forts depend. Nor is the tendency of moral | experience, in which good indubitably results evil to extend and improve his moral attain- from evil, and especially that the influence of ments less certain and direct. The most ex- adversity, in the formation and improvement alted virtues which can adorn human nature of human virtue, is oftentimes extremely great are not only promoted by, but could not possi--from these positions, it does not directly fol bly exist without, the prevalence of moral evil. low, that all mankind will ultimately be made If there were no contumely and injustice, there pure and happy; but it does directly follow, could be no forbearance; if men never violated that evil is the means of producing ultimate the rights of men, nor neglected their mutual good. duties, there could be no forgiveness; if there were no tendency in human nature to pride, there could be no virtue in humility; if there were no wants, nor weaknesses, nor sorrows, and no dependence of men on each other, there could be no charity, no sympathy, no compassion, no generous forgetfulness of his own to minister to another's necessities; if there were no temptation, there could be no joy, no glory from successful resistence, and, if no danger, no fortitude and no victory. In whatever shape or measure evil may assail the virtuous, it is universally admitted, that to them at least it is but another form of good. Whether he be placed under the discipline of physical or of moral evil, or of both, to the good man, according to the emphatic language of scripture, all will work together for good. When the psalmist says, It is good for me that I have been afflicted,' he records that experience of the moral benefit of adversity, to the truth of which, wise and reflective men, in all ages and all climes, have born testimony-to the truth of which, all men, however various the sources of their sorrow, and however different their modes of faith, without a single dissentient voice, still bear testimony. Nor can it be said, that it is to the virtuous only, that adversity is thus the minister of good; for adversity is frequently the means by which the vicious are made virtuous. The position, therefore, that evil, both physical and moral, under the government of the Deity, is the means of producing ultimate good, appears to be established on evidence as indubitable and complete as any subject of human belief. This reasoning, it is obvious, is not adduced to prove that the punishment inflicted on the wicked in a future state will be corrective, and ultimately restore them to purity and happiness. The precise point which the preceding arguments are intended to establish, is, that evil, both physical and moral, is the means of producing ultimate good. One single case in which physical good is clearly and certainly produced by physical evil-one single case in which moral good is clearly and certainly produced by moral evil, is sufficient to establish this position-especially since, as has been shown, it is utterly impossible to prove the contrary; that is, since no instance can be pointed out in all nature, and no example in all the records of human experience, which renders it certain, or even probable, that physical or moral evil is absolutely and ultimately evil. From the position, then, that God is the author of that constitution of things in which physical and moral evil originates, that there are cases in nature, and instances in human It does not seem possible to resist the force of this reasoning in any other way than by denying the position on which it is founded, namely, that God is the author of evil, and by ascribing the benefit which all admit sometimes results from evil, not to the natural operation of evil, but to God's counteracting and overruling it for good. With regard to the position, that God is not the author of evil, conscious as every human being must be, of the inadequacy of his faculties to comprehend fully the origin of evil, it becomes him to speak on the subject with profound humility. But surely it is not presumption to endeavour to form a clear, while it is confessed that in the present state it is not possible to form an adequate, conception of it. In tracing back the origin of evil, then, unless the mind be paralyzed by false fear, the offspring of false system, and unless the doctrine of Manicheeism be revived, it should seem no more possible to stop till we have arrived at the appointment of the Deity, than, in tracing back the series of second causes, it is possible to stop till we have arrived at the great First Cause of all things. The argument, that the First Cause must be himself uncaused, because an infinite number of dependent beings requires a first and independent cause, as much as any one in the series, appears to be clear and irresistible;equally clear and irresistible is the argument, that the same Being is the author of evil, because he is the author of the constitution of nature, both physical and moral, and because he appointed all the circumstances, the operation of which he foreknew would certainly involve the existence of evil. It deserves, too, to be well considered, that the hypothesis, that evil is the appointment of the Deity, for the promotion of greater ultimate good, is adequate to remove every difficulty; while the doctrine, that he partially counteracts its operation, is extremely imperfect. Of physical evil, it surely cannot be said that God has no other relation to it than that of benevolent counteraction. Physical evil is as strictly dependent on the operation of the laws of nature, as any physical phenomena whatever. The structure of the bodies of animals, by which they are subject to disease and suffering certain constitutions of the air, which at one time directly impair or destroy animal life, and at another blast the fruits of the earth, by which life is supported-earthquakes, pestilence, and the calamities incident to themthe evil which arises in all these cases is as strictly dependent on the operation of the laws of nature, as the gravitation of bodies to the earth. To him who appointed these laws, this evil must necessarily be referred; and it is obviously insufficient to say, of any benefit which may result from their operation, that it is the consequence only of his benevolent counteraction. In like manner, the suffering connected with moral disorder as necessarily results from the constitution of the moral nature of man, as physical evil results from the constitution of nature. That man must be rendered unhappy by every deviation from rectitude, is as much the consequence of a law of his nature, as the due nourishment of his body by the reception of nutritious food. That inestimable advantages result from this moral constitution, is universally admitted; and it is obviously insufficient to say of these, that they are the consequence merely of God's counteracting and overruling evil; for surely there can be no more certain evidence, that God has appointed or ordained a thing, than that he has made it the invariable result of a general law. In a word, the brief, but full answer to the hypothesis we are considering, is, that, if God benevolently counteract evil, he makes it the instrument of good. The imagination cannot conceive of his counteracting evil in any other way than by his making it the instrument of producing greater ultimate good. Upon this very hypothesis, therefore, it must be admitted, that evil is sometimes at least the instrument of producing ultimate good. The essential difference between God's benevolent counteraction of evil and his benevolent causation of it, is, that, according to the former hypothesis, the beneficial effect of his interference is par tial and imperfect; according to the latter, it is universal and complete. Upon the whole, it is perfectly evident, that neither the nature nor the government of the Deity can be benevolent, unless evil be, in every instance and every measure in which it prevails, through the vast system which he at first constituted, and which he constantly superintends, not an end, but the means to some further end, namely, that of promoting ultimate good-good, higher, in nature, and greater in degree, than could have been produced without it. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the existence of natural and moral evil with infinite wisdom and goodness, on the principle, that, by the operation of evil, the sum of happiness produced to mankind collectively is greater than the sum of misery. It has even been conceived, that this may be the case, though by far the greater number of mankind, after having been exposed to sin and misery on earth, not only fail to obtain happiness in a future state, but suffer excruciating and unceasing torment through all the ages of eternity. How the few who escape this tremendous and general ruin can, by any measure or duration of felicity, cause the collective sum of happiness to exceed that of a misery which must ever be as lasting and more general than itself, it seems impossible to conceive. It is believed that those who die in unrepented sin will be as greatly wretched as the penitent❘ and pious will be greatly happy-that the dis proportion in their number will ever be at least as great as it is at present, and the disproportion in their destiny infinitely greater; how, then, upon the supposition of unmitigated, unmixed, and everlasting misery, is it possible, that the evil which has produced this misery can be the means of increasing the collective sum of happiness? It is only necessary to bring the mind to the steady and distinct conception of what is really supposed in a misery which involves the great majority of mankind, and which is at once as great as can be endured, and as lastting as eternity, to perceive that its existence is impossible, unless the author of the system in which it prevails be cruel and malignant in the highest degree. That myriads and myriads of human beings, constituting a number so vast, that the imagination can form no adequate conception of it, should be doomed to inexpressible torment, and that this tremendous mass of never-ending misery should be adopted by a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, as the means of producing a greater collective sum of happiness to his creatures, is an hypothesis which the heart, were it permitted to indulge its genuine feeling, must execrate, and the understanding, did not system prostrate it in the dust, reject with indignation. There is in this hypothesis a difficulty which ought never to be lost sight of. It supposes the great majority of mankind to be sacrificed (and O, how sacrificed!) to comparatively a few; while, to the great majority thus sacrificed, in no period of their being, in no manner, in no measure, is any compensation afforded. In no other part of the great system with which we are acquainted, is there any thing like this! In the whole economy of nature, there is nothing bearing the slightest analogy to it! The wisdom and goodness of the Deity, in the permission of natural and moral evil, may be perfectly vindicated, and can be perfectly vindicated, only on the supposition, that, considered in relation to the entire period of his being, it increases the sum of happiness to every individual. And that this will be the ultimate issue of evil, is confirmed by every thing which reason and experience teach concerning its nature and tendency, and is opposed by nothing but the prejudices of a system which leads to consequences truly horrible, and which is supported by no appearance in nature, by no testimony of experience, and by no induction of reason. If it be said that this is assuming more than is absolutely necessary, to vindicate the divine perfections, it must at least be granted, that the lowest ground it is possible to assume, is, that, how much soever evil may prevail, every individual will nevertheless experience, the whole period of his being considered, more happiness than misery. If this position be denied, no ingenuity can reconcile the prevalence of evil with the government of infinite wisdom and goodness. If it be granted, the doctrine of endless misery must be aban doned at once, and the mind must ultimately Deity is to bring all his intelligent offSPRING to a state of pURITY AND HAPPINESS. This doctrine reconciles every difficulty, and throws a glorious and cheering light on all the dispensations of the Deity. If it be true, every thing was planned by benevolence, every thing is guided by benevolence, every thing will terminate in benevolence, in eternal and ever-increasing felicity to all. This doctrine, which represents the character of the Universal Parent in the most glorious and affecting light, and is benevolent in its tendency beyond any other opinion whatever, has been opposed with much violence by some of the best of men, and the worst have as loudly exclaimed against it. The prejudices of the good and the bad, of the pious and the profane, equally oppose it; yet there is no other truth which seems to be supported by so many different appearances, or by evidence derived from so many different sources. And, since it throws so much light on the character and dispensations of the Deity, and is replete with such solid consolation, it may be useful to examine it somewhat at length-first considering some of the arguments which appear to favour it, and next the objections which are usually brought to oppose it. Because this doctrine maintains that mankind will finally be restored from sin, and from the present and future misery which is its consequence, to a state of purity and happiness, and that this will ultimately be the case with respect to every individual of the human race, it is sometimes termed the doctrine of UNIVERSAL RESTORATION, which phrase, merely for the sake of brevity, we may hereafter frequently employ. From the whole of what has been said, then, it appears that we may, without presumption, with the full concurrence of reason, and on the clear warrant of scripture, affirm, that, when the Deity placed man in such circumstances as he foresaw would be attended with the production and indulgence of evil passions, he at the same time perceived, that under his direction these passions would produce, to mankind collectively, and to every individual particularly, a greater sum of happiness than could have existed without them. That the evil which results from the indulgence of the bad passions of mankind may be made the means of eradicating them, and of training the mind Some dispute, however, has arisen respect- " to purity and benevolence, we have, as hasing the nature of the evidence which alone been fully shown, unquestionable proof in the can establish this doctrine. It will be vain daily events of life. This, then, which we to proceed, therefore, before the principles are see to be their effect, with regard to some in- settled, upon which it will be proper to condividuals at present, it is contended, will be duct the investigation. The nature of the their ultimate effect with respect to all man- evidence, which will be deemed legitimate kind—that this is the final cause of their ex- and satisfactory, must be determined before it istence, and THAT THE GREAT DESIGN OF THE will avail to adduce any. 167 PART SECOND. INTRODUCTION. OF THE KIND OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF THE ULTIMATE PURITY AND HAPPINESS OF ALL MANKIND. SOME persons maintain that the only evi-ance of man's reason, but because, if a docdence which can establish the doctrine of trine be contrary to reason, we know that it is Universal Restoration is the direct testimony not the word of God. It betrays an ignorance of scripture. They seem to think that every of the nature of both, to pay no regard to a proof, however solid in itself, if it cannot be clear deduction of reason because it is not adduced in the very words, or at least if it be revelation, or to maintain that what is contranot borne out by the express testimony of ry to reason is revealed in scripture; for truth revelation, is insufficient. cannot be inconsistent with reason, nor can scripture and truth clash. Others contend, that there is nothing in this doctrine which can prevent the application of such principles or modes of reasoning to it, as are universally deemed just and satisfactory when applied to other subjects—that, if there be any doctrine of religion, of which we can obtain a well-founded assurance, by considerations which do not derive their force from the express declarations of scripture, or which are altogether independent of it, there can be no reason why the doctrine of Universal Restoration may not be one of these, and that, if this opinion can be established upon a just and solid principle, it is sufficient, whether that principle be derived from revelation, or from any other source. If the first of these classes will be content to say, 'No evidence will be sufficient to establish this opinion, unless it harmonize with scripture,' there will remain no difference whatever between them; and surely it is absurd to endeavour to establish a distinction where there ought to be the greatest union. Every principle, from whatever source it be derived, if it be just, must harmonize with scripture, and all scripture, if it be genuine, and rightly understood, must harmonize with every just principle. Evidence founded upon a just principle is satisfactory, from whatever source it be derived; the only question which can affect the solidity of the conviction it produces, is whether it be just, not whether it have this or that origin. One single solid argument in favour of the doctrine of Universal Restoration, deduced from the perfections of God, for example, is sufficient to establish its truth. One single solid argument deduced from scripture is likewise sufficient; but, if a solid argument can be derived from both, the conviction produced will be more complete. In a word, if this doctrine be true, it can be established both by reason and by revelation; if it be false, it can be refuted by both. It is for this reason, that the evidence of both will be adduced in the following pages. The testimony of reason adds an unspeakable value to the declarations of scripture-not because established scripture wants the assist In adducing the evidence in favour of the doctrine of the ultimate restoration of all mankind to purity and happiness, it may be proper to begin with the statement of that which is derived from considerations which have no direct reference to the positive declarations of scripture-then to examine the objections which are urged against it, whether derived from scripture or from other sources, and, in the last place, to state those express declarations of scripture which appear to establish it. If it can be shown, that all the perfections of the Deity, that the nature of man, and the nature and design of punishment, are completely in favour of this doctrine, that the objections which have been urged against it, whether derived from reason or revelation, may be satisfactorily removed, that the arguments which have been supposed to establish contrary opinions are not conclusive, and that the scriptures contain some passages which can have no meaning unless this doctrine be supposed, others which cannot be true unless it be admitted, and others which seem directly and positively to favour it this would seem sufficient to convince a candid inquirer of its truth; because, in this case, the evidence in its favour will not only be direct and positive, but will be founded also on the most firm and solid principles, and there will be no evidence against it. It will be the object of the following pages to establish, in order, each of the above positions. It may be proper, however, to observe, that arguments may in reality be derived from scripture, which do not at first sight appear to be so. Revelation has poured so much light upon the mind, and has led us into such a just way of reasoning, concerning God, concerning his design in creation, and his government of the world, that our conceptions and arguments, even when they do not appear at all to depend upon this heavenly guide, attain a degree of sublimity and truth, to which they would never have arrived without it; and we often appear to be following the deductions of our own understanding, when in reality we are only repeating in other words, and with other asso things, we conclude that such a Being exists, things and beings, he must be independent of them. Because he who could create such world as this, must be able to do any thing which is not in itself a contradiction, we infer that his power is without limits. Because the exhibitions of wisdom, in every part of nature with which we are acquainted, surpass all assignable limits, and because we cannot but conceive, that the intelligence which is displayed in the constitution of the world is adequate to the performance of any thing which is in its own nature possible, we conclude also, that his wisdom is infinite. From these principles, his goodness follows as a necessary consequence. ciations, the declarations of scripture. Why, without any direct or apparent dependence and that, since he is the cause of all other upon revelation, are we now able to form such pure and exalted conceptions of the Supreme Being, as were totally unknown to the great sages of antiquity? It is because revelation has furnished us with the light which has conducted us to these noble and just conclusions. Of our views of the perfections of the Deity, of his dispensations to his creatures, of his works and of his ways-in a word, of all the principles upon which the subsequent reasoning is founded, this observation is peculiarly true. Although, therefore, the arguments contained in the second part of this work may not appear, at first sight, to be founded upon the scriptures, it is not just to conclude that they have a different origin; for, in so far as they are true, they must be, either directly or indirectly, derived from it, since there is no reason to believe that they could have been formed by any mind which had not been illumined by this divine light. The evidence in favour of the doctrine of Universal Restoration, distinct from that afforded by the express declarations of scripture, may be arranged under three heads, namely: that which is deducible from the perfections of God, from the nature of man, and from the nature and design of punishment. It is proper to say, that the arguments adduced under each of these particulars are distinct from those afforded by the express declarations of scripture; because, how much soever they may really depend upon the light of revelation, (and for the reason already assigned they may depend upon it in a very great degree,) yet they are framed without any direct reference to it, and seem in general to be derived from the nature of things. Reasoning of this kind is peculiarly satisfactory; and, if the positive declarations of scripture can be shown to coincide with it, to include it, and to be founded upon it, it must produce a conviction as strong as can be effected by any thing which is not an object of sense, or which cannot be proved upon the principles of geometry. CHAPTER I. OF THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF THE DOCTRINE SECTION I. Of the Goodness of God. WERE it assumed, that he who gave us existence, and bestowed upon us all things richly to enjoy, is a Being of infinite goodness, it would be only taking for granted what all Christians, and even all theists, allow. It may be proper, however, to state briefly the evidence of the perfect benignity of the Universal Parent. Because the phenomena of nature cannot be accounted for without the supposition of a self-existent Being, the original cause of all For the Original Cause of all things, being absolutely independent, being infinite in power and wisdom, must be good, since evil is the result of want, weakness, or error. But he who is infinite in power can have no want; neither can he have any weakness; and he who created all things, and gave them the relations they possess, cannot but know them perfectly, and therefore must be incapable of error. That evil can arise from no other sources than those which have been mentioned, will appear evident from considering the origin of any form of it with which we are acquainted. Whence, for example, arise envy, malice, hatred, injustice? Envy is the malicious coveting of a good possessed by another; something is desired which cannot be attained. He, then, who has it in his power to obtain all good, must be incapable of envy. Injustice is the withholding of a good, real or supposed, from another whose right it is; he who has it in his power to obtain all good, must therefore be incapable of injustice. And the same may be said of every description of moral evil whatever. If an intelligent being perceive perfectly the true relation of all things to each other, so as to be incapable of mistake, and if at the same time he have the whole of possibility in his power, he must, in the nature of things, be incapable of evil; because he cannot commit evil through ignorance, and there can be nothing to induce him to act with an evil design. This, then, is exactly the idea which we form of the Supreme Intelligence. If this deduction of the goodness of God, from the other essential attributes of his nature, be just, it will be confirmed by the appearances of his works. What he has done will satisfy us that we are right in our conception of what he is. In endeavouring to ascertain from his works, whether or not the Deity be benevolent, we must conduct our investigation in the same manner as when we endeavour to discover his other perfections; because, in the objects around us, we perceive so many marks of design, such various and exquisite contrivance, we conclude that their Author is intelligent. In like manner, if it appear that this design is a good design, that this contrivance ministers |