Night, but where tis ever Light and Day, and where Truth fhines pure and without a Cloud. A World Simple in its Variety, and Various in its Simplicity, Infinite in its ftore and fullness, and ftored with incorruptible and unfading Treasures, univerfal in its Prefence, and uncircumfcribed by any limit of Time or Place. the genuin Country of Truth, and its proper native Soil, the Place of Spirits, the Living and ever Springing Fountain of Intelligence, and the great Academy of all Arts and Sciences. Where those folid Realities, and Substantial Entities perpetually Flourish and Shine, whereof we have here only the Faint Reflections, and in Comparison of which this Material World is but a Phantom or a Shadow. Where all is Youth and Pleasure, Life and Joy, Effence and Flower, where Happy Spirits Drink of the Wine that Wisdom it felf has Mingled, and are Fed with Immortal Truth. Whofo is Simple, let him turn in hither, Prov. 9.

10. But tho' very great and glorious Things may be Spoken of thee, O thou City of God! yet how little art thou known, and how much less art thou in the Thoughts and Minds of Men! Plunged as they are in a Life of Senfe they are Ignorant of thee, Thou firft and only Intelligible, and Immers'd as they are in a Body of Flesh, they feldom think of thee who art all Spirit and Truth, and that tho' thou Shineft into their very Eyes, and they See continually by thy Light. Thou makeft their Day, and thou thy felf art the only thing

that

that is not Seen by it. They take the Shadows of this Natural World for moft Real and Solid things, and thy moft Subftantial Realities they look upon as Shadows and Vifionary Chimera's, and all Difcourfe about thee, (tho' never fo Rational) as but extravagant and delirous Talking, or at best but as National Romancing, pure Metaphyfical Reverie, a Subtilifing upon a fine nothing. They are indeed United to thee by their Souls, but by their Bodies to this Senfible World, and as their Bodies are to them their principal Selves, this latter Alliance makes them Infenfible of the Former. Thou art nearer to them than this World is, nay than their very Bodies are, and yet they are far Distant from thee, meer Aliens to thee, and fo utterly Infenfible of thee, that they will hardly beleive that thou art. If any mention be made of thy Name the amazed Vulgar Stare, and the Learned gravely Smile, and if the Difcourse be any whit long, they Sleep. But if they continue Awake, they Sleep however to thee. Tho they were Caft in thy Mould, and Form'd upon thy Model, yet (ungrateful Stupidity) they feldom or never mind their Original, nor look up to the Rock from whence they were Hewn. But had Men but one clear and diftin&t View of thy Rich Intellectual Scene, could we but Draw the Curtain of our Mortality fo far, as but once to see thee as thou art, we fhould be fo Tranfported and Ravifh'd with thy Divine. Beauty, fo Enamour'd of thy glorious Syftem, all Shining with the very Effence of Being, and

full

full of Grace and Truth, that we should lofe not only all Value for this Senfible World, but even Senfe it felf too, and pass along in the croud and throng of Creatures without any notice or perception of them, all fix'd and intent upon thy more ingaging Views, not minding the Bodies we fee, nor feeling those we touch. We fhould in a manner be Dead to this Senfible World, and Alive only to thee.

II. This great Intellectual Syftem is by fome term'd the Ideal, by fome the Intelligible, and by fome the Archetypal World, which are but fo many relative Appellations for the fame thing, to diftinguish it according to fo many different refpects it carries to the Syftem of Created Beings, which accordingly is fometimes call'd the Natural, fometimes the Senfible, and sometimes the Ectypal World. It ought to be farther obferv'd here, that when we fay the Intelligible World, the meaning is not as if it did exift only in our Conception, and had no real being out of it, after the manner of an Ens Rationis, but tis therefore fo call'd, partly because tis the first and only proper Intelligible, the fole and immediate object of all our Intellectual Views, and that which exa&ly Speaking is the very thing we alwaies understand and Reason about. And partly because tis a Word of a nature purely Spiritual and Intellectual, and fuch as is not Senfible, but Intelligible only, And partly again becaufe tis a World of a conceivable Being and Existence, and fuch indeed as we cannot but conceive to be, not Subjected indeed

to

to the perufal and examination of our Bodily Senfes, but as certain and as really and truly prefent to our Understanding, as this Natural World is to our Senfe. But chiefly is it fo call'd because it is the Idea of this Senfible World, as being truly reprefentative and expreffive of it to the Understanding. For the Idea of a thing is Intelligibly that thing, and as the Idea of a Circle is call'd an Intelligible Circle, or the Idea of a Square an Intelligible Square, because they exprefs these things to our Thoughts, fo in like manner the Idea of the World, or if you will, thofe Ideas which anfwer to the feveral beings whereof it confifts, may very reasonably and fitly be call'd the Intelligible World. Of the real existence of which the, following Account is to give Satisfaction.

12. In the mean while I have only one Remark to interpofe, which is, that this DiftinЄtion of a twofold World or state of things,Senfible, and Intelligible is very Antient, and is even under thefe very terms (not to mention remoter hints and intimations) formally and exprefly taken notice of by St Austin, as held and maintained by Plato. Sat eft enim ad id quod volo, Platonem fen- Lib. 3. Ch. 17. fiffe duos effe mundos, unum Intelli

Contra Academ.

gibilem, in quo ipfa veritas habitaret, iftum autem Senfibilem, quem Manifeftum eft nos vifu tactuq; fentire. Itaq; illum verum, hunc verifimilem, & ad illius imaginem factum. As alfo by Plotinus before him in as formal and exprefs terms, who befides abundance of paffages relating to this

mat

matter,

Ennead. 4. Lib. 9. Chap. 7.

for 'tis the very burthen of his Philofophy) makes diftinct mention of a twofold Nature, one Senfible and the other Intelligible. Dins de púσεως ταύτης ἔσης, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰπητῆς, &c. which Diftinction is alfo frequently inculcated by Philo in his Cofmopoea. This I thought Convenient in the entrance to touch upon, for the prevention of Prejudice, that might otherwife arife against the Subject of our Theory as a modern Fancy, by the removal of which the Minds of fome Readers (with whom the Imputation of Novelty is an invincible objection against the moft rational Propofal) may be the better difpofed for the Confideration of the following Argument, fo as not either fupercilioufly to lay it aside, or to come to it as a Metaphyfical Novel or Romance.

С НА Р. II.

The Reality of the Distinction juftifid, by fhewing that this is not the only State of things, but that they have an Ideal as well as a Natural State.

Here are fome things whereof Men have Naturally, that is, I mean by the ordinary use of their rational Faculties, a Confuse Notion and Conception, and if let alone to themselves do in great measure affent to, as be