(5) Congress should provide funds for the forces permitted under such a treaty that are required to ensure the stability of the force balance under such a treaty.

(6) Congress faces critical resource choices for fiscal year 1989 and subsequent fiscal years, and the resource choices made by Congress for those years could substantially influence the strategic force posture of the United States in the period after such a treaty goes into effect.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.-Before entering into any Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or other agreement with the Soviet Union for the reduction of strategic arms, but not later than September 15, 1988, the President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the implications such a treaty or agreement might have on_the_strategic force postures of the United States during the 1990s. The report shall include the following:

(1) A description of alternative force postures that might be permitted for the United States under such an arms reduction agreement, including the posture recommended by the President.

(2) The estimated costs, over at least a seven-year period, associated with each alternative force posture.

(3) The damage limitation capability, the survivability, and the retaliatory potential of such force posture, and the implications for strategic stability, assessed with regard to the likely force postures of the Soviet Union under such an agreement and the first-strike potential of such force postures.

(4) The likely effect of a breakout by the Soviet Union from such an arms control agreement on the survivability and of the force posture of the United States under such an agreement recommended by the President under paragraph (1).

(c) FORM OF REPORT.-The President shall submit the report under subsection (b) in both classified and unclassified form. SEC. 909. ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY

(a) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.-(1) Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the officers named in paragraph (2) shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate an unclassified report, with classified annexes as necessary, on the responsibility of each such officer for the monitoring and verification of arms control agreements. Each such report

(A) shall address specifically any responsibility the officer submitting the report has with respect to on-site inspections (whether inspections of facilities of the United States or inspections of facilities of another party to the agreement); and

(B) shall set forth the organizational elements of each department or agency over which the officer submitting the report has jurisdiction which have functions related to the monitoring or verification of arms control agreements.

(2) Officers referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: (A) The Secretary of Defense.

(B) The Secretary of State.

(C) The Director of Central Intelligence.

(D) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.-Each report under subsection (a) shall

(1) describe in detail the monitoring and verification activities carried out with respect to the INF Treaty,

(2) evaluate the effectiveness with which these functions have been implemented, and

(3) include recommendations for any future organizational or policy changes that may be necessary in view of the experience of implementing the INF Treaty.

(c) INF TREATY DEFINED.-For purposes of subsection (b), the term "INF Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (signed at Washington on December 9, 1987).

(d) BUDGET REQUESTS.-Any request submitted to Congress by the Executive Branch for authorization of appropriations for the On-Site Inspection Agency for any fiscal year shall, as a separate activity, provide details of all funding and of all military and civilian personnel requested for that Agency for that fiscal year, including the number of such personnel of the Department of Defense and other agencies that will be assigned to on-site inspection activities and to support such activities during that fiscal year.

SEC. 910. COORDINATION OF VERIFICATION POLICY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

(a) REPORT.-Not later than June 30, 1989, the President shall submit to Congress a report reviewing the relationship of arms control objectives of the United States with research and development of improved monitoring systems for arms control verification. The review shall include the participation of the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(b) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.-The report shall include the findings of the President, and such recommendations for improvements as the President considers appropriate, with respect to the following:

(1) The status of coordination among the officers named in subsection (a) in the formulation of the policy of the United States regarding arms control verification.

(2) The status of efforts to ensure that such policy is formulated in a manner which takes into account available monitoring technology.

(3) The status of efforts to ensure that research and development on monitoring technology evolves concurrently with such policy.

h. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989

Partial text of Public Law 100-180 [H.R.1748], 100 Stat. 1019, approved December 4, 1987; as amended by Public Law 101-189 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991; H.R. 2461], 103 Stat. 1352, approved November 29, 1989

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

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TITLE IX-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

SEC. 901. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

(1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of missiles capable of the delivery of nuclear weapons is a threat to international peace and security;

(2) in the early 1980's, the danger of the proliferation of such weapons and missiles was formally recognized in discussions among the governments of the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom; and

(3) these seven governments, after four years of negotiations, on April 7, 1987, concluded an agreement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime, for the purpose of limiting the proliferation of missiles capable of the delivery of nuclear weapons (and hardware and technology related to such missiles) throughout the world.

(b) EXPRESSIONS OF CONGRESS.-The Congress

(1) expresses its fm support for the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of enhancing international peace and security;

(2) expresses its strong hope that all nations of the world will adhere to the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and

(3) expresses its expectation that all relevant agencies of the United States Government will ensure the fully effective implementation of this regime.

(c) REPORT ON MANPOWER REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME. (1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1990,1 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report

(A) identifying the functional responsibilities of the Department of Defense for implementing the Missile Technology Control Regime;

(B) describing the number and skills of personnel currently available in the Department of Defense to perform these functions; and

(C) assessing the adequacy of these resources for the effective performance of these responsibilities.

(2) The report required by paragraph (1) shall identify the total number of current Department of Defense full-time employees or military personnel and the grades of such personnel and the special knowledge, experience, and expertise of such personnel, required to carry out each of the following responsibilities of the Department under the regime:

(A) Review of private-sector export license applications and government-to-government cooperative activities.

(B) Intelligence analysis and activities.

(C) Policy coordination.

(D) International liaison activity.

(E) Enforcement and technology security operations.

(F) Technical review.

(3) The report shall include the Secretary's assessment of the adequacy of staffing in each of the categories specified in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (2) and shall make recommendations concerning measures, including legislation if necessary, to eliminate any identified staffing deficiencies and to improve interagency coordination with respect to the regime.

SEC. 902.2 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:

(1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party to the Treaty from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

(2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party to the Treaty from deploying an anti-ballistic missile system to defend its national territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide defense.

(3) Large phased-array_radars were recognized during negotiation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles.

(4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged to be for ballistic missile early warning and tracking.

1 Sec. 1639(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1612; approved November 29, 1989), struck out "February 1, 1988" and inserted "60 days after the date of enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990".

2 Sec. 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1543), reaffirmed this sense of the Congress.

(5) The Krasnoyarsk radar is more than 700 kilometers from the Soviet-Mongolian border and is not directed outward but instead, faces the northeast Soviet border more than 4,500 kilometers away.

(6) The Krasnoyarsk radar is identical to other Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars and is ideally situated to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in a nationwide Soviet ballistic missile early warning radar network.

(7) The President has certified that the Krasnoyarsk radar is an unequivocal violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union is in violation of its legal obligation under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

SEC. 903. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(a) IN GENERAL.-The President shall submit to Congress, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report discussing the use of the current official United States method of estimating the yield of Soviet underground nuclear tests to determine the extent to which the Soviet Union is complying with the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

(b) FORM AND CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall be submitted in both classified form and (if possible) unclassified form and shall include the following matters:

(1) A discussion of whether past assessments made by the United States of the extent of Soviet compliance with the 150 kiloton limit contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty would have been different if the United States, in making those assessments, had used the current official United States method of estimating the yield of underground nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union.

(2) The number of nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union after March 31, 1976, that have a central value exceeding 150 kilotons yield (estimated on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating underground nuclear test yields), the central value of those tests (estimated on such basis), and the dates on which those tests were conducted.

(3) The number, dates, and estimated central values of tests, if any, conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976, which, if measured on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating Soviet underground nuclear test yields (taking into account the differences between. the United States and Soviet test sites), would have an indicated central value exceeding 150 kilotons yield.

(4) The number of tests conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976, if any, which actually had yields exceeding 150 kilotons, the estimated central value of each such test, and the date on which each such test was conducted.

(5) A description of all nuclear testing activities of the Soviet Union which the President has found to be likely violations of the legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the