of them, and fo establish'd the Order of Generati on. But the Bleffing of Increase and Multiply would have had but a very wild, confuse and indeterminate Effect, if the Rule and the Hand had not ftill gon on together, and the Fecundity of his Will, had not been regulated by the Ideality of his Wifdom. Tho' then the Work of the Creation be long fince concluded in a Sabbath of Reft, yet our Ideas muft not be laid afide. No, tho' their Effects were tranfient, their Ufe and Neceffity is perfevering, and Nature can no more proceed than The could begin without them, fince to continue the fame Species of Things fhe must be conducted by the fame Rule. It is therefore by these Ideal Measures that the great Agent proceeds in the Perpetuation and Multiplication of his Creatures, according to their feveral Kinds, and fince these Ideas have a Real Identity with the Eternal Word, all things by him may be faid to be Generated as well as Made, and in this Senfe also that saying of his will be found to be true, My Father worketh bitherto, and I work, John 5. 17.

24. Only in perfuance of the Principles before laid down. I muft here Remark, that there is this one very confiderable difference between the manner of working Now, and in the firft Production of Things. Then God acted by Particular Wills, and because his Will was equal to his Wisdom, the Divine Originals were copied with Exactness, Things were form'd moft feverely according to their Ideas, and accordingly every thing was very Good and perfect in its Kind, and there was no Monster to be feen at the opening of this First Scene of Nature. But now in the Adminiftration of the World

World (the Wisdom and Order of his Conduct fo requiring) God proceeds by General and Stated Laws of Motion, and thofe exceeding few and fimple, which is the occafion of those little Aberrations which fometimes happen in the courfe of Generation, when the Wheel of Nature gives us a jogg by stepping a little out of the Tract, and fince we will not admire the Regularity of her Ordinary Procedure, tries to amuse and ftir up our Wonder by Irregular. Births. And thefe we Criticks are pleas'd to fet down for Erratas, and to mark out as Defects and Faults in Nature, and fo indeed they are fimply confider'd and with relation to Ideal Standards, from which they are real Deficiencies,but not when confider'd and compared with the Generality and great Simplicity of those Laws of Motion by which they are produced. It be ing better,and more befitting the Wife Order of the Divine Conduct, that the Hand of Nature should proceed as it does, fo as not always to hit thofe Marks of Ideal Perfection which it aims at (with fo great a Simplicity of Administration) than to have Eher Works fomewhat more Correct in a more ope rofe Method, and by the Establishment of more O Laws of Motion purposely provided for that End. 25. But then upon this Suppofition these occa fional Monftrofities, or Irregularities in Nature are no Argument against Ideas, or the Formation of 5 Things by them, as was difcours'd before, fince this comes to pass by reason of the different Con duct in the after Adminiftration from what was ufed in the Creation of the World. But to this I now farther add, that they are fo far from being Arguments against the Ideal Formation of Things, that on the contrary they are moit CoU 2

gent

Metap. Tom. I. Difput. 23. Sect. 10. Num. 11.

gent Arguments for it, and are themselves utterly Unaccountable, I may fay Impoffible without it. For all Irregularity fuppofes a Rule, and if there were no Ideas, upon which Things were form'd, and by which their Perfection is to be measured, there is no Intelligible Reason to be affign'd why any one thing should be accounted Monftrous, Irregular, or deform'd rather than another. And accordingly from the like Confideration or ObjeЄtion rather, of Natural Agents fometimes failing of their End, Suarez draws a like Argument for their acting for an End. For, fays he, As Art intending an End, fometimes does not attain it, fo in the Actions of Nature from their intending a certain End follow Monsters, or Defects of Nature, because they cannot always attain their End by reafon of fome intervening Impediment. Otherwife if Nature did not tend to or aim at a certain End, there would be no Monsters in Nature, because she would not more Swerve from her Scope in producing a Monfter than in producing any thing else. For a Monster is properly a Defect in Nature coming short of her End. But then as to the Objection taken from the Intention of the Author of Nature, viz. that if Natural Agents did act by a Divine Intention, they would never err in their Actions, nor fail of attaining their Ends, this he fays fignifies nothing, because that Intention is not always Abfolute and Efficacious, or in the Language of Divinity, by a Will of Beneplaciture, or a confequent Will, but by a general or antecedent Will, which is as it were a Conditional Intention, confifting in this, that God will have a perfect Effect to follow, as far as it shall

be

be able to follow according to the Order of Natural Causes, with which no Neceffary Concurrence on his part fhall be wanting. Now 'tis but mutatis mutandis to apply this Account (which indeed is most worthy of its Judicious Author) to the Hypothefis of the Formation of things by Ideas, and it will give the fame Satisfaction in this Cafe as in the other. For the Locks have the fame Wards, and therefore the fame Key will open both.

SECT. IV.

Wherein is Confider'd how the Divine Ideas confift with the Simplicity, Immateriality, and Infinity of the Divine Nature.

1.

TH

HE Truth and Neceffity of these Attributes is fo Unquestionably certain in the Nature of that Glorious and Adorable Being which we call God, that there needs no other Evidence of the Falfhood of any Hypothefis how rational foever and well adjufted it may otherwife appear, than the Repugnance which it fhall be convinc'd to carry in it to all or any of these Attributes. And therefore it is neceffary to acquit our Theory of Ideas from that Inconvenience which on this fide it may seem to lie open to, and which alone would be fufficient utterly to Silence and Overthrow it. And fince it is fo Neceffary, 'tis no lit tle Satisfaction to me to find it foTM Feasible.

1

V 3

1

2. And

*Compofitio ni hil aliud eft quam

realis unio rerum diftin&tarum. Suarez Metap. Difput. 34. Sect. 4. Num.

20,

*

2. And first as to the Simplicity of God, to which it must be allow'd that his Ideality feems at the firft Salutation to threaten fome Õpposition, as indeed what does not, that imports any thing of Plurality or Diftinction. But 'tis not all Plurality or Diftinction, that is inconfiftent with Simplicity (for then the Divine Attributes, nay even Perfonality it felf must come under the fame Cenfure) but only fuch as implies a real Diversity of component Parts. For indeed nothing is contrary to Simplicity, but Compofition, which imports real Multitude, and indeed is nothing else but the Union of Things together really different and diftinct from one another. But now it is not thus in the Divine Ideas, which according to the fore-ftated Account of them are neither Things nor Modes really distinct from the Divine Nature, but the very fame Divine Nature it felf, as 'tis varioufly imitable or Participable ad extra, according to fuch or fuch intelligible Degrees of Being or Perfection. Indeed fhould we put any thing in God that was not God, or ftate his Ideas as Vorftius is faid to do his Decrees, by fuppofing them to be really diftinct from him, this I confefs by the common consent of the Metaphyfical School would be to intrench upon his Simplicity. But fuppofing, as we do, that the Ideas in God are in Reality no other than the very Effence of God himself as it relates to Things out of himself, 'tis plain that this will no more infer any real Compofition in the Divine Nature, than that of St. John concerning him, to whofe Character we fuppose these Ideas

to