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(2) the budget resources necessary to support verification requirements necessary to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a chemical
weapons ban. (c) The President is requested to submit the report referred to in subsection (b) to the committees referred to in such subsection not later than March 15, 1985. SENSE OF CONGRESS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES TO
PURSUE OUTSTANDING ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE SEC. 1110. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) It is a vital security objective of the United States to limit the Soviet nuclear threat against the United States and its al
(2) The President has declared that "as for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint".
(3) The United States has legitimate concerns about certain Soviet actions and behavior relevant to limitations and other provisions of existing strategic arms agreements.
(4) The President has declared that "the United States will continue to press compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and to insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions”.
(5) The President has also declared that "the United States is continuing to carry out its obligations under relevant agreements”.
(6) It would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to international peace and stability for the last remaining limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons to break down or lapse before replacement by a new strategic arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.
(7) The continuation of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear arms would provide an atmosphere more conducive to achieving an agreement significantly reducing the levels of nuclear arms.
(8) The Soviet Union has not agreed to a date for resumption of the nuclear arms talks in Geneva, and it is incumbent on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table.
(9) A termination of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear weapons could make the resumption of negotiations more difficult.
(10) Both sides have, to date, abided by important numerical and other limits contained in existing strategic offensive arms agreements, including dismantling operational missile-firing submarines and remaining within the ceilings on multiple-warhead missile launchers and other related limits.
(11) It is in the interest of the United States and its allies for the Soviet Union to continue to dismantle older missile-firing submarines as new ones are deployed and to continue to remain at or below a level of 820 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicles, 1,200 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 1,320 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with air launched cruise missiles, and other related limits in existing strategic offensive
arms agreements. (b) In view of these findings, it is the sense of Congress that
(1) the United States should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of concerns over compliance with existing strategic and other arms control agreements and should seek corrective actions, where appropriate, through the Standing Consultative Commission and other available diplomatic channels;
(2) The United States should, through December 31, 1985, continue to pursue its stated policy to refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union refrains from undercutting the provisions of those agreements, or until a new strategic offensive arms agreement is concluded;
(3) the President should provide a report to the Congress in both classified and unclassified forms reflecting additional findings regarding Soviet adherence to such a no-undercut policy, by February 15, 1985;
(4) the President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985, a report that,
(A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy and strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;
(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;
(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and
(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy; and (5) the President should carefully consider the impact of any change to this current policy regarding existing strategic offensive arms agreements on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies and should consult with the Congress before making any change in current policy.
POLICY ON THE STATUS OF CERTAIN TREATIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR
(1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.
(2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
(3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976, and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable.
(5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately veri. fiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means.
(6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
(7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (b) It is the sense of the Senate that at the earliest possible date, the President should
(1) request advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and
(2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive
test ban treaty. (c) In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating.
13. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Appropriations,
Partial text of Public Law 103-317 (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995; H.R. 4603), 108 Stat. 1724 at 1768, approved August 26, 1994
AN ACT Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and making supplemental appropriations for these departments and agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other purposes, namely:
TITLE V-DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES For necessary expenses not otherwise provided, for arms control and disarmament activities, $54,500,000, of which not less than $9,500,000 is available until expended only for activities related to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and of which not to exceed $100,000 shall be for official reception and representation expenses as authorized by the Act of September 26, 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2551 et seq.): Provided, That of the budgetary resources available in fiscal year 1995 in this account, $122,000 are permanently canceled: Provided further, That amounts available for procurement and procurement-related expenses in this account are reduced by such amount: Provided further, That as used herein, “procurement” includes all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process of determining a need for a product or services and ending with contract completion and closeout, as specified in 41 U.S.C. 403(2). 14. Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical
Herbicides and Riot Control Agents 1
Executive Order 11850, April 8, 1975, 40 F.R. 16187 The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil dis
turbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations. I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.
Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.
NOTE.-Former Executive Order 11902 regarding Procedures for an Export Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment was repealed by Executive Order 12058. For text of Executive Order 12058, see Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1994, vol. IV, sec. L.
1 See also texts of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, Legislation on Foreign Relations, vol. V, sec. F.