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SEC. 906. REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL
POSITIONS Not later than June 30, 1988, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified versions, containing the following:
(1) A description of the quantitative and qualitative implications for the strategic modernization program of the United States of the publicly-announced position of the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, giving special, but not exclusive, attention to the implications of such position for the Trident SSBN program, the rail-garrison Peacekeeper program, and the small intercontinental ballistic missile (“Midgetman”) program.
(2) A description of the advantages and drawbacks of following the recommendations made in 1983 in the report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces with regard to research on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential followon to the Trident submarine force.
(3) The recommendations of the Secretary of Defense with regard to paragraphs (1) and (2) on United States force mod
ernization policy and arms control policy. SEC. 907. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS
(a) Congress applauds the recent signing of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers. Congress regards this agreement as an important and practical first step in reducing the threat of nuclear war due to accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. Congress notes that the agreement calls for centers to be established in each nation's respective capital for the routine exchange of information and advanced notification of nuclear and missile testing.
(b) It is the hope of Congress that this first step in nuclear risk reduction will increase the confidence and mutual trust of both parties to the agreement and lead to an expansion in functions to reduce further the chances of accidental war. Such functions may include joint discussions on crisis prevention and the development of strategies to deal with incidents or threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or other mutually agreed upon issues of concern in reducing nuclear risk.
i. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987 Partial Text of Public Law 98 661 (S.2368), 100 Stat. 3816, approved
November 14, 1986
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to improve the defense acquisition process, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the State and House of Representations of the United States of American in Congress assembled,
TITLE X-ARMS CONTROL MATTERS SEC. 1001. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO SALT I COMPLI.
ANCE (a) CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT II NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS.It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union complies with such sublimits.
(b) DEFINITION.–For purposes of this section, the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty include prohibitions on the deployment of the following:
(1) Launchers for more than 820 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.
(2) Launchers for an aggregate of more than 1,200 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.
(3) An aggregate of more than 1,320 launchers described in paragraph (2) and heavy bombers equipped for air-launched
cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. SEC. 1002. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTING (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.
(2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
(3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976,
and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable.
(5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means.
(6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
(7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible date, the President should
(1) request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively, and
(2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive
test ban treaty. In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating. SEC. 1003. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF ON UNITED STATES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EX.
ISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS (a) IN GENERAL.—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed assessment of
(1) the military consequences to the United States of a policy decision by the United States to discontinue compliance with the major provisions of
(3) Under average annual real growth projections in defense spending of 0 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent, the percent of the annual defense budget in each year between fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1996 which would be consumed by increased United States strategic forces needed to counter the Soviet force expansions.
(4) The military effect on United States national security of the diversion the funds identified under paragraph (2) away from nonstrategic defense programs and to strategic programs to counter expanded Soviet strategic capabilities, including the military effect of such a diversion on the ability of United States conventional forces to meet the specific non-nuclear defense commitments of the United States as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan.
(5) The military implications for the United States of Soviet violations of offensive arms control agreements that have been
determined. (c) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.-(1) The Chairman shall
(A) include in the report required under subsection (a) the individual views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
(B) submit such report in both classified and unclassified form. (2) The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than December 19, 1986.
(e) RESTRICTION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.—If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fails to submit the report required by subsection (a) before December 20, 1986, no funds may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, on or after such date by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for any study or analysis to be conducted by a civilian contractor until such report is received by Congress. SEC. 1004. SENSE OF CONGRESS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR
CENTRAL ROLE FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CEN.
TERS (a) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS.—The Congress
(1) has expressed its prior support for the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers; and
(2) supports the President's willingness to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish such centers in
each nation. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that if an agreement on nuclear risk reduction centers is signed, the United States center should
(1) be assigned the responsibility to serve as the center of activity for United States risk reduction activities under the agreement; and
(2) make recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs regarding additional risk reduction arrangements that might be proposed to the Soviet Union. j. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986
Partial text of Public Law 99-145 (S. 1160), 99 Stat. 583, approved November
8, 1986; as amended by Public Law 99-190 (Further Continuing Appropriations, 1985; HJ. Res. 465); 99 Stat. 1185, approved December 19, 1985; and by Public Law 100_456 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, H.R. 4481), 102 Stat. 1918, approved September 29, 1988
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for military functions of the Department of De
fense and to prescribe military personnel levels for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1986, to revise and improve military compensation programs, to improve defense procurement procedures, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for national security programs of the Department of Energy, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE X-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL SEC. 1001. POLICY ON COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING STRATEGIC OF.
FENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that
(1) the United States should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of concerns of the United States over Soviet compliance with existing strategic arms control agreements and should seek corrective actions through confidential diplomatic channels, including, if appropriate, the Standing Consultative Commission and the Nuclear and Space Arms negotiations;
(2) the Soviet Union should take positive steps to resolve the compliance concerns of the United States about existing strategic offensive arms agreements in order to maintain the integrity of those agreements and to strengthen the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of a new strategic offensive arms agreement;
(3) the United States should continue, through December 31, 1986, to refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements
(A)(i) to the extent that the Soviet Union refrains from undercutting those provisions; and
(ii) if the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the Nuclear and Space Arms negotiations; or
(B) until a new strategic offensive arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is con
(A) should carefully consider the impact of any change in the current policy of the United States regarding existing