(4) Current communications links represent equipment of the 1960's and as such are relatively outdated and limited in their capabilities.

(5) The President, responding to congressional initiatives, proposed the establishment of additional and improved communications links between the United States and the Soviet Union and other measures to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation, and has initiated discussions at a working level with the Soviet Union pertaining to

(A) the addition of a high speed facsimile capability to the direct communication link (hotline);

(B) the creation of a joint military communications link between the Department of Defense and the Soviet Defense Ministry; and

(C) the establishment by the Governments of the United States and Soviet Union of high-rate data communication links between each nation and its embassy in the other nation's capital.

(6) The establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow could reduce the risk of increased tensions and nuclear confrontations, thereby enhancing the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

(7) These centers could serve a variety of functions, including

(A) discussing procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons by third parties;

(B) maintaining close contact during nuclear threats or incidents precipitated by third parties;

(C) exchanging information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, materials, or equipment by subnational groups;

(D) exchanging information about United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions; and

(E) establishing a dialog about nuclear doctrines, forces, and activities.

(8) The continuing and routine implementation of these various activities could be facilitated by the establishment within each Government of facilities, organizations, and bureaucratic relationships designated for these purposes, such as risk reduction centers, and by the appointment of individuals responsible to the respective head of state with responsibilities to manage such centers.

(b) The Congress

(1) commends the President for his announced support for the confidence building measures described in subsection (a) and his initiation of negotiations which have occurred; and

(2) urges the President to pursue negotiations on these measures with the Government of the Soviet Union and to add to these negotiations the establishment of nuclear risk reduction

centers in both nations to be operated under the direction of the appropriate diplomatic and defense authorities.

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CERTAIN VERIFICATION PROGRAMS RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

SEC. 1109. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Iran-Iraq war has recently demonstrated a marked increase in the proliferation of technology on the production of chemical weapons and an increase in the willingness of nations to use such weapons in armed conflict.

(2) The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Arms Control Noncompliance concluded that the Soviet Union has refused to respond adequately to United States concerns about the transfer or use by the Soviet Union of lethal chemical warfare agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan and United States concerns about adherence by the Soviet Union to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

(3) Experts at the recent annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and at the First World Congress on New Compounds in Biological and Chemical Warfare held at Ghent, Belgium, emphasized that better verification of the use of chemical weapons and of the development of biological and toxin weapons was essential to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

(4) The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is scheduled for review in 1985.

(5) The United States is anxious to promote and strengthen adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention and is vigorously pursuing a comprehensive, verifiable, international agreement to ban chemical weapons.

(6) Any comprehensive agreement intended to ban the production, storage, and transfer of chemical weapons must provide for effective measures of verification and enforcement and in order for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to be effective, compliance with the terms of the convention must be verifiable; and

(7) The Congress must be well informed regarding existing and planned programs for verifying compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and with a chemical weapons ban agreement.

(b) It is the sense of Congress that the President should submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report identifying and evaluating

(1) existing and planned programs to support verification requirements necessary to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a chemical weapons ban; and

(2) the budget resources necessary to support verification requirements necessary to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a chemical weapons ban.

(c) The President is requested to submit the report referred to in subsection (b) to the committees referred to in such subsection not later than March 15, 1985.

SENSE OF CONGRESS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES TO PURSUE OUTSTANDING ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE

SEC. 1110. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) It is a vital security objective of the United States to limit the Soviet nuclear threat against the United States and its allies.

(2) The President has declared that "as for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint".

(3) The United States has legitimate concerns about certain Soviet actions and behavior relevant to limitations and other provisions of existing strategic arms agreements.

(4) The President has declared that "the United States will continue to press compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and to insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions".

(5) The President has also declared that "the United States is continuing to carry out its obligations under relevant agreements".

(6) It would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to international peace and stability for the last remaining limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons to break down or lapse before replacement by a new strategic arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(7) The continuation of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear arms would provide an atmosphere more conducive to achieving an agreement significantly reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

(8) The Soviet Union has not agreed to a date for resumption of the nuclear arms talks in Geneva, and it is incumbent on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table.

(9) A termination of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear weapons could make the resumption of negotiations more difficult.

(10) Both sides have, to date, abided by important numerical and other limits contained in existing strategic offensive arms agreements, including dismantling operational missile-firing submarines and remaining within the ceilings on multiple-warhead missile launchers and other related limits.

(11) It is in the interest of the United States and its allies for the Soviet Union to continue to dismantle older missile-firing submarines as new ones are deployed and to continue to remain at or below a level of 820 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry

vehicles, 1,200 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 1,320 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with air launched cruise missiles, and other related limits in existing strategic offensive arms agreements.

(b) In view of these findings, it is the sense of Congress that(1) the United States should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of concerns over compliance with existing strategic and other arms control agreements and should seek corrective actions, where appropriate, through the Standing Consultative Commission and other available diplomatic channels;

(2) The United States should, through December 31, 1985, continue to pursue its stated policy to refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union refrains from undercutting the provisions of those agreements, or until a new strategic offensive arms agreement is concluded;

(3) the President should provide a report to the Congress in both classified and unclassified forms reflecting additional findings regarding Soviet adherence to such a no-undercut policy, by February 15, 1985;

(4) the President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985, a report that—

(A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy and strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;

(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;

(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and

(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy; and

(5) the President should carefully consider the impact of any change to this current policy regarding existing strategic offensive arms agreements on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies and should consult with the Congress before making any change in current policy.

POLICY ON THE STATUS OF CERTAIN TREATIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TESTING

SEC. 1111. (a) The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to

seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

(2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976, and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

(4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable.

(5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means.

(6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(b) It is the sense of the Senate that at the earliest possible date, the President should

(1) request advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and

(2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty.

(c) In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating.

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