"A. No. You mean on the first floor. "Q. Yes. * * It is my "A. I guess that is so, may be. remembrance that that goes all the way up, but it is wood instead of solid. I guess all the way. * * "Q. Just tell us how the wall on the east side of the stairway was built, of what material? "A. It is built of stone and brick, the first floor, and my recollection is that it was wood above that, at one time. What it is now I don't recall, I didn't look to see. "Q. You considered when you built it that the dividing line on the stairway would be the wall on the west side of the stairway? "A. No, no, the dividing line was right in the center, each of us owning a half of it. "Q. Was that the arrangement with Vanden Brooks? "A. It must have been, because it was constructed under that system. * * The only specific agree * ment with reference to who should use it, was in reference to these little rooms. When we kind of got finished, that is my recollection, and I guess I am right, coming along to where we were going to do something with these spaces, Mr. Vanden Brooks and I finally decided that he should have these two little rooms over the stairway. "Q. Mr. Vanden Brooks has had possession of all of the space above the stairway from the time this building was constructed? "A. Yes, I guess that's right. "Q. And Mr. Vanden Brooks shared in the building expense of the stairway that is in dispute? "A. Yes, his half of it on his side of the building. I am almost sure about surrounding that stairway, because, as I recall it, I scolded about that on account of the fire risk, of his using wood in the construction of the first story, using studding instead of solid brick, on account of the insurance. My part would naturally cost more than the construction of Mr. Vanden Brooks." He further testified that in painting the front of his building, he just painted up to the windows and stopped there-up to the pilaster of the stairway. Also that he deeded to the Bank Building Company, and had charge of the property for at least a couple of years thereafter, adding: "My best recollection is that it would be about 1892 to 1895. I should think it was about 1893." The defendant Vanden Brooks testified that he had known this property for 25 years, and had always supposed that he had the absolute title to the whole stairway. He testified: "I can remember back as to the condition of this building for the last 25 years. * * * I never thought anything else, but the whole stairway belonged to the Vanden Brooks' block. We always kept the stairway in repair, painted it, painted the walls, both sides. That would be right up to the west pilasters, considering that as a party wall, to the point Y on Exhibit 'A.' And we had possession of the rooms here, and rented them. At that time I had possession of everything above the stairway and I still occupy that. * * * I have control of all of that property. The west pilaster is an iron beam from the ground to the first floor, right from the basement, bottom of the basement, right to the roof, is a solid brick construction. I am referring to the pilaster as the point in Exhibit 'A,' marked Y. * * * That wall supports the roof, is a carrying wall for the roof from the second and third floors. * * * No one had ever made any claim that the First National Bank, or any successors of Mr. B. E. Warren had any title to that stairway during the 20 years, that I can remember. From the time that I had been administrator of my father's estate to the time shortly before the commencement of this suit, no one ever made any claim that the First National Bank or any successors of B. E. Warren had any interest in the stairway." The position of the plaintiff is, as we understand it, that the use by Warren of the basement under the stairway, and by Vanden Brooks, of the rooms over the stairway, and of the joint use of the stairway itself, were in pursuance of an oral agreement between the parties, made when the buildings were constructed; that this agreement was never put in writing, and was not made for any definite time; that the arrangement between Warren and Vanden Brooks created a mutual, revocable license; that it was revoked by the plaintiff when the bill of complaint herein was filed; and that the original property line therefore marks the present boundary line of the property. The plaintiff, from the foregoing position, claims that in this State there can be no adverse possession or prescriptive right made under such circumstances, and that the use was a permissive user, citing Gates v. Sebald, 180 Mich. 578, 583; Township of Jasper v. Martin, 161 Mich. 336, 341 (137 Am. St. Rep. 508); and Wilkinson v. Hutzel, 142 Mich. 674. And that where there is no prescriptive right, an easement cannot be created, in real estate, by parol or estoppel, or by any other means than a grant; citing Nowlin Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 119 Mich. 406, 410, 412. The position and claim of defendant and appellant are frankly stated in the brief as follows: "It is not disputed that defendant Vanden Brooks, and his father had sole possession of the space above the stairway for 42 years. The answer and the crossbill are therefore founded upon the theory of title by adverse possession in and to the lands under the stairway, and all the spaces above it. The testimony, however, discloses that Mr. Vanden Brooks had not had exclusive possession of the spaces under the stairway for the statutory period, and for this reason, in the argument, the claim of title was abandoned, and the lower court was advised, as is this court, that defendant does not claim title by adverse possession, but does claim an easement in the stairway and the spaces above the stairway. * * Inasmuch, however, as claim is not made by defendant in the title of the real estate under the stairway, for the purposes of this case, the discussion as to the party wall is of no importance, except as it tends to corroborate the testimony that Vanden Brooks has maintained an adverse user of all the space east of the wall since its construction." Defendant says: "Plaintiff seeks to defeat the apparent equities of defendant's position by the assertion of a hard rule of law, viz., that the testimony shows that Vanden Brooks' continual use of this stairway and the space above it, was permissive only, and that under this rule of law, his apparent rights are defeated. "Our position is, that the facts clearly show that the original possession and continual use of Vanden Brooks was not by permissive or revocable license, but was under an agreement which was to continue for all time. However, for the sake of this argument only, and conceding that the original arrangement between Andreas Vanden Brooks and B. E. Warren was permissive and revocable in character, another hard legal rule intervenes, which this court has announced in several cases, but has been loath to enforce where it is possible to make a decision on any other ground. This rule is, that a permissive license is revoked by operation of law, when the licensor parts with his title. This court has said: "It is well settled that a conveyance of the land by the licensor operates ipso facto as a revocation of a license previously granted. Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 466; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Marble, 112 Mich. 10; Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 N. Y. 585 (1 L. R. A. 487, 18 N. E. 443).' v. Knapp, 142 Mich. 652, 661. Toney "The testimony is undisputed that B. E. Warren parted with his title in 1891, which would be 24 years prior to the filing of the bill of complaint in this case. Therefore, even though it should be found that the original arrangement was permissive and revocable in character, upon revocation of such license, the element of permission would from that time be eliminated." It is claimed by counsel for plaintiff that this question was a new one, not raised in the court below. Insofar as this record shows, the question is inherent 204-Mich.-12. both in the pleadings and the evidence. The defendant had claimed adverse possession and prescriptive right since 1871. Now he claims it since 1891, by reason of the deed of that date. The question has been discussed by counsel for both parties upon its merits. Conceding, as we do, the correctness of the position of the plaintiff as to the parol license and permissive use of the property in the first instance, we are constrained to hold that the deed of the premises by Warren in 1891 revoked that license and permissive use, and that the use of the defendant of the stairway and spaces above since that time has been of such a character as to give him a prescriptive right to the easement claimed. It is urged by counsel for plaintiff that the rule of revocation is a hard rule. We must say in reply that for 40 years it has been a rule of property in this State. In Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Marble, supra, this court said that the rule was too well settled in this and other courts to need discussion. We applied the rule in the recent case of Voorhies v. Pratt, 200 Mich. 91. In that case, Justice BIRD, speaking for the court, said: "The drains appear to have had their beginning in favor, extended by Mr. Hatt to defendant, and, therefore, were permissive. While they were maintained as a matter of favor, defendant could not acquire any right by adverse user. People v. Ferguson, 119 Mich. 373. After a sale of the premises to Mr. James Pratt the favor was thereby extinguished (Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 466), and the statute would begin to run." It cannot be said that, because other persons than this defendant used this stairway, his use was not exclusive. In Schmidt v. Brown, 226 Ill. 590 (80 N. E. 1071, 11 L. R. A. [N. S] 457), it was held that because other persons besides the claimant of a right of way used it, did not prevent the claimant's user |