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6. U.N. Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 1
Partial text of Public Law 103_337 (S. 2182), 108 Stat. 2663, approved
October 5, 1994
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE XIV-PEACE OPERATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN
SUBTITLE A-PEACE OPERATIONS SEC. 1401. REPORTS ON REFORMING UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPER
ATIONS. (a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress two reports on proposals by the United States for improving management by the United Nations of peace operations. The Secretary shall submit the first report not later than December 1, 1994, and the second not later than June 1, 1995.
(b) STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES PROPOSALS. — Each report shall contain
(1) a discussion of the status of implementation of proposals by the United States contained in section IV (relating to strengthening the United Nations) of the document entitled “The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” that was issued by the Executive Office of the President in May 1994; and
(2) an analysis of the results of such implementation. (c) SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED.-Each report shall cover, at a minimum, the following matters:
(1) The reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
(2) The reasons for lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a peace operation has been authorized and steps by the United Nations to reduce those delays.
(3) The establishment by the United Nations of a professional peace operations training program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.
(4) Assistance by the United States to facilitate improvements by the United Nations in the matters described in para
1 See also title XV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1547 at 1835), in Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1994, vol. 1-B.
graphs (1) and (3) and the terms under which such assistance
has been or is being provided. (d) PEACE OPERATION DEFINED.-In this section, the term "peace operation” means an operation to maintain or restore international peace and security under chapter VI or chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. SEC. 1402. REPORT ON MILITARY READINESS IMPLICATIONS OF
BOSNIA PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT. (a) REPORT.-(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report assessing the implications for United States military readiness of the participation of United States ground combat forces in peacekeeping operations within Bosnia-Hercegovina.
(2) The report shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act or 30 days following the deplovment of United States ground forces to Bosnia-Hercegovina, which ever occurs sooner.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a shall include the following:
(1) An estimate of the total number of forces required to carry out such an operation, including forces required for a rotation base.
(2) An estimate of the expected duration of such an oper. ation.
(3) An estimate of the cost of such an operation, together with an explanation of how the Secretary proposes to provide funds for such an operation and an assessment of how such proposed funding plan would affect overall military readiness.
(4) An assessment of the effect such an operation would have on the ability of the United States Armed Forces to execute successfully the two nearly-simultaneous major regional conflict strategy articulated in the Bottom-Up Review.
(5) An assessment of how readily forces participating in such an operation could be redeployed to a major regional conflict, including an analysis of the availability of strategic lift, the likely condition of equipment, and the extent of retraining necessary to facilitate such a redeployment.
(6) An assessment of the effect such an operation would have on the general combat readiness and deployability of combat units designated to be part of the contingency force, including the extent to which contingency force combat units would support the initial deployment and subsequent rotations.
(7) An assessment of the effect such an operation would have on the general combat readiness and deployability of combat units not designated to be part of the contingency force, including the extent to which non-contingency force combat units would support the initial deployment and subsequent rotations.
(8) For the initial deployment and subsequent rotations, an assessment of the number and type of combat support and combat service support units required from active forces, including how many of such units are designated to support the deployment of the contingency force.
(9) An assessment of the degree to which such an operation would require the use of reserve component units and person
nel and the use and timing of involuntary Selected Reserve call-up authority as provided by section 673b of title 10, United States Code.
(10) An assessment of the anticipated cost of equipment refurbishment resulting from such an operation.
(11) An assessment of how the increased operational tempo associated with such an operation would affect the mission capable readiness rates and overall health of both strategic and
theater airlift assets. (c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: (1) The term “contingency force” includes
(A) the set of four or five Army divisions that is designated as the Army contingency force by the Secretary of the Army, as well as Army active duty and reserve component combat, combat support, and combat service support units designated to respond to a regional conflict within the first 75 days of such conflict; and
(B) Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps active duty and reserve component combat, combat support, and combat service support units designated to respond to a regional
conflict within the first 75 days of such conflict. (2) The term “Bottom-Up Review” means the October 1993 Department of Defense report entitled “Report on the Bottom
Dep ReviewCATION britten
(d) CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified form. SEC. 1403. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED FROM
UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA. (a) REPORT.-The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned from the United States participation in United Nations activities in Somalia. (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall
(1) specifically describe the availability of intelligence on forces of other nations and of indigenous forces operating in Somalia before, during, and after the insertion of United States forces; and
(2) set forth a complete review of any intelligence failures, any equipment failures, and any equipment unavailability in
the theater. (c) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.-The report shall be submitted not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 1404. BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA. (a) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this section
(1) to express the sense of Congress concerning the international efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina; and
(2) to establish a process to end the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina. (b) STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.-The Congress supports the efforts of the Contact Group to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina based upon the Contact Group proposal.
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(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that:
(1) The United States should work with the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina which maintains the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
(2) A peaceful settlement of the conflict must preserve an economically, politically, and militarily viable Bosnian state capable of exercising its rights under the Charter of the United Nations as part of a peaceful settlement, which rights include the inherent right of a sovereign state to self defense.
(3) The acceptance of the Contact Group proposal by the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina should lead to the lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo.
(4) In providing weapons to the Bosnian Government or taking other actions, care should be taken to provide for the safety of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the civilian personnel working for the United Nations or nongovernmental volunteer organizations.
(5) The United States should immediately seek to organize an international effort to provide assistance to the states bordering Serbia and Montenegro to bring about more effective enforcement by those states of the international economic sanc
tions on the Government of Serbia and Montenegro. (d) GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY.—The United States should exercise leadership within the international community to cause the Bosnian Serb faction to accept the Contact Group proposal Such action should be taken on separate but complementary international and unilateral tracks, as set forth in subsections (e), (f), and (g).
(e) INTERNATIONAL POLICY.-If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the Contact Group proposal by the date that is the later of October 15, 1994, or the end of the 10-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (or his representative) should, not later than 14 days thereafter, formally introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to terminate the Bosnia arms embargo. The resolution should provide for the termination of the arms embargo no later than December 1, 1994 (and may allow for the termination to be accomplished in stages ending no later than that date).
(H 2 UNILATERAL UNITED STATES POLICY.(1) If by the earlier of November 15, 1994, or the end of the 15-day period beginning on
FERALter than that termination later than
2 The President issued the following determination on November 12, 1994:
"Pursuant to the authority provided in section 1404(0/3XA) of the National Defense Author ization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103–337) (the 'Act"), I hereby determine that the limitation in section 1404(0(2) of the Act is waived in the case of U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions, including the following
"(1) All U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.
"(2) The Commanders and all U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing dubes at the stails of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe or the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic,
"(3) The Commanders and all U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at the staff of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe.
"(4) Those U.S. Commanders and U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing doties at subordinate NATO headquarters stalls of the above listed stalls.