not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legislature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void. But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a *constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative [* 136] acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered.2 The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative sessions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences, also Prescott v. Trustees, &c., 19 Ill. v. Perkins, 94 U. S. Rep. 260. The presumption always is, when the act, as signed and enrolled, does not show the contrary, that it has gone through all necessary formalities; but this presumption may be overthrown by the journals. Berry v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Md. 446; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 69; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. And see Opinions of Justices, 52 N. H. 622; Hensoldt v. Petersburg, 63 Ill. 157; Larrison v. Peoria, &c. R. R. Co., 77 Ill. 12; People v. Commissioners of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276; English v. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317; State v. Swift, 10 Nev. 176. In a few States the ruling is contra. See Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560; Louisiana Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 743; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 602; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. It has been held that where the constitution requires previous notice of an application for a private act, the courts cannot go behind the act to inquire whether the notice was given. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244. See People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; Day v. Stetson, 8 Me. 365. 1 See cases cited in preceding note; 324. 2 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181. But where a statute can only be enacted by a certain majority, e. g. two-thirds, it must affirmatively appear by the printed statute or the act on file that such a vote was had. People v. Commissioners of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276. It seems that, in Illinois, if one claims that a supposed law was never passed, and relies upon the records to show it, he must prove them. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Grob v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119; Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91. The court will not act upon the admission of parties that an act was not passed in the constitutional manner. Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166. The Constitution of Alabama, art. 4, § 27, requires the presiding officer of each house, in the presence of the house, to sign them "after the titles have been publicly read immediately before signing, and the fact of signing shall be entered on the journal." This seems a very imperative require ment. by making void all contracts which have for their object to influence legislation in any other manner than by such open and public presentation of facts, arguments and appeals to reason as are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies. While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract to pay for this service,1 yet to secretly approach the members of such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views, is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be enforced by the law.2 1 See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. 533; Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. 539. 2 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by the town of demands to the amount of nearly $9,000, which the town had voted to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chapman, J.: "It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given of the hear ings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to adverse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And *The Introduction and Passage of Bills. [* 137] Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he belongs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do cases. They are disqualified from acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency and object of these influences are to obtain by corruption what it is supposed cannot be obtained fairly. "It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The principle was fully discussed in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other States it has been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case. 66 In Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264, it was held in Vermont that an agreement, on the part of a corporation, to grant to individuals certain privileges in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to the passage of a legislative act touching the interests of the corporation, is against sound policy, prejudicial to just and correct legislation, and void. In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87, it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an act of Congress. and tends to defraud the United States, is void. A. had agreed to give B. $100, on condition that B. would forbear to propose or offer himself to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain mail route, and it was held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general principle as to contracts contravening public policy was discussed in that case at much length. In Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had employed the plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky legalizing his divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court say: 'A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writing a petition, or even for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof; but the law should not hold him or any other person to a recompense for exercising any personal influence in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly important to just and wise legislation, and therefore to the most essential interests of the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous influence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.' "In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Pennsylvania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of the legislature by using personal influence with the members, or by any sinister means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of our political institutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on the passage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would be a strong incentive to the exercise of personal and sinister influences to effect the object. The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for services performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the house as a body nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan, 289, the court of appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper [*138] at any time when the house is in session, unless the constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid. limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof: Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly presenting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court, very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and receive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.' "In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the wellestablished right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as attorney and counsel, but remarks that the fact appearing that persons do so act prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations are weighed and considered accordingly.' He also admits the right of disinterested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a particular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another person; but a promise to pay for such service is void. "Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract.' See, further, a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 16 How. 314. A sale of a town office, though by the town itself, cannot be the consideration for a contract. Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H. 517; see Carleton v. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394. A town cannot incur expenses in opposing before a legislative committee a division of the territorial limits: Westbrook v. Deering, 63 Me. 231; or to pay the expenses of a committee to procure the annexation of the town to another: Minot v. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1; s. c. The Constitution of Michigan* provides that no new bill [* 139] shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired;1 and the Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put immediately upon their passage.3 17 Am. Rep. 52. And any contract constitutionally be done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the constitutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may construct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed; but the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved! This trick is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and the evidence at the same time is so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter of surprise to find it so often resorted to. |
