dates on which those activities took place, and the specñt legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty bikely to have been violated by the Soviet Union in conducting such ac tivities.

(6) A discussion of whether and, if so, the extent to which, the President, in arriving at his finding that several nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union constituted a hikely vidiation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, considered the mutual agreement contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which permits one or two minor, unintended breaches of the 150 kiloton limit per year to be considered nonviclations of the Treaty.

(7) A detailed comparison of the current official method used by the United States Government in estimating Soviet underground nuclear test yields with the method replaced by the current method, and the date on which the current official method was adopted by the United States.

SEC. 904. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

(a) CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in negotiations to conclude a treaty on intermediaterange nuclear forces (INF) and are continuing serious negotiations on other issues of vital importance to the national security of the United States.

(2) The current negotiations, which reflect delicate compromises on both sides, are a culmination of years of detailed and complex negotiations in which the negotiators for the United States have been pursuing a policy consistently advocated by the past two Presidents regarding nuclear arms control in the European theater.

(3) While recognizing fully that the President, under clause 2, section 2, article II of the Constitution, has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, the Congress also recognizes the special responsibility conferred by the Founding Fathers on the Senate in requiring that it give its advice and consent before a treaty may be ratified by the United States and that in carrying out this responsibility the Senate is accountable to the people of the United States and has a duty to ensure that no treaty is ratified which would be detrimental to the welfare and security of the United States.

(4) In recognition of this responsibility, the Senate has established a special continuing oversight body, the Arms Control Observer Group, which over the last two and one-half years has functioned to provide advice and counsel to the President and his negotiators, when appropriate, on a continuing basis during the course of the negotiations to achieve an INF treaty.

(5) The Senate and the President both have a role under the Constitution in the making of treaties and Congress as a whole has a role under the Constitution in the regulating of expenditures, including expenditures for weapons systems that may be the subject of treaty negotiations.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.-In light of the findings in subsection (a), Congress

(1) fully supports the efforts of the President to negotiate stabilizing, equitable, and verifiable arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union;

(2) endorses the principle of mutuality and reciprocity in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and cautions that neither the Congress nor the President should take actions which are unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union; and (3) urges the President to take care that no provision is agreed to in those negotiations that would be harmful to the security of the United States or its allies and friends.

(c) DECLARATION OF THE SENATE.-The Senate declares that it will reserve judgment regarding the approval of any arms control treaty until it has conducted a thorough examination of the provisions of the treaty and has assured itself that those provisions(1) are effectively verifiable; and

(2) serve to enhance the strength and security of the United States and its allies and friends.

SEC. 905. REPORT ON MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

(a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.-Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report examining the military consequences of any arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that would provide for the elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union.

(b) MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED.-Such report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include a discussion of the strategic, budgetary, and force structure implications of an agreement described in subsection (a) for

(1) conventional defenses of the United States and its allies in Europe, the Far East, and other regions vital to the national security of the United States;

(2) tactical nuclear deterrence by the United States in those regions;

(3) strategic offensive retaliatory systems of the United States that would not be affected by such an agreement, including bomber forces and cruise missiles;

(4) air defenses of the United States needed to counter bomber forces and cruise missiles of the Soviet Union;

(5) Strategic Defense Initiative programs designed to provide possible defenses against strategic ballistic missiles; and

(6) any new programs which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may consider necessary in order for the United States to protect its national security interests in light of the relative advantage conferred by such an agreement on other nations possessing nuclear weapons whose strategic ballistic missile forces would not be affected by the agreement.

SEC. 906. REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL

POSITIONS

Not later than June 30, 1988, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified versions, containing the following:

(1) A description of the quantitative and qualitative implications for the strategic modernization program of the United States of the publicly-announced position of the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, giving special, but not exclusive, attention to the implications of such position for the Trident SSBN program, the rail-garrison Peacekeeper program, and the small intercontinental ballistic missile ("Midgetman”) program.

(2) A description of the advantages and drawbacks of following the recommendations made in 1983 in the report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces with regard to research on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential followon to the Trident submarine force.

(3) The recommendations of the Secretary of Defense with regard to paragraphs (1) and (2) on United States force modernization policy and arms control policy.

SEC. 907. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

(a) Congress applauds the recent signing of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers. Congress regards this agreement as an important and practical first step in reducing the threat of nuclear war due to accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. Congress notes that the agreement calls for centers to be established in each nation's respective capital for the routine exchange of information and advanced notification of nuclear and missile testing.

(b) It is the hope of Congress that this first step in nuclear risk reduction will increase the confidence and mutual trust of both parties to the agreement and lead to an expansion in functions to reduce further the chances of accidental war. Such functions may include joint discussions on crisis prevention and the development of strategies to deal with incidents or threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or other mutually agreed upon issues of concern in reducing nuclear risk.

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i. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987

Partial Text of Public Law 99-661 [S.2368], 100 Stat. 3816, approved

November 14, 1986

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to improve the defense acquisition process, and for other

purposes

Be it enacted by the State and House of Representations of the United States of American in Congress assembled,

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TITLE X-ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

SEC. 1001. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO SALT II COMPLIANCE

(a) CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT II NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS.It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union complies with such sublimits.

(b) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section, the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty include prohibitions on the deployment of the following:

(1) Launchers for more than 820 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.

(2) Launchers for an aggregate of more than 1,200 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.

(3) An aggregate of more than 1,320 launchers described in paragraph (2) and heavy bombers equipped for air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. SEC. 1002. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTING

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

(2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976,

and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

(4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable.

(5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means.

(6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible date, the President should—

(1) request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and (2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty.

In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating.

SEC. 1003. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON UNITED STATES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS

(a) IN GENERAL.-The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed assessment of(1) the military consequences to the United States of a policy decision by the United States to discontinue compliance with the major provisions of

(3) Under average annual real growth projections in defense spending of 0 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent, the percent of the annual defense budget in each year between fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1996 which would be consumed by increased United States strategic forces needed to counter the Soviet force expansions.

(4) The military effect on United States national security of the diversion the funds identified under paragraph (2) away from nonstrategic defense programs and to strategic programs to counter expanded Soviet strategic capabilities, including the military effect of such a diversion on the ability of United States conventional forces to meet the specific non-nuclear defense commitments of the United States as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan.