person to whom it is assessed, by a two-thirds vote of all the members elect, to repay the same out of the contingent fund, if collected, or if not collected, to vacate the assessment in whole or in part, in the manner and with like effect as is provided for in cases of illegal taxes and assessments in this chapter."

This chapter (No. 7 of the charter) provides how the common council shall be constituted and defines its powers and duties relative to municipal affairs, including various local improvements to be paid for by taxation, which the council is authorized to provide by specified proceedings. Following a section devoted to construction of sidewalks and manner of levying and collecting taxes to defray the necessary cost of the same, section 58 of the chapter authorizes the common council to

"provide and ordain by ordinance, that whenever it shall appear that any taxes or assessments have been illegally assessed or collected, the common council may, by a vote of two-thirds of all members elected, direct and cause the amount so collected to be refunded out of the contingent fund, or in case it has not been collected, to vacate the assessment, and fix upon an amount, to be received in full of such tax or assessment, and no such action on the part of the council, under such ordinance, shall in any way affect or invalidate any other tax or assessment assessed, levied or collected in said city."

Whether it appeared to the council that those taxes were unjust, or when assessed were based upon property not owned by the person to whom it was assessed, over three years before this resolution was adopted, is not disclosed; but they are shown to have been spread on an assessment roll passed upon and approved by the common council acting as a board of review, and, in the regular course of proceedings which the city itself had initiated, this land was returned delinquent for taxes, had been regularly advertised, offered at the

204-Mich.-29.

annual tax sale and bid in by the State for such delinquent taxes at the time this resolution was passed. The State purchased the land and held it in like manner as an individual. A State tax bid transferred to a private purchaser is in his hands in all respects like a title bid off by himself originally. Section 4082, 1 Comp. Laws 1915; Auditor General v. Board of Sup'rs of Monroe Co., 36 Mich. 70; Haney v. Miller, 154 Mich. 337. In any aspect of the question the delinquent tax had passed into the hands of the State authorities, the common council had no further control over these tax proceedings at that time and the resolution purporting to cancel those State and county taxes was of no validity.

It is further claimed that plaintiff's tax deeds are void under the ruling of this court in Graham v. City of Detroit, 174 Mich. 538 (44 L. R. A. [N. S.] 836), because they cover lands which had been acquired by the municipality and were in use for a public purpose before they had been purchased for delinquent taxes from the State. The Graham Case was an action in ejectment against the city for a portion of a public street, the easements for which had been acquired for highway purposes by condemnation proceedings. Defendant had given notice under its plea of the general issue that it did not own or claim to own the lands in question, and asserted they were in use as part of a highway for public travel under an easement acquired for that purpose, and the right of the public to so use them could not be determined in ejectment. It was held that the municipality neither owned the easements nor held the property in exclusive possession, the court saying:

"The easement in the lands in question for the purposes of public travel belonged to the State at the time it purchased such lands at the tax sales. A municipality in its control of these highways acts for the

State, and has no right to the possession or use of these easements other than the public generally. It takes the burden of maintaining such easements fit for public travel. Lynch v. Town of Rutland, 66 Vt. 573 (29 Atl. 1015). These easements belong to the State, and were in use as public highways at the time they were bid in to the State for delinquent taxes."

And it was held the auditor general could not issue deeds in the name of the State for lands in which the State had then acquired easements for public use as a part of its highways devoted to public travel.

The obstacle to applying that rule in the instant case is that the State had no right, title, easement, or interest in, or control over, these lands. The city had 'bought them from private owners for municipal purposes, and was not acting for the State in its exclusive possession and control of the property for a municipal purpose. To hold that the city was acting as an agent of the State in the ownership and control of property devoted exclusively to one of its local municipal activities would be to overturn the doctrine for which cities have strenuously and successfully contended under the ægis of home rule and right of local self-government since early in the history of the State. Education and highways for the use of the people of the State at large are held to be matters of general State concern and control, while the fire departments and other purely local functions of municipalities are not. The distinction is pointed out and the rule well settled in City of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 (80 Am. Dec. 78); People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (9 Am. Rep. 103); Board of Park Commissioners v. Detroit Common Council, 28 Mich. 228 (15 Am. Rep. 202); Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294 (15 L. R. A. [N. S.] 575, 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas 352); Simpson v. Paddock, 195 Mich. 581, and cases there cited.

So far as the city's rights under the sale of these

lands for delinquent State and county taxes is concerned, there is no legal distinction in this controversy between defendant and any other negligent owner. The published notice of the auditor general's petition, order of hearing, etc., were, under the law, equivalent to a personal service upon it of notice of all proceedings in and by order of the chancery court leading up to and including the public sale of these lands at the annual tax sale for that year. The abortive attempt of the common council to wipe out those State and county delinquent taxes, which were beyond its control, but indicates it had actual notice as early as August 9, 1910. The lands could then have been redeemed and the whole matter adjusted by simply paying the tax of 1907 to the county treasurer, and applying to the auditor general for cancellation of those of 1908. In the prescribed course of proceedings when taxes are returned delinquent, as done by the county treasurer in this case, the property was sold to satisfy the taxes and deeds therefor given. The matter was again called to the attention of the city by personal notice of the outstanding tax titles and of its right to redeem and obtain reconveyance on payment of the taxes and prescribed penalty within six months as the law provides. This added provision in the law for collecting the revenue of the State was passed for the benefit of the defaulting taxpayer. Following all prior demands, opportunities and legal proceedings to induce payment, it again offers him relief “by giving him a last chance to save his land, it apparently being thought that, by requiring notice and giving an opportunity to repurchase, there would be little excuse for an owner losing his land through inattention." Haney v. Miller, 154 Mich. 338. The provisions of the tax law as to the rights and duties of the respective parties in interest after a valid tax sale have been fully discussed and construed in the following cases, and oth

ers to which they refer: Ball v. Ridge Copper Co., 118 Mich. 7; Gustin v. Fitzpatrick, 182 Mich. 640; Huron Land Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 183 Mich. 45; Rousseau v. Riihiniemi, 186 Mich. 653, and Haney v. Miller, supra.

No steps were taken by the city to secure a determination of any legal questions which personal service of notice to redeem from a tax deed from the auditor general upon its property suggested, no offer or tender of payment was made and the notices were ignored during the time for reconveyance, and until this petition was filed. The contention that this neglect puts defendant in a more advantageous position than the fee owner in the Iron Mountain Case because there the question of loss of public property was not involved is not tenable. It was involved, and such loss inevitable, had that municipality treated the notice as in the instant case; otherwise the decision is a nullity and it was folly for Iron Mountain to act in the matter either by litigation or redemption, when by its doing nothing until the expiration of the six months' notice to redeem had expired the tax deed would automatically become a nullity and the tax lien, to collect which the land was sold by the State, liquidated.

In a supplemental brief filed after this case was submitted counsel raises the point that the notice to redeem served upon it was invalid because it included the amount paid the auditor general for the taxes of 1908 which were concededly illegal, reference being made to the notice to redeem which is among the exhibits in the case. The notice contains, separately stated, the amount for each year, showing plainly the description of the land upon which it was paid.

As to this proposition, it is expressly stipulated in the record that "notice of its (petitioner's) tax title in conformance with the provisions of Act No. 229 of the Public Acts of 1897 and acts amendatory" was