Dem. I am excited to laughter, when I fee fo much impertinence and folly.

Her. And yet, after all, they who are the objects of thy ridicule, include not only mankind in general, but the perfons with whom thou liveft, thy friends, thy family, nay, even thyfelf.

Dem. 1 care very little for all the filly perfons I meet with: and think I am juftifiable in diverting myfelf with their folly.

Her. If they are weak and foolish, it marks neither wifdom nor humanity, to infult rather than pity them: But is it certain, that thou art not as extravagant as they are?

Dem. I prefume that I am not fince, in every point, my fentiments are the very reverfe of theirs.

Her. There are follies of different kinds. By constantly amufing thyfelf with the errors and mifconduct of others, thou mayeft render thyfelf equally ridiculous and culpable.

Dem. Thou art at liberty to indulge fuch fentiments; and to weep over me too, if thou haft any tears to spare. For my part, I cannot refrain from pleafing myfelf with the levities and ill conduct of the world about me. Are not all men foolish or irregular in their lives?

:

Her. Alas! there is but too much reafon to believe, they are fo and on this ground, I pity and deplore their condition. We agree in this point, that men do not conduct themselves according to reafonable and juft principles : but I, who do not fuffer myfelf to act as they do, mult yet regard the dictates of my understanding and feelings, which compel me to love them; and that love fills me with compaffion for their mistakes and irregularities. Can't thou condemn me for pitying my own fpecies, my brethren, perfons born in the fame condition of life, and deftined to the fame hopes and privileges? If thou fhouldeft enter a hofpital, where fick and wounded perfons refide, would their wounds and diftreffes excite thy mirth? And yet, the evils of the body bear no comparison with thofe of the mind. Thou wouldst certainly blufh at thy barbarity, if thou hadft been fo unfeeling, as to laugh at or defpife a miserable being who had loft one of his legs and yet thou art fo deftitute of humanity, as to ridicule thofe, who appear t be deprived of the noble powers of the understanding, the little regard which they pay to its dictates.

:

Dem. He who haft lost a leg is to be pitied, ber lofs is not be imputed to himself: but he who

dictates of reafon and confcience, voluntarily deprives himfelf of their aid. The lofs originates in his own folly.

Her. Ah! fo much the more is he to be pitied! A furious maniac, who fhould pluck out his own eyes, would deferve more compaffion than an ordinary blind man. Dem. Come, let us accommodate the bufinefs. There is fomething to be faid on each fide of the queftion. There is every where reafon for laughing, and reafon for weeping. The world is ridiculous, and I laugh at it; it is deplorable, and thou lamenteft over it. Every perfon views it in his own way, and according to his own temper. One point is unquestionable, that mankind are prepofterous; to think right, and to act well, we muft think and act differently from them To fubmit to the authority, and follow the example of the greater part of men, would render us foolifh and miferable.

Her. All this is, indeed, true; but then, thou haft no real love or feeling for thy fpecies. The calamities of mankind excite thy mirth: and this proves that thou haft no regard for men, nor any true refpect for the virtues which they have unhappily abandoned.

FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray

SECTION II.

DIONYSIUS, PYTHIAS, AND DAMON.

Genuine Virtue commands Kefpect, even from the bad. Dionyfius. AMAZING! What do I fee? It is Pythias juft arrived. It is indeed Pythias. I did not think it poffible. He is come to die, and to redeem his friend!

Pythias. Yes, it is Pythias. I left the place of my confinement, with no other views, than to pay to Heaven the vows I had made; to fettle my family concerns according to the rules of juftice; and to bid adieu to my children, that I might die tranquil and fatisfied.

Dio. But why dost thou return? Haft thou no fear of death? Is it not the character of a madman, to feek it thus voluntarily ?

Py. I return to fuffer, though I have not deferved death. Every principle of honour and goodnefs forbids me to allow my friend to die for me.

Dio. Doft thou then love him better than th self?

Py.

No; I love him as myfelf. But I am perfuaded
I ought to fuffer death rather than my friend; fi
Pythias whom thou hadft decreed to die. It werd

juft that Damon fhould fuffer, to deliver me from the death which was defigned not for him, but for me only.

Dio. But thou fuppofeft, that it is as unjuft to inflict death upon thee, as upon thy friend.

Py. Very true; we are both perfectly innocent; and it is equally unjult to make either of us fuffer.

Dio. Why doft thou then affert, that it were injustice to put him to death, instead of thee?

Py. It is unjuft, in the fame degree, to inflict death, either on Damon or on myfelf; but Pythias were highly culpable to let Damon fuffer that death, which the tyrant had prepared for Pythias only.

Dio. Doft thou then return hither, on the day appointed, with no other view, than to fave the life of a friend, by lofing thy own?

I'y I return in regard to thee, to fuffer an act of injuftice which it is common for tyrants to inflict; and, with reipect to Damon, to perform my duty, by rescuing him from the danger he incurred by his generofity to me.

Ds. And now, Damon, let me addrefs myself to thee. Did thou not really fear, that Pythias would never return; and that thou wouldst be put to death on his account?

Da. i was but too well affured, that Pythias would punctually return: and that he would be more folicitous to keep his promise than to preferve his life. Would to Heaven, that his relations and friends had forcibly detained him! He would then have lived for the comfort and benefit of good men; and I fhould have the fatisfaction of dying for him! Dio. What Does life difpleafe thee?

Da. Yes; it difpleafes me when I fee and feel the

er of a tyrant

pow

Dio. It is well! Thou fhalt fee him no more. 1 will order thee to be put to death immediately.

Py. Pardon the feelings of a man who fympathifes with his dying friend. But remember it was Pythias who was devoted by thee to deftruction. I come to fubmit to it, that I may redeem my friend. Do not refufe me this confolation in my last hour.

Dio. I cannot endure men, who defpife death, and fet my power at defiance.

Da. Thou canst not, then, endure virtue.

Dio. No: I cannot endure that proud, difdainful tue, which contemns life; which dreads no punif and which is infenfible to the charms of riches and

Da. Thou feeft, however, that it is a virtue, which is not infenfible to the dictates of honour, juftice, and friendship. Dio. Guards, take Pythias to execution. We fhall fee whether Damon will continue to defpife my authority.

Da. Pythias, by returning to fubmit himfelf to thy pleasure, has merited his life, and deferved thy favour; but I have excited thy indignation, by refigning myself to thy power, in order to fave him: be fatisfied, then, with this facrifice, and put me to death.

Py. Hold, Dionyfius ! remember, it was Pythias alone who offended thee: Damon could not.

Dio. Alas! what do I fee and hear! where am I? How miferable; and how worthy to be fo! I have hitherto known nothing of true virtue. I have fpent my life in darknefs and error. All my power and honours are infufficient to produce love. I cannot hoaft of having acquired a fingle friend, in the courfe of a reign of thirty years. And yet these two perfons in a private condition, love one another tenderly, unrefervedly confide in each other, are mutually happy, and ready to die for each other's prefervation.

Py. How couldst thou, who haft never loved any perfon, expect to have friends? If thou hadft loved and refpected men, thou wouldst have fecured their love and respect. Thou haft feared mankind; and they fear thee: they deteft thee.

Dio. Damon, Pythias, condefcend to admit me as a third friend, in a connection fo perfect. I give you your lives; and I will load you with riches.

Da. We have no defire to be enriched by thee; and, in regard to thy friendship, we cannot accept or enjoy it till thou become good and juft. Without thefe qualities, thou can't be connected with none but trembling flaves, and bafe Aatterers To be loved and efteemed by men of free and generous minds, thou must be virtuous, affectionate, difinterelted, beneficent; and know how to live in a fort of equality with thofe who fhare and deferve thy friendship.. FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray.

SECTION III.

LOCKE AND BAYLE.

Chriftianity defended against the Cavils of Scepticifm.
yle Yes, we both were philofophers; but my phi-
y was the deepest. You dogmatized: I doubted

Locke. Do you make doubting a proof of depth in philofophy? It may be a good beginning of it; but it is a

bad end.

Bay. No: the more profound our refearches are into the nature of things, the more uncertainty we fhall find; and the moft fubtle minds fee objections and difficulties, in every fyftem, which are overlooked or undiscoverable by ordinary understandings.

Locke. It would be better then to be no philofopher, and to continue in the vulgar herd of mankind, that one may have the convenience of thinking that one knows fomething. I find that the eyes which nature has given me, fee many things very clearly, though fome are out of their reach, or difcerned but dimly. What opinion ought I to have of a phyfician, who fhould offer me an eyewater, the use of which would at firft fo fharpen my fight, as to carry it farther than ordinary vifion; but would in the end put them out? Your philofophy is to the eyes of the mind, what I have fuppofed the doctor's noftrum to be to thofe of the body. It actually brought your own excellent underftanding, which was by nature quickfighted, and rendered more fo by art and fubtilty of logic peculiar to yourself; it brought, I fay, your very acute understanding to fee nothing clearly; and enveloped all the great truths of reafon and religion in mifts of doubt.

Bay. I own it did; but your comparifon is not juft. I did not fee well, before I ufed my philofophic eyewater: I only fuppofed I faw well; but I was in an error, with all the rest of mankind. The blindnefs was real, the per ceptions were imaginary. 1 cured myfelf firft of thofe falfe imaginations, and then I laudably endeavoured to cure other men.

Locke. A great cure indeed! and do not you think that in return for the fervice you did them, they ought to erce you a ftatue?

Bay. Yes; it is good for human nature to know its own weakness. When we arrogantly prefume on a ftrength w have not, we are always in great danger of hurting our felves, or at leaft of deferving ridicule and contempt, b vain and idle efforts.

Locke. I agree with you, that human nature should kno its own weaknefs, but it fhould alfo feel its ftrength, try to improve it. This was my employment as a opher. I endeavoured to difcover the real powe