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(d) DEADLINE FOR PLAN.-The Secretary shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) not later than December 1, 1985.

SEC. 1006. REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

(a) CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN INTERAGENCY STUDIES.-Notwithstanding any limitation in any other provision of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with section 1107(a) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-525), shall participate in any comprehensive interagency study conducted on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear war and the implications that such consequences have for the nuclear weapons strategy and policy, the arms control policy, and the civil defense policy of the United States.

(b) REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS.-Not later than March 1, 1986, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives an unclassified report suitable for release to the public, together with classified addenda (if required), concerning the subject described in subsection (a). The Secretary shall include in such report the following:

(1) A detailed review and assessment of the findings in the current body of domestic and international scientific literature on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions and nuclear exchanges. (2) A thorough evaluation of the implications that such findings have on

(A) the nuclear weapons policy of the United States, especially with regard to strategy, targeting, planning, command, control, procurement, and deployment;

(B) the nuclear arms control policy of the United States; and

(C) the civil defense policy of the United States.

(3) A discussion of the manner in which the results of such evaluation of policy implications will be incorporated into the nuclear weapons, arms control, and civil defense policies of the United States.

(4) An analysis of the extent to which current scientific findings on the consequences of nuclear explosions are being studied, disseminated, and used in the Soviet Union.

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k. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985

Partial Text of Public Law 98-525 [H.R. 5167], 98 Stat. 2492, approved October 19, 1984; as amended by Public Law 99-145 [Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986; S. 1160], 99 Stat. 619, approved November 8, 1985; Public Law 99-661 [National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1987, S. 2368] 100 Stat. 3816, approved November 14, 1986; and by Public Law 100-180 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, H.R. 1748], 101 Stat 1019, approved December 4, 1987

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1985 for the military functions of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel levels for that fiscal year for the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

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TITLE XI-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

REPORT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FORCE

SEC. 1101. Not later than April 1, 1985, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the survivability of the United States strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine force. The report shall address whether there are grounds for adjusting, in short or long-range terms, strategic force plans of the United States based on any vulnerability or potential vulnerability of such force. The report shall also examine the feasibility and desirability of enhancing the survivability of such force through measures that would affect antisubmarine warfare, including the nature of the patrols and the rules of engagement of attack submarines and the nature of the patrols and the rules of engagement of ballistic missile submarines.

ANNUAL REPORT ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

SEC. 1102.1 * * * [Repealed-1987]

REPORT ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

SEC. 1103. Not later than January 19, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report setting forth reasons why the United States should or should not initiate a long-term program for the renovation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear deterrent in a manner designed to reduce pressures for early first use of tactical nuclear weapons and to substantially reduce the theater nuclear arsenal to types and numbers of weapons whose characteristics make for a more stable and credible force. The re

1Sec. 1102 was repealed by sec. 231(b) of Public Law 100-180 (101 Stat. 1019).

port (in addition to any other matter covered) should specifically address the following issues:

(1) Whether NATO should not eliminate its reliance on short-range battlefield nuclear weapons (such as the atomic demolition bomb and 155-millimeter and 8-inch nuclear artillery rounds), the exposure of which to early loss from enemy action promotes pressures for early use.

(2) Whether NATO should not refurbish its nuclear deterrent by designing and deploying specific dedicated nuclear launchers of a range which permits the coverage of all potential targets from locations in the rear of the European NATO territory in the territory of the Warsaw Pact short of the territory of the Soviet Union, thereby reducing pressure from enemy action for early first use of nuclear weapons.

(3) Whether NATO should not, as a consequence of a change in policy described in paragraph (2), eliminate its inventory of dual-capable nuclear/conventional weapons in order to allow early use of artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles for conventional missions rather than causing them to be withheld for possible nuclear use.existing strategic offensive arms limitations agreements (including central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the SALT II accord) would have on the security of the United States; and

(2) the likely military responses of the Soviet Union to such a policy decision.

(b) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.-The assessment required by subsection (a) shall focus on what the likely Soviet military responses would be during the period between 1987 and 1996. In making such assessment, the Chairman shall specifically consider the following:

(1) The effect on the ability of United States strategic forces to accomplish their nuclear deterrent mission (including the effect on the survivability of United States strategic forces and on the ability of United States strategic forces to achieve required damage expectancies against Soviet targets) of any expansion of Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements.

(2) The additional cost to the United States, above currently projected military expenditures for those periods for which such budget projections are available, of research, development, production, deployment, and annual operations and support for any additional strategic forces required to counter any expansion in Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements.

(4) Whether NATO should not place control and operation of tactical nuclear weapons in a single specialized command established for that purpose so that all other NATO force elements could be free to concentrate on pursuing conventional military missions with maximum efficiency.

REPORT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE

SEC. 1104. The President shall submit a report to Congress not later than 90 days after the final decision is made (based upon the recommendations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) regarding the net reduction to be made by the United States in the number of tactical nuclear warheads in the territory of North Atlantic Treaty Organization European member nations pursuant to the decision of the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of October 17, 1983. The report shall

(1) specify the types of warheads to be withdrawn in accordance with that decision, the number of each such warhead to be withdrawn, the schedule for the withdrawal, and the rationale for the selection of the particular warheads to be withdrawn; and

(2) any changes in force structure to be made resulting from the changes in the tactical nuclear warheads positioned in Eu

rope.

REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY

SEC. 1105. (a) Not later than April 15, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report discussing the required strategic counterforce capability consistent with existing United States policy.

(b) The report under subsection (a) shall be developed taking into consideration current and proposed United States intercontinental ballistic missiles having an accuracy on the order of the MX missile (including specifically the MX missile, the D-5 Trident missile, and the small single-warhead missile) intended to be procured for United States strategic force modernization and the rationale for the overall counterforce capability that would be attained as a cumulative result of those procurements. The President shall include in the report a specific definition of what United States counterforce capability would constitute a so-called "first-strike capability" against the Soviet Union.

(c) The report shall also include an assessment of corresponding Soviet counterforce and first-strike capabilities.

TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 1106. (a) Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the text of the report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control of the arms Control and Disarmament Agency entitled "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 (U)", dated November 1983. If the President determines that that report contains material the release of which to Congress would compromise United States intelligence sources, methods of intelligence gathering, or the national security of the United States, the President may furnish the text of such report after deleting or modifying such compromising material.

(b) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress an unclassified version of the report described in subsection (a).

REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

SEC. 1107. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall participate in any comprehensive study of the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear war and the implications that such consequences have for the nuclear weapons strategy and policy, the arms control policy, and the civil defense policy of the United States.

(b) Not later than March 1, 1985, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives an unclassified report suitable for release to the public, together with classified addenda (if required), concerning the subject described in subsection (a). The Secretary shall include in such report the following:

(1) A detailed review and assessment of the current scientific studies and findings on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions and nuclear exchanges.

(2) A thorough evaluation of the implications that such studies and findings have on (A) the nuclear weapons policy of the United States, especially with regard to strategy, targeting, planning, command, control, procurement, and deployment, (B) the nuclear arms control policy of the United States, and (C) the civil defense policy of the United States.

(3) A discussion of the manner in which the results of such evaluation of policy implications will be incorporated into the nuclear weapons, arms control, and civil defense policies of the United States.

(4) An analysis of the extent to which current scientific findings on the consequences of nuclear explosions are being studied, disseminated, and used in the Soviet Union.

SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

SEC. 1108. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) An increasing number of scenarios (including misjudgment, miscalculation, misunderstanding, possession of nuclear arms by a terrorist group or a State sponsored threat) could precipitate a sudden increase in tensions and the risk of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, situations that neither side anticipates, intends, or desires.

(2) There has been a steady proliferation throughout the world of the knowledge, equipment, and materials necessary to fabricate nuclear weapons.

(3) Such proliferation of nuclear capabilities suggests an increasing potential for nuclear terrorism, the cumulative risk of which, considering potential terrorist groups and other threats over a period of years into the future, may be great

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