ceded; for it is stated with some ambiguity. "To will and not to will this thing," may be understood concerning either a complete or an incomplete volition and nolition, (to use the words of Thomas Aquinas,)* though in a sense a little different.-(1.) I give the appellation of a complete will to that which is borne to a particular object that is particularly considered, approving or disapproving of that object according to the prescript or direction of the last judgment of the reason that is formed concerning it. (2.) I give the appellation of an incomplete will to that which is borne towards the same object generally considered, approving or disapproving of it according to the prescript or direction not of the last judgment of the reason which is formed concerning it. The former of these, which is indeed complete, may be called simply a volition and a nolition: But the latter, which is incomplete, is otherwise expressed by the words, desire and wishing, and ought to be called velleity rather than will.

Having premised these things, I now say, It cannot be affirmed with truth," that a regenerate man wills more good with a complete will than he actually performs," unless, without any fault of his own, he be hindered by necessity or by some greater force, or "that he actually does more evil than it is his will to do." For he does it not through co-action. A merchant who, for the sake of avoiding shipwreck, throws his heavy bales into the sea, willingly performs that act, having followed this last judgment of his reason, that it is better for his bales of goods to be destroyed, than for himself to perish with them. Thus, with a complete (I do not say, with a full) volition, David willed his adulterous intercourse with Bathsheba. Willingly, and with a complete volition, Peter denied Christ.

But if this be understood concerning an incomplete will, then I grant it may be said, "that the regenerate will to perform more good than they really execute, and to omit more evil than they omit." This, however, is not an exclusive property of the regenerate: For it belongs to all those who are so under the law, that in them the law has discharged all its functions, and (the Holy Spirit employing it for this purpose) in them has produced all those effects which it is possible and usual for the law to produce. Both the regenerate, and those who are under the law, might indeed will, that there was not in them such a vast force and efficacy of sin yet existing and reigning in them; and might wish, that they were not solicited and impelled to evil deeds through concupiscence

* See page 537.

and the temptation of sin; nay, they might also will that they did not lust or indulge in concupiscence: But those evil acts to which they are solicited by sin which either is in them, or dwells in them and reigns, they do not perform, except through the intervention of the consent of the will that has been obtained by this temptation of sin. For lust does not bring forth sin, unless it has conceived; but it conceives through the consent of the will tanquam ex marito. But as long as the will remains in a state of suspense, inclining to neither part, so long no act is produced: As we behold in a just balance, or true scales; of which neither part verges upward or downward prior to one of them receiving an accession of weight, which depresses that scale and elevates the opposite one. All motion reclines or depends on rest as on a foundation. Thus, the will does not move towards the part of sin unless when acquiescing in its temptation.

5. THESE remarks are exceedingly plain, and capable of being fully confirmed by experience itself, if any one will only accurately ponder within himself all the motions of his own will. But the greatest part of us avoid this duty; for it cannot be laid aside without [inducing] sorrow and sickness of mind, which no man willingly brings upon himself. But it is by no means probable, that sin should obtain a full consent from the will of that man who is generally well instructed in the righteousness and unrighteousness of actions, before he has ceased to feel any sorrow or regret: Wherefore, the difference between a regenerate and an unregenerate man must not be placed in this particular, when both of them commit sin. For, in that particular deed, they equally yield to the temptation of sin, both of them sin from the same principle of depraved nature, and in both instances the resistance is one and the same when sin is perpetrated, that is, on the part of the mind and conscience convicted of the justice or the injustice of the deed .For if the Spirit were itself that resistance, then sin would not be perpetrated in the very act.

"Is there then no difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate, when they commit sin?" That I may not deny this, I say that such difference must be brought forward from plain passages in the Holy Scriptures; otherwise, that man will deceive himself to his great peril, who follows some other rule of judging.

THE CONCLUSION.

AN Examination and Comparison of each of the three Interpretations of this Chapter-1. The FIRST, which is the latest of the two Opinions embraced by St. Augustine, and which interprets this Chapter concerning a Man under Grace, has various disadvantages: (1.) In the Meaning of the Word CARNAL, and that of the phrase," Sold under Sin." (2.) In the Explanation of the Evil which, the Apostle says, he did; and of the Good which he omitted. (3.) In the Explanation of the word TO DO or TO PERFORM. (4.) In the Interpretation of " Indwelling Sin." (5.) In the Explanation of "the Law of the Mind." (6.) In Explaining the Captivity of Man under the Law of Sin. (7.) In the distorted Meaning given to the votive Exclamation. (8.) In assigning to a regenerate Man a double Servitude, and in interpreting "the Mind" for "the Spirit." These Eight Inconveniences are sufficient to induce a Rejection of this FIRST INTERPRETATION.-2. The SECOND, which is that of modern Divines, and which also explains the Chapter concerning a Man under Grace, in Addition to the Inconveniences that it has in common with the FIRST, has likewise some which are peculiar to itself. (1.) In saying, What permanently belongs to the continuous State of this Man, sometimes only happens to him. (2.) In giving a rash Explication of "performing that which is good." (3.) In asserting, that the Regenerate commit sin unwillingly. (4.) In predicating contradictory Things concerning this Man. (5.) In predicating with Restriction those Things concerning the Regenerate, which the Scriptures simply attribute to them.-3. The THIRD, which is St. Augustine's First Opinion, as well as that of Arminius, and which understands this Chapter as relating to a Man who is under the Law, is plain and perspicuous, and not at Disagreement either with Apostolical Phraseology or with other passages of Scripture: This Fact is rendered obvious even from this Circumstance, that this Man is said at once to be " placed under the Law" and " under the Dominion of Sin."-4. This Treatise is closed with an Address, by Arminius, to his Brethren in the Ministry ; in which the Author offers himself for Examination, with a most serious Entrealy for them to admonish him, in a fraternal Manner, if he has erred; but to yield their Assent to the Truth, if he has in this Work written such Things as are in Accordance with the Scriptures and with the Meaning of the Apostle.

LET us now briefly compare together these three expositions of Romans vii: FIRST, That which St. Augustine gave not long before his death: SECONDLY, That which he taught in early life, which is likewise my interpretation, and that of many Doctors of the Primitive Church, as I have already proved, and that of some even among our own divines: And, LASTLY, the exposition of

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those persons who assent to St. Augustine in this particular,that in common with him they explain it as relating to a regenerate man; but who dissent from him on another particular,—that they interpret Good and EVIL, not as relating to the act of CONCUPISCENCE, but as referring to ACTUAL GOOD AND EVIL.

1. THAT St. Augustine might be able to interpret this chapter as relating to a regenerate man and one placed under grace, (which he supposed would be serviceable to him in his disputes with the Pelagians,) he was compelled to put a forced construction on the apostolical phraseology, and to interpret many things in opposition to the express meaning and intention of the apostle.

(1.) He has interpreted a carnal man to mean one who yet bears about with him mortal flesh, who is not yet become spiritual in the flesh, and who still has and feels within himself the lusts of the flesh. But about the first of these two descriptions of men the apostle is not here treating: It is therefore quite beyond the purpose; and I beseech St. Augustine to point out to me a single passage of Scripture, in which the regenerate are called carnal because they still have within them the lusts of the flesh. If they are called spiritual, in the Scriptures, "because by the Spirit they mortify the deeds of the flesh" and do not go after carnal lusts, but walk according to the Spirit, then indeed they cannot be called carnal from the fact of their still having those lusts. They may be called "those who are not perfectly spiritual" on account of the presence of sinful lusts; but they can by no means be styled carnal, because the dominion of sin is taken away from them.

In a similar manner he was under the necessity of distorting another attribute of this man, sold under sin, when this phrase properly signifies "one who is the slave of sin, and who serves sin," whether he does this willingly without any resistance of conscience, or in opposition to his mind and so far unwillingly. It is not allowed to us to frame petty distinctions, and, according to these, to attribute to persons certain words, which the Scriptures do not employ, in that sense, and which are not usually ascribed to those persons in Holy Writ.

(2.) Then he interprets the evil which the apostle says he did, by the word to lust or to indulge in concupiscence; and the good which he says he omitted, by the word not to lust. A most absurd and distorted application of those terms!

FIRST. Because the words, Κατεργαζεσθαι, Πρασσειν and Ποιειν,* "to do," cannot have the same signification as concupisco,

66 to

* These three Greek words occur together in the very outset of this discussion, Rom. vii, 15; and our translators have rendered them all by the English verb, “to do.”

lust." At least, so far as I know, the Scriptures have in no passage explained "to lust" by any of those three words. And St. Augustine himself, in the definition of sin, when distinguishing between these things, says, "Sin is every thing which is spoken, done, and lusted or desired against the law of God."

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BUCER, in his "Comment on Romans vii," says, "Some persons receive the three verbs here rendered to do,' in the acceptation, to lust:' But that is not St. Paul's mode of speaking: He understands by the word, the deed itself which is actually committed at the impulse of the conscience, in opposition to that which the law dictates, and which the mind, consenting to that law, approves. Concupitio, to lust' or desire, is in reality an internal act of concupiscence in the mind which indulges in such concupiscence: But these verbs, to do,' in this chapter do not signify an internal act of lusting, but, properly, the external act of doing those things which have been lusted or desired." (Fol. 369.)

SECONDLY." Sin is said to do this evil, and, by the perpetration of the evil, to slay the man himself." Sin does not slay him through concupiscence. St. James speaks thus: "Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, [or completed by action,] bringeth forth death." (i, 15.) But it slays the man through actual sin: This is declared by the apostle in the 5th verse of this very chapter, when he says, "For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” I am now speaking, not according to the rigour of the law, but according to the grace of the Gospel in Jesus Christ.

THIRDLY. The Evil and the Good, the former of which, he says, he perpetrates, but the latter he omits, are so opposed to each other, that EVIL is what is forbidden by a prohibitive law, which law is usually proposed by a negative; but Good is what is commanded by a preceptive law, which is usually propounded by an affirmative. A sin is perpetrated against a prohibitive law by commission, but against a preceptive law by omission: On this account they are called sins of omission and of commission. If a prohibitive law be observed, Evil is said to be omitted; but if a preceptive law be observed, Good is said to be performed.

Now, to lust, and not to lust, are not thus opposed to each other For though to lust be forbidden by a prohibitive law, yet not to lust is not commanded by a preceptive law: Neither can it be commanded by such a law; for not to lust consists of a negative or the omission of an act,-but by omission an offence is committed VOL. II. X x