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REPORT ON RUSSIAN MILWARY OPERATIONS IN THE
DDEPENDENT STATES OF NEX FORMER SOVIET UNION.

2. IN GENERAL-N a man 5 months after the date of enachment of tons An the President stall submit to Congress a repors on the spermons and acvices of the armed forces of the Rusnan Federation, mening elements purportedly operating outside the than of tmmand of me med tres fhe Russian Federaton, coride the borders of the Russian Federation and, specifity, the other dependent states that were a part of the former Soviet Union and in the Baltic States.

B. CONTENT OF Rapoan-The report required by subsection (a) shall include, but not be limited to

1. an assessment of the numbers and types of Russian armed forces deployed in each of the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and in the Baltic States and a summary of their operations and activities since the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991:

2) a detailed assessment of the involvement of Russian armed forces in conflicts in or involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, including support provided directly or indirectly to one or more parties to these conflicts; 13, an assessment of the political and military objectives of the operations and activities discussed in paragraphs (1) and (2, and of the strategic objectives of the Russian Federation in its relations with the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States;

(4) an assessment of other significant actions, including political and economic, taken by the Russian Federation to influence the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States in pursuit of its strategic objectives; and (5) an analysis of the new Russian military doctrine adopted by President Yeltsin on November 2, 1993, with particular regard to its implications for Russian policy toward the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States.

(c) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section—

(1) "the other independent states of the former Soviet Union" means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; and

(2) "the Baltic States" means Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. SEC. 529. UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTH KOREA. It is the sense of the Congress that:

(1) It is in the United States national security interest to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

(2) The North Korea nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing national security challenges the United States currently faces.

120 Functions vested in the President in sec. 528 were delegated to the Secretary of State (Presidential memorandum of July 26, 1994; 59 F.R. 40205), and further delegated to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Department of State Public Notice 2086; sec. 1 of Delegation of Authority No. 214; 59 F.R. 50790). Sec. 16 of the same delegation of authority, however, reserves authorities in this section for the Secretary of State.

(3 North Korea's development of other weapons of mass de struction and of ballistic missiles further threatens United States nancial security interests and regional secu/72).

(4) United States policy should ensure that North Korea dues not possess a nuclear bomb or the capability to build une

(5) United States forces in Korea must remaa vigiant and maintain a robust defense posture.

(6) While diplomacy is the preferable method of dealing with the North Korean nuclear challenge, all options, including th appropriate use of force, remain available.

(7) In fashioning an appropriate policy for dealing with the challenge presented by North Korea's nuclear program, the Ad ministration should consult closely with United States treály allies, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as with China, Russia, and other members of the United Nations Security Council.

(8) United States policy should support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as the international community's designated body for venfying amplian with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nudear Manyons,130 to perform inspections of North Korea's Giudeat program.

(9) The United States should encourage strong and pret tious action by the United Nations Security Coučiti zast as North Korea has proved sawing to comply ty following:

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(C) The agreement or a cepted on February 15, 1995 (10) Unless North Korea unequivocay adheres to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Vitoyle and acides by all provisions of that treaty, the President should seek international consensus to isolate North Korea including the imposition of sanctions, in an effort to persuade Frongran i hait its nuclear weapons program and permit LAEA Inspections of all its nuclear facilities.

(11) Recognizing that within the international community China has significant influence over Pyongyang the nature and extent of Chinese cooperation with the rest of the international community on the North Korean nucilar issue, including Chinese support for international sanctions should such sanctions be proposed and/or adopted, will inevitably be a significant factor in United States-China relations

(12) If unable to achieve an internationa consensus to isolate North Korea, the President should employ all unilateral

130 Sec. 1ad of Public Law 103-415 (108 Stat 4302, ruck out Treaty' as sact point it appeared in sec. 529, and inserted in lies to mouf proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.

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means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea.

(13) The President should consult with United States allies in the region regarding the military posture of North Korea and the ability of the United States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack, or to defeat such an attack should it

occur.

(14) Toward these ends, the United States and South Korea should take all steps necessary to ensure that United States and South Korean forces stationed on the Korean peninsula can defend themselves, including the holding of Team Spirit or other joint military exercises, the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and other appropriate measures.

(15) The problem posed by North Korea's nuclear program is not a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea.

(16) The international community must insist upon full compliance by North Korea with all its nonproliferation commitments including acceptance of regular and ad hoc inspections of its declared nuclear facilities on a continuing basis, as well as special inspections of all suspected nuclear sites as the IAEA deems appropriate.

(17) International concerns about North Korea's nuclear intentions and capabilities will not be adequately addressed until North Korea cooperates fully with the IAEA, all North Korea nuclear facilities and materials are placed under fullscope safeguards, and North Korea adheres unequivocally to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 130 as well as to its 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea.

(18) The Administration should work to encourage a productive dialogue between North and South Korea that adequately addresses all security concerns on the Korean peninsula.

SEC. 530.131 ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES.

(a) POLICY. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to enhance the role of that institution in the enforcement of nonproliferation treaties through the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution which would state that, any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the United Nations Security Council, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would be subjected to international economic sanctions, the scope of which to be determined by the United Nations Security Council.

(b) PROHIBITION.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be provided to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement or materially violated a bilateral United States nuclear cooperation agreement

131 22 U.S.C. 2429a-2.

entered into after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

(c) WAIVER.-The President may waive the application of subsection (b) if

(1) the President determines that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; and

(2) the President reports such determination to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any resumption of assistance to that state.

SEC. 531. TAIWAN.

In view of the self-defense needs of Taiwan, the Congress makes the following declarations:

(1) Sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act are reaffirmed.

(2) Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act take primacy over statements of United States policy, including communiques, regulations, directives, and policies based thereon.

(3) In assessing the extent to which the People's Republic of China is pursuing its "fundamental policy" to strive peacefully to resolve the Taiwan issue, the United States should take into account both the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China.

(4) The President should on a regular basis assess changes in the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China and consider whether it is appropriate to adjust arms sales to Taiwan accordingly.

SEC. 532. WAIVER OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ABROAD.

(a) 132 AUTHORITY.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt from sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia those United States-supported programs, projects, or activities involving reform of the electoral process, or the development of democratic institutions or democratic political parties.

(b) POLICY.-The President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should propose that any action, past or future, by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should take account of the exemption described in subsection (a).

SEC. 533.133 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN OPEN SKIES TREATY DATA.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Data with respect to a foreign country collected by sensors during observation flights conducted in connection with the Treaty on Open Skies, including flights conducted prior to

132 Functions vested in the President in sec. 532(a) were delegated to the Secretary of State (Presidential memorandum of July 26, 1994; 59 F.R. 40205).

1335 U.S.C. 552 note.

entry into force of the treaty, shall be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act—

(1) if the country has not disclosed the data to the public; and

(2) if the country has not, acting through the Open Skies Consultative Commission or any other diplomatic channel, authorized the United States to disclose the data to the public. (b) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.-This section constitutes a specific exemption within the meaning of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code.

(c) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section

(1) the term "Freedom of Information Act" means the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the term "Open Skies Consultative Commission" means the commission established pursuant to Article X of the Treaty on Open Skies; and

(3) the term "Treaty on Open Skies" means the Treaty on Open Skies, signed at Helsinki on March 24, 1992.

SEC. 534. STUDY OF DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVENESS.

(a) REPORT.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on a streamlined, cost-effective organization of United States democracy assistance. The report shall include a review of all activities funded by the United States Government, including those funded through the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall include the following: (1) A review of all United States-sponsored programs to promote democracy, including identification and discussion of those programs that are overlapping.

(2) A clear statement of achievable goals and objectives for all United States-sponsored democracy programs, and an evaluation of the manner in which current democracy activities meet these goals and objectives.

(3) A review of the current United States Government organization for the delivery of democracy assistance and recommended changes to reduce costs and streamline overhead involved in the delivery of democracy assistance.

(4) Recommendations for coordinating programs, policies, and priorities to enhance the United States Government's role in democracy promotion.

(5) A review of all agencies involved in delivering United States Government funds in the form of democracy assistance and a recommended focal point or lead agency within the United States Government for policy oversight of the effort.

(6) A review of the feasibility and desirability of mandating non-United States Government funding, including matching funds and in-kind support, for democracy promotion programs. If it is determined that such non-Government funding is feasible and desirable, recommendations should be made regarding goals and procedures for implementation.

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