decided supremely, and there lay no appeal from it. When there was a division, and the senate could not be brought to an agreement, the affair was then laid before the people, on whom the power of deciding thereby devolved. The reader will easily perceive the great wisdom of this regulation; and how happily it was adapted to crush factions, to produce harmony, and to enforce and corroborate good counsels: such an assembly being extremely jealous of its authority, and not easily prevailed upon to let it pass into other hands. Of this we have a memorable instance in Polybius:1-When, after the loss of the battle fought in Africa, at the end of the second Punic war, the conditions of peace offered by the victor were read in the senate; Hannibal, observing that one of the senators opposed them, represented, in the strongest terms, that as the safety of the republic lay at stake, it was of the utmost importance for the senators to be unanimous in their resolutions, to prevent such a debate from coming before the people; and he carried his point. This, doubtless, laid the foundation, in the infancy of the republic, of the senate's power, and raised its authority to so great a height. And the same author observes,m in another place, that whilst the senate had the administration of affairs, the state was governed with great wisdom, and was successful in all its enterprises. The People. It appears from every thing related hitherto, that even so low as Aristotle's time, who gives so beautiful a picture, and bestows so noble a eulogium on the government of Carthage, the people, spontaneously, left the care of public affairs, and the chief administration of them, to the senate: and this it was which made the republic so powerful. But things changed afterwards. For the people, grown insolent by their wealth and conquests, and forgetting that they owed these blessings to the prudent conduct of the senate, were desirous of having a share in the government, and arrogated to themselves almost the whole power. From that period, the public affairs were transacted wholly by cabals and factions: and this Polybius assigns as one of the chief causes of the ruin of Carthage. The Tribunal of the Hundred. This was a body composed of a hundred and four persons; though often, for brevity's sake, they are called only the Hundred. These, according to Aristotle, were the same in Carthage, as the Ephori in Sparta; whence it appears, that they were instituted to balance the power of the nobles and senate; but with this difference, that the Ephori were but five I L. xv. n. 706, 707. Polyb. 1. vi. p. 494. m A. M. 3609. in number, and continued in office but a year; whereas these. were perpetual, and were upwards of a hundred. It is believed, that these Centumviri are the same with the hundred judges mentioned by Justin," who A. Carth. 487. were taken out of the senate, and appointed to inquire into the conduct of their generals. The exorbitant power of Mago's family, which, by its engrossing the chief employments both of the state and the army, had thereby the sole direction and management of all affairs, gave occasion to this establishment. It was intended as a curb to the authority of their generals, which, whilst the armies were in the field, was almost boundless and absolute; but, by this institution, it became subject to the laws, by the obligation their generals were under, of giving an account of their actions before these judges on their return from the campaign: Ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi judicia legesque respicerent.o Of these hundred and four judges, five had a particular jurisdiction superior to that of the rest; but it is not known. how long their authority lasted. This council of five was like the council of ten in the Venetian senate. A vacancy in their number could be filled by none but themselves. They also had the power of choosing those who composed the council of the hundred. Their authority was very great, and for that reason none were elected into this office but persons of uncommon merit; and it was not judged proper to annex any salary or reward to it; the single motive of the public good being thought a tie sufficient to engage honest men to a conscientious and faithful discharge of their duty. Polybius,P in his account of the taking of New Carthage by Scipio, distinguishes clearly two orders of magistrates established in Old Carthage: for he says, that among the prisoners taken at New Carthage, were two magistrates belonging to the body or assembly of old men [Ex Tys Tepovoias]: so he calls the council of the hundred; and fifteen of the senate [ėk tŷjs Zvykλýτov]. Livy mentions only the fifteen of the senators; but, in another place, he names the old men; and tells us, that they formed the most venerable council of the government, and had great authority in the senate. Carthaginenses-Oratores ad pacem petendam r n L. xix. c. ii. o Justin. 1. xix. M. Rollin might have taken notice of some civil officers who were estaplished at Carthage, with a power like that of the censors of Rome, to inspect the manners of the citizens. The chief of these officers took from Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, a beautiful youth, named Asdrubal, on a report that Hamilcar was more familiar with this youth than was consistent with modesty. Erat præterea cum eo [Amilcare] adolescens illustris et formosus Hasdrubal, quem nonnulli diligi turpius quam par erat, ab Amilcare, loquebantur. Quo factum est ut a præfecto morum Hasdrubal cum eo vetaretur esse. Nep. in Vitâ Amilcaris. Corn mittunt triginta seniorum principes. Id erat sanctius apud illos conscilium, maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis. Establishments, though constituted with the greatest wisdom and the justest harmony of parts, degenerate, however insensibly, into disorder and the most destructive licentiousness. These judges, who by the lawful execution of their power were a terror to transgressors, and the great pillars of justice, abusing their almost unlimited authority, became so many petty tyrants. We shall see this verified in the history of the great Hannibal, who, during his prætorship, after his return to Africa, employed all his influence to reform so horrid an abuse; and made the authority of these judges, which before was perpetual, only annual, about two hundred years from the first founding the tribunal of the One Hundred. A. M. 3082. A. Carth. 682. Defects in the Government of Carthage. Aristotle, among other reflections made by him on the government of Carthage, remarks two great defects in it, both which, in his opinion, are repugnant to the views of a wise lawgiver and the maxims of sound policy. The first of these defects was, the investing the same person with different employments, which was considered at Carthage as a proof of uncommon merit. But Aristotle thinks this practice highly prejudicial to the public welfare. For, says this author, a man possessed but of one employment, is much more capable of acquitting himself well in the execution of it; because affairs are then examined with greater care, and sooner despatched. We never see, continues our author, either by sea or land, the same officer commanding two different bodies, or the same pilot steering two ships. Besides, the welfare of the state requires that places and preferments should be divided, in order to excite an emulation among men of merit : whereas the bestowing of them on one man, too often dazzles him by so distinguishing a preference; and always fills others with jealousy, discontent, and murmurs. The second defect taken notice of by Aristotle in the government of Carthage, was, that in order for a man to attain the first posts, a certain income was required (besides merit and noble birth). By which means, poverty might exclude persons of the most exalted merit, which he considers as a great evil in a government. For then, says he, as virtue is wholly disregarded, and money is all-powerful, because all things are attained by it; the admiration and desire of riches seize and corrupt the whole community. Add to this, that when magistrates and judges are obliged to pay large sums for their employments, they seem to have a right to reimburse themselves. There is not, I believe, one instance in all antiquity, to show that employments, either in the state or the courts of justice, were sold. The expense, therefore, which Aristotle talks of here to raise men to preferments in Carthage, must doubtless be understood of the presents that were given in order to procure the votes of the electors; a practice, as Polybius observes, very common at Carthage, where no kind of gain was judged a disgrace. It is therefore no wonder, that Aristotle should condemn a practice whose consequences, it is very plain, may prove fatal to a government. But in case he pretended that the chief employments of a state ought to be equally accessible to the rich and the poor, as he seems to insinuate; his opinion is refuted by the general practice of the wisest republics: for these, without any way demeaning or aspersing poverty, have thought that, on this occasion, the preference ought to be given to riches; because it is to be presumed, that the wealthy have received a better education, have nobler sentiments, are more out of the reach of corruption, and less liable to commit base actions; and that even the state of their affairs makes them more affectionate to the government, more disposed to maintain peace and order in it, and more interested in suppressing whatever may tend to sedition and rebellion. Aristotle, in concluding his reflections on the republic of Carthage, is much pleased with a custom that prevailed there; viz. of sending from time to time colonies into different countries; and in this manner procuring its citizens commodious settlements. This provided for the necessities of the poor, who, equally with the rich, are members of the state and it disburdened Carthage of multitudes of lazy, indolent people, who were its disgrace, and often proved dangerous to it: it prevented commotions and insurrections, by thus removing such persons as commonly occasion them; and who, being ever discontented under their present circumstances, are always ready for innovations and tumults. SECT. IV. TRADE OF CARTHAGE, THE FIRST SOURCE OF ITS WEALTH AND POWER. Commerce, strictly speaking, was the occupation of Carthage, the particular object of its industry, and its peculiar and predominant characteristic. It formed the greatest strength and the chief support of that commonwealth. In a • Παρὰ Καρχηδονίοις οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν τῶν ἀνηκόντων πρὸς κέρδος.-Polyb. 1. vi. p. 497. word, we may affirm, that the power, the conquests, the credit, and glory, of the Carthaginians, all flowed from their commerce. Situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, and stretching out their arms eastward and westward, the extent of their commerce took in all the known world, and wafted it to the coast of Spain, of Mauritania, of Gaul, and beyond the straits and pillars of Hercules. They sailed to all countries, in order to buy at a cheap rate the superfluities of every nation; which, by the wants of others, became necessaries; and these they sold to them at the dearest rates. From Egypt the Carthaginians fetched fine flax, paper, corn, sails, and cables for ships; from the coast of the Red Sea, spices, frankincense, perfumes, gold, pearls, and precious stones; from Tyre and Phoenicia, purple and scarlet, rich stuffs, tapestry, costly furniture, and divers curious and exquisite works of art: in a word, they fetched from various countries, all things that can supply the necessities, or are capable of contributing to the convenience, the luxury, and the delights of life. They brought back from the western parts of the world, in return for the articles carried thither, iron, tin, lead, and copper: by the sale of these various commodities, they enriched themselves at the expense of all nations; and put them under a kind of contribution, which was so much the surer as it was spontaneous. In thus becoming the factors and agents of all nations, they had made themselves lords of the sea; the band which held the east, the west, and south together; and the necessary channel of their communication: so that Carthage rose to be the common city, and the centre of the trade, of all those nations which the sea separated from one another. The most considerable personages of the city were not ashamed of engaging in trade. They applied themselves to it as industriously as the meanest citizens; and their great wealth did not make them less in love with the diligence, patience, and labour, which are necessary to augment it. To this they owed their empire of the sea; the splendour of their republic; their being able to dispute for the superiority with Rome itself; and their exalted pitch of power, which forced the Romans to carry on a bloody and doubtful war, for upwards of forty years, in order to humble and subdue this haughty rival. In short, Rome, even when triumphant, thought Carthage was not to be entirely reduced any other way, than by depriving that city of the resources which it might still derive from its commerce, by which it had so long been enabled to resist the whole strength of that mighty republic. However, it is no wonder that, as Carthage came in a manner out of the greatest school of traffic in the world, I mean |