elements of each department or agency over which the officer submitting the report has jurisdiction which have functions related to the mon
itoring or verification of arms control agreements. (2) Officers referred to in paragraph (1) are the following:
(A) The Secretary of Defense.
(B) The Secretary of State.
(D) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under subsection (a) shall
(1) describe in detail the monitoring and verification activities carried out with respect to the INF Treaty,
(2) evaluate the effectiveness with which these functions have been implemented, and
(3) include recommendations for any future organizational or policy changes that may be necessary in view of the experience
of implementing the INF Treaty. (c) INF TREATY DEFINED. For purposes of subsection (b), the term “INF Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (signed at Washington on December 9, 1987).
(d) BUDGET REQUESTS.-Any request submitted to Congress by the Executive Branch for authorization of appropriations for the On-Site Inspection Agency for any fiscal year shall, as a separate activity, provide details of all funding and of all military and civil. ian personnel requested for that Agency for that fiscal year, including the number of such personnel of the Department of Defense and other agencies that will be assigned to on-site inspection activities and to support such activities during that fiscal year. SEC. 910. COORDINATION OF VERIFICATION POLICY AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (a) REPORT.-Not later than June 30, 1989, the President shall submit to Congress a report reviewing the relationship of arms control objectives of the United States with research and development of improved monitoring systems for arms control verification. The review shall include the participation of the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(b) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—The report shall include the findings of the President, and such recommendations for improvements as the President considers appropriate, with respect to the following:
(1) The status of coordination among the officers named in subsection (a) in the formulation of the policy of the United States regarding arms control verification.
(2) The status of efforts to ensure that such policy is formulated in a manner which takes into account available monitoring technology.
(3) The status of efforts to ensure that research and development on monitoring technology evolves concurrently with such policy.