tribunes of the people excepted. M. Minucius was appointed his general of horse. We are now in the second year of the war. Hannibal's Conduct with respect to Fabius. Hannibal, after the battle of Thrasymenus, not thinking it yet proper to march directly to Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste the country. He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days' march, arrived in the territory of Adria. He got a very considerable booty in this march. Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that all who were able to bear arms, should be put to the sword; and meeting no obstacle any where, he advanced as far as Apulia; plundering the countries which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order to compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the Romans; and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited, yielded him the victory. Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution not to let him take the least advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred every place; nor hazard a battle till he should be sure of success. As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the very intrenchments of their camp. But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming, in appearance, the cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having at last lost that valour so natural to their ancestors; but fretted inwardly, to find he had to do with a general of so different a disposition from Sempronius and Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed by their defeat, had at last made choice of a commander capable of opposing Hannibal. From this moment he perceived, that the dictator would not be formidable to him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of his conduct, which might perplex and embarrass him very much. The only circumstance he now wanted to know, was, whether the new general had firmness enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down. He endeavoured, therefore, to shake his resolution by the different movements which he made, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities, and burning the villages and towns. He, at one time, would raise his camp with the utmost precipitation; and, at another, stop short in some valley out of the common route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the plain. However, Fabius still kept his troops on the hills, but without d Polyb. 1. iii. P: 239-255. Liv. 1. xxii. n. 9-30. e A small town, which gave its name to the Adriatic sea. losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching near enough to come to an engagement; nor yet keeping at such a distance, as might give him an opportunity of escaping him. He never suffered his soldiers to stir out of the camp, except to forage, nor even on those occasions without a numerous convoy. If ever he engaged, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously, that his troops had always the advantage. By this conduct he revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the soldiers, which the loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled them to rely, as they had formerly done, on their valour and good fortune. Hannibal, having got an immense booty in Campania, where he had resided a considerable time, left that country, in order that he might not consume the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter season. Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye than useful for the subsistence of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take up his winter-quarters among marshes, rocks, and sands; while the Romans would have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of Italy. He therefore resolved to settle elsewhere. Fabius naturally supposed, that Hannibal would be obliged to return the same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, and thereby securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which separated the territories of Falernum from those of Capua: he afterwards detached 4000 men to seize the only pass through which Hannibal could come out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself with the remainder of the army on the hills adjoining to the road. The Carthaginians arrive, and encamp in the plain at the foot of the mountains. And now the crafty Carthaginian falls into the snare he had laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymenus; and it seemed impossible for him to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there being but one outlet, of which the Romans were possessed. Fabius, fancying himself sure of his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He flattered himself, and not without the appearance of probability, with the hopes of putting an end to the war by a single battle. Nevertheless, he thought fit to defer the attack till the next day. Hannibal perceived that his own artifices were now employed against him." It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of unusual presence of mind and fortitude, to view danger in its utmost extent, without being dismayed; and to find out sure and instant expedients without deliberating. Immediately, the Carthaginian general caused 2000 oxen to be f Nec Annibalem fefellit se artibus peti. Liv. got together, and ordered small bundles of vine-branches to be tied to their horns. Towards the dead of night, having commanded the branches to be set on fire, he caused the oxen to be driven with violence to the top of the hills where the Romans were encamped. As soon as these creatures felt the flame, the pain rendered them furious, they flew up and down on all sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes they met in their way. This squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a good number of light-armed soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the summit of the mountain, and to charge the enemy, in case they should meet them. All things happened as Hannibal had foreseen. The Romans who guarded the defile, seeing the fires spread over the hills which were above them, and imagining that it was Hannibal making his escape by torch-light, quit their post, and run up to the mountains to oppose his passage. The main body of the army not knowing what to think of all this tumult, and Fabius himself not daring to stir, while it was dark, for fear of a surprise, wait for the return of the day. Hannibal seizes this opportunity, marches his troops and the spoils through the defile, which was now unguarded, and rescues his army out of a snare in which, had Fabius been but a little more vigorous, it would either have been destroyed, or at least very much weakened. It is glorious for a man to turn his very errors to his advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation. The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and harassed by the Romans. The dictator, being obliged to take a journey to Rome on account of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of horse, before his departure, not to fight during his absence. However, Minucius did not regard either his advice or his entreaties; but the very first opportunity he had, whilst part of Hannibal's troops were foraging, he charged the rest, and gained some advantage. He immediately sent advice of this to Rome, as if he had obtained a considerable victory. The news of this, with what had just before happened at the passage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circumspection of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard of before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this: for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what was contriving against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so. This soon became manifest. 8 Satis fidens haudquaquam cum imperii jure artem imperandi æquatam. Liv. 1. xxii. n. 26. Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share. Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers : Let us hasten to the assistance of Minucius: let us fly and snatch the victory from the enemy, and extort from our fellowcitizens a confession of their fault. This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, That the cloud which had been long hovering on the summit of the mountains, had at last burst with a loud crack, and caused a mighty storm. So important and seasonable a service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and showed that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than not to have committed it. The State of Affairs in Spain. In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quantity of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to be particularly attentive to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country. Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to P. Scipio, who after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances; but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much farther up into the country. The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Han h Polyb. 1. iii. p. 245-250. Liv. l. xxii. n. 19–22. nibal had left there the children of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity. A. M. 3789. A. Rom. 533. The Battle of Canna. The next spring, C. Terentius Varro and L. Emilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of 5000 men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about 4000 foot, and 300 horse. They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of 5000 of the one, and 400 of the other. As for the troops of the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act separately; and it was very seldom that all these forces were used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought fit, that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, by reason of his great age. Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated so long as men such as Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near 1700 were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul's rashness, and prompt him on to a battle, which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The i Polyb. 1. iii. p. 255–268. Liv. l. xxii. n. 34–54. Polybius supposes only 200 horse in each legion: but J. Lipsius thinks this is a mistake either of the author or transcriber. |