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prohibited activity (without regard to whether subsection (b) applies), the President shall, by order, impose the sanctions described in subsection (d) on such person.
(d) SANCTIONS.—The following sanctions shall be imposed pursuant to any order issued under subsection (c) with respect to any United States person or any foreign person:
(1) BAN ON DEALINGS IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE.
(A) DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER.–Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation of any prior designation of, the person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.
(B) SERVICE AS DEPOSITARY.—The person may not serve as a depositary for United States Government funds. (2) RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS.—The person may not, directly or indirectly
(A) commence any line of business in the United States in which the person was not engaged as of the date of the order; or
(B) conduct business from any location in the United States at which the person did not conduct business as of
the date of the order. (e) JUDICIAL REVIEW.-Any determination of the President under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with chapter 7 of part I of title 5, United States Code.
(f) CONSULTATION WITH AND ACTIONS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.
(1) CONSULTATIONS.—If the President makes a determination under subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person, the Congress urges the President to initiate consultations immediately with any appropriate foreign government with respect to the imposition of any sanction pursuant to this section. (2) ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.
(A) SUSPENSION OF PERIOD FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS.-In order to pursue consultations described in paragraph (1) with any government referred to in such paragraph, the President may delay, for up to 90 days, the effective date of an order under subsection (c) imposing any sanction.
(B) COORDINATION WITH ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.–Following consultations described in paragraph (1), the order issued by the President under subsection (c) imposing any sanction on a foreign person shall take effect unless the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the government referred to in paragraph (1) has taken specific and effective actions, including the imposition of appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of the foreign person in any prohibited activity.
(C) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.—After the end of the period described in subparagraph (A), the President may delay, for up to an additional 90 days, the effective date of an order issued under subsection (b) imposing any sanction on a foreign person if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the appropriate foreign government is in the process of taking actions described in
subparagraph (B). (3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date on which an order is issued under subsection (c), the President shall submit to the Congress a report on
(A) the status of consultations under this subsection with the government referred to in paragraph (1); and
(B) the basis for any determination under paragraph (2)
that such government has taken specific corrective actions. (g) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTIONS.-Any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) shall
(1) remain in effect for a period of not less than 12 months; and
(2) cease to apply after the end of such 12-month period only if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that,
(A) the person has ceased to engage in any prohibited activity; and
(B) the President has received reliable assurances from such person that the person will not, in the future, engage
in any prohibited activity. (h) WAIVER.–The President may waive the continued application of any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the continued imposition of the sanction would have a serious adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the domestic or international financial system or on domestic or international payments systems.
(i) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.—The Attorney General may bring an action in an appropriate district court of the United States for injunctive and other appropriate relief with respect to
(1) any violation of subsection (b); or
(2) any order issued pursuant to subsection (c). 6) KNOWINGLY DEFINED.
(1) IN GENERAL-For purposes of this section, the term "knowingly* means the state of mind of a person with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result in which
(A) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or
(B) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. (2) KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE.-If knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that
such circumstance does not exist. (k) SCOPE OF APPLICATION.–This section shall apply with respect to prohibited activities which occur on or after the date this part takes efect
SEC. 825.146 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK. • • •
(a) 169 CONTENT OF ACDA ANNUAL REPORT.-* *
(b) REPORTING ON DEMARCHES.(1) It is the sense of the Congress that the Department of State should, in the course of implementing its reporting responsibilities under section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, include a summary of demarches that the United States has issued or received from foreign governments with respect to activities which are of signifi. cance from the proliferation standpoint.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term "demarche" means any official communication by one government to another, by written or oral means, intended by the originating government to express
(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible future action or activity of the recipient government, or of a person within the jurisdiction of that government, contributing to the global spread of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear explosive devices;
(B) a request for the recipient government to counter such action or activity; or
(C) both the concern and request described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
SEC. 830. DEFINITIONS.
(A) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is created or organized under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business
outside the United States;
(A) nuclear materials and equipment and sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms are defined in section 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), all export items designated by the President pursuant to section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and all technical assistance requiring authorization under section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and
(B) in the case of exports from a country other than the United States, any goods or technology that, if exported
166 Sec. 825 amended sec. 20X4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 6350X4)).
187 Sec. 826 a) added a new chapter 10 to the Arms Export Control Act, relating to nuclear proliferation controls (22 U.S.C. 2799aa et seq.) Sec. 826D) repealed secs. 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2429, 2429a). Sec. 826c) made corresponding technical amendments.
188 Sec. 827 amended sec. 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a)).
169 Sec. 828(a) amended sec. 51(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Statute or the Agent betweenards" me
from the United States, would be goods or technology de
scribed in subparagraph (A); (3) the term “LAEA safeguards" means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
(4) the term "nuclear explosive device means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT);
(5) the term "non-nuclear-weapon state" means any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
(6) the term "special nuclear material" has the meaning given that term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014aa); (7) the term “United States person" means
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is not a foreign person; and (8) the term "unsafeguarded special nuclear material" means special nuclear material which is held in violation of IAEA safeguards or not subject to IAEA safeguards (excluding any quantity of material that could, if it were exported from the United States, be exported under a general license issued by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). SEC. 831. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this part, and the amendments made by this part, shall take effect 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
PART C—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 179 SEC. 841. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.
It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance international confidence in the efectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors aug the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to
(1) build international SUDUURL for priciple that nuclear supply relationships must Tuure purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international saluyuz? QE;
(2) encourage eact numar mazuri 8ate within the meaning of the Treaty to under ars Qumr1918 ve review of its own procedures for deciassilyon mulur11:aut relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;
170 See relaved legislation under tion on Foreign heialus Througat 16
at Environment" in Lagwia
(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weaponsgrade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;
(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are currently using or planning to use weaponsgrade nuclear material for commercial purposes;
(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United States;
(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched alternative nuclear fuels;
(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;
(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards verification purposes;
(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods;
(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and
(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new lim
its on the right to withdraw from the Treaty. SEC. 842. IAEA INTERNAL REFORMS.
In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to
(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;
(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and