« FöregåendeFortsätt »
SC 543 7 A 92
Y OPERATIONS N TH2ncEISE SICEOR SOVET INON. 23 S -16 22 ai sertas ada the date of en te: 1
EP cert sot. Corgress a re: Tre scerzerHC Ertes i de arted cries of the Rus. 12:32c
tetier 3 core coeraring outside terasse- ise Ited tries I e Rassian Federa C e te perders Ie sa Federazica and, specifi-27. ze ci rdecerdeci 23:25 at fere a part of the
Scret ac rere Bad Sees. SCANI CE Z8-Se recor: recured by subsection (a). 12. serce c.ct de
2an assessment e crier ad types of Russian are res secr et e cher independent states cí teiser Sovet i = arce Base States and a sum: rary of her speza.ccs ad merides since the demise of the Scret ta00. Ceceber 39:;
2; a ceta: ed assessment of the invchement of Russian art.ed forces in ecc. in or invivrg Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georga, Voicva ard Tacsan, inciding support provided directay or indirectly to cce or Icre parties to these conflicts,
13, an assessmes: ct the polineai ard military objectives of the operators and activities discussed in paragraphs (1) and (2, and of the strategie ocjectives of the Russian Federation in its relations with the corer independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baisc States;
(4) an assessment of other significant actions, including political and economic, taken by the Russian Federation to influence the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States in pursuit of its strategic objectives; and
(5) an analysis of the new Russian military doctrine adopted by President Yeltsin on November 2, 1993, with particular regard to its implications for Russian policy toward the other independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic
States. (c) DEFINITIONS.—Por the purposes of this section
(1) "the other independent states of the former Soviet Union" means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; and
(2) "the Baltic States” means Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. BEC. 529. UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTH KOREA. It is the sense of the Congress that:
(1) It is in the United States national security interest to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.
(2) The North Korea nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing national security challenges the United States currently faces.
12* Functions verted in the President in sec. 528 were delegated to the Secretary of State (Premidential memorandum of July 26, 1994; 59 F.R. 40205), and further delegated to the Under Herrotary for Political Affairs (Department of State Public Notice 2056; sec. I of Delegation of Authority No. 214, 69 ER 50790). Sec. 16 of the same delegation of authority, however, reserves authorities in the section for the Secretary of State.
(3 :c brea's development of scher weapons met de strucco ard ui baiste missies furtner wiede ilicu States caca secunty interests and region. Ch.166.
(4, Coed States pecey shou.d ensure i n kreu suces not possess a nicear bomb or the capabuy w w.. md.
(5) United States forces in Korea must remai vigilt and maintain a rocust defense posture.
(6) While diplomacy is the preferable method u tuin with the North Korean nuclear challenge, all opens, cuild appropriate use of force, remain available.
(7) In fashioning an appropriate policy for dealing with this challenge presented by North Korea's nuclear program, te u ministration should consult closely with United Siles tituly allies, particularly Japan and the Republic of hurta, a. wetl 4a with China, Russia, and other members of the United Misbuns Security Council.
(8) United States policy should support the erfurt van troue International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as wie inisi national community's designated body for Venting Oran quloddin with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Distrul ons, 130 to perform in gections of North Lurea Bouak: gram.
(9) The United Staa esild encourage stru.Z. 10 . tious action by the C: 12.03 Serurity Chodno s as North Korea has pro
v o Gori following:
(Ă) North Korea Tel :91 deriva LAUT agreement with your , & 148. 14 puses. Tas ufacture, or use nusta 1.4 148. U gastas Palavr reprocessing fachlises, arr LBP.ak Ut es abusaca? of a nuclear inspections
(B) The nucieat saavat T er! Vortr Kure signed with the late on vaivory 6, 2972
(C) The agreement 01. obr. indigos Norts Korea accepted on February 15, 1834 (10) Unless North Korec ust a , aliseres u the Treats on the Nonproliferation of Nulitar vitendo anc acides by all provisions of that treaty, tist Free 80cc ster intrnational consensus to isolant Nuru Peyrtec Canave tie imposition of sanctions, in an etiori x bersa't Forgalik x kai: its nuclear weapons prograli, anc pero i t inspectors of all its nuclear facilities.
(11) Recognizing that within the darkatulia' community China has significant infiuence over tulevalg tite nature and extent of Chinese cooperaror will liat Its of the invernational community on the Nortii Portal, boleh ariseut, incuding Chinese support for international Salakave showic such sanctions be proposed and or acopec, wii itakvivalry ist á sig. nificant factor in United States-Chulia Itinera
(12) If unable to achieve an inverkatulia Colaklibue to isolate North Korea, the President siivuil tegevy a untiaveral
ta! Vigo piccolio:
vien no biet vis
means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea.
(13) The President should consult with United States allies in the region regarding the military posture of North Korea and the ability of the United States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack, or to defeat such an attack should it occur.
(14) Toward these ends, the United States and South Korea should take all steps necessary to ensure that United States and South Korean forces stationed on the Korean peninsula can defend themselves, including the holding of Team Spirit or other joint military exercises, the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and other appropriate measures.
(15) The problem posed by North Korea's nuclear program is not a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea.
(16) The international community must insist upon full compliance by North Korea with all its nonproliferation commitments including acceptance of regular and ad hoc inspections of its declared nuclear facilities on a continuing basis, as well as special inspections of all suspected nuclear sites as the IAEA deems appropriate.
(17) International concerns about North Korea's nuclear intentions and capabilities will not be adequately addressed until North Korea cooperates fully with the IAEA, all North Korea nuclear facilities and materials are placed under fullscope safeguards, and North Korea adheres unequivocally to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 130 as well as to its 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea.
(18) The Administration should work to encourage a productive dialogue between North and South Korea that adequately
addresses all security concerns on the Korean peninsula. SEC. 630.131 ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES.
(a) POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to enhance the role of that institution in the enforcement of nonproliferation treaties through the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution which would state that, any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the United Nations Security Council, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would be subjected to international economic sanctions, the scope of which to be determined by the United Nations Security Council.
(b) PROHIBITION.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be provided to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President to have terminated, abrogated, or materi. ally violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement or materially violated a bilateral United States nuclear cooperation agreement
131 22 U.S.C. 2429a-2.
entered into after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.
(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of subsection (b) if
(1) the President determines that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; and
(2) the President reports such determination to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any resumption of assistance to
that state. SEC. 531. TAIWAN.
In view of the self-defense needs of Taiwan, the Congress makes the following declarations:
(1) Sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act are reaffirmed.
(2) Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act take primacy over statements of United States policy, including communiques, regulations, directives, and policies based thereon.
(3) In assessing the extent to which the People's Republic of China is pursuing its "fundamental policy" to strive peacefully to resolve the Taiwan issue, the United States should take into account both the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China.
(4) The President should on a regular basis assess changes in the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China and consider whether it is appropriate to adjust arms
sales to Taiwan accordingly. SEC. 532. WAIVER OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY
ABROAD. (a) 132 AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt from sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia those United States-supported programs, projects, or activities involving reform of the electoral process, or the development of democratic institutions or democratic political parties.
(b) POLICY.—The President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should propose that any action, past or future, by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should take account of the exemption described in subsection (a). SEC. 533.133 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN
OPEN SKIES TREATY DATA. (a) IN GENERAL.-Data with respect to a foreign country collected by sensors during observation flights conducted in connection with the Treaty on Open Skies, including flights conducted prior to
132 Functions vested in the President in sec. 532(a) were delegated to the Secretary of State (Presidential memorandum of July 26, 1994; 59 F.R. 40205).
1335 U.S.C. 552 note.
(a) is Act, Melations
entry into force of the treaty, shall be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act,
(1) if the country has not disclosed the data to the public; and
(2) if the country has not, acting through the Open Skies Consultative Commission or any other diplomatic channel, au
thorized the United States to disclose the data to the public. (b) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—This section constitutes a specific exemption within the meaning of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code. (c) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section
(1) the term “Freedom of Information Act" means the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
(2) the term “Open Skies Consultative Commission” means the commission established pursuant to Article X of the Treaty on Open Skies; and
(3) the term “Treaty on Open Skies” means the Treaty on
Open Skies, signed at Helsinki on March 24, 1992. SEC. 534. STUDY OF DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVENESS.
(a) REPORT.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on a streamlined, cost-effective organization of United States democracy assistance. The report shall include a review of all activities funded by the United States Government, including those funded through the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development. (b) CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report shall include the following:
(1) A review of all United States-sponsored programs to promote democracy, including identification and discussion of those programs that are overlapping.
(2) A clear statement of achievable goals and objectives for all United States-sponsored democracy programs, and an evaluation of the manner in which current democracy activities meet these goals and objectives.
(3) A review of the current United States Government organization for the delivery of democracy assistance and recommended changes to reduce costs and streamline overhead involved in the delivery of democracy assistance.
(4) Recommendations for coordinating programs, policies, and priorities to enhance the United States Government's role in democracy promotion.
(5) A review of all agencies involved in delivering United States Government funds in the form of democracy assistance and a recommended focal point or lead agency within the United States Government for policy oversight of the effort.
(6) A review of the feasibility and desirability of mandating non-United States Government funding, including matching funds and in-kind support, for democracy promotion programs. If it is determined that such non-Government funding is feasible and desirable, recommendations should be made regarding goals and procedures for implementation.