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port (in addition to any other matter covered) should specifically address the following issues:

(1) Whether NATO should not eliminate its reliance on short-range battlefield nuclear weapons (such as the atomic demolition bomb and 155-millimeter and 8-inch nuclear artillery rounds), the exposure of which to early loss from enemy action promotes pressures for early use.

(2) Whether NATO should not refurbish its nuclear deterrent by designing and deploying specific dedicated nuclear launchers of a range which permits the coverage of all potential targets from locations in the rear of the European NATO territory in the territory of the Warsaw Pact short of the territory of the Soviet Union, thereby reducing pressure from enemy action for early first use of nuclear weapons.

(3) Whether NATO should not, as a consequence of a change in policy described in paragraph (2), eliminate its inventory of dual-capable nuclear/conventional weapons in order to allow early use of artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles for conventional missions rather than causing them to be withheld for possible nuclear use.existing strategic offensive arms limitations agreements (including central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the SALT II accord) would have on the security of the United States; and

(2) the likely military responses of the Soviet Union to such a policy decision. (b) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.—The assessment required by subsection (a) shall focus on what the likely Soviet military responses would be during the period between 1987 and 1996. In making such assessment, the Chairman shall specifically consider the following:

(1) The effect on the ability of United States strategic forces to accomplish their nuclear deterrent mission (including the effect on the survivability of United States strategic forces and on the ability of United States strategic forces to achieve required damage expectancies against Soviet targets) of any expansion of Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements.

(2) The additional cost to the United States, above currently projected military expenditures for those periods for which such budget projections are available, of research, development, production, deployment, and annual operations and support for any additional strategic forces required to counter any expansion in Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements.

(4) Whether NATO should not place control and operation of tactical nuclear weapons in a single specialized command established for that purpose so that all other NATO force elements could be free to concentrate on pursuing conventional military missions with maximum efficiency.

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(4) Current communications links represent equipment of the 1960's and as such are relatively outdated and limited in their capabilities.

(5) The President, responding to congressional initiatives, proposed the establishment of additional and improved communications links between the United States and the Soviet Union and other measures to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation, and has initiated discussions at a working level with the Soviet Union pertaining to

(A) the addition of a high speed facsimile capability to the direct communication link (hotline);

(B) the creation of a joint military communications link between the Department of Defense and the Soviet Defense Ministry; and

(C) the establishment by the Governments of the United States and Soviet Union of high-rate data communication links between each nation and its embassy in the other na

tion's capital. (6) The establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow could reduce the risk of increased tensions and nuclear confrontations, thereby enhancing the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

(7) These centers could serve a variety of functions, including

(A) discussing procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons by third parties;

(B) maintaining close contact during nuclear threats or incidents precipitated by third parties;

(C) exchanging information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, materials, or equipment by subnational groups;

(D) exchanging information about United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions; and

(E) establishing a dialog about nuclear doctrines, forces, and activities. (8) The continuing and routine implementation of these various activities could be facilitated by the establishment within each Government of facilities, organizations, and bureaucratic relationships designated for these purposes, such as risk reduction centers, and by the appointment of individuals responsible to the respective head of state with responsibilities to manage

such centers. (b) The Congress

(1) commends the President for his announced support for the confidence building measures described in subsection (a) and his initiation of negotiations which have occurred; and

(2) urges the President to pursue negotiations on these measures with the Government of the Soviet Union and to add to these negotiations the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in both nations to be operated under the direction of the appropriate diplomatic and defense authorities.


SEC. 1109. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Iran-Iraq war has recently demonstrated a marked increase in the proliferation of technology on the production of chemical weapons and an increase in the willingness of nations to use such weapons in armed conflict.

(2) The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Arms Control Noncompliance concluded that the Soviet Union has refused to respond adequately to United States concerns about the transfer or use by the Soviet Union of lethal chemical warfare agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan and United States concerns about adherence by the Soviet Union to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

(3) Experts at the recent annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and at the First World Congress on New Compounds in Biological and Chemical Warfare held at Ghent, Belgium, emphasized that better verification of the use of chemical weapons and of the development of biological and toxin weapons was essential to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

(4) The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is scheduled for review in 1985.

(5) The United States is anxious to promote and strengthen adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention and is vigorously pursuing a comprehensive, verifiable, international agreement to ban chemical weapons.

(6) Any comprehensive agreement intended to ban the production, storage, and transfer of chemical weapons must provide for effective measures of verification and enforcement and in order for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to be effective, compliance with the terms of the convention must be verifiable; and

(7) The Congress must be well informed regarding existing and planned programs for verifying compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and with a chemical

weapons ban agreement. (b) It is the sense of Congress that the President should submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report identifying and evaluating

(1) existing and planned programs to support verification requirements necessary to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a chemical weapons ban; and

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